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Introduction and Summary
The recent economic and nancial crisis brought the government to the center of
the policy debate. In fact, many industrialized countries raised government expen-
ditures in an attempt to stimulate economic activity. In most cases, governments
prioritized investment in public infrastructure. Implicit in this choice is the belief
that public investment not only stimulates aggregate demand in the short run
but also expands the public capital stock, which generates positive supply-side
spillovers to the private sector in the medium to long run. The dynamic eects of
public investment on private sector output (and other macroeconomic variables)
depend on how it aects the productivity of private capital relative to the produc-
tivity of labor. On the other hand, an increase in public expenditures requires a
shift of resources from the private sector to the public sector, which aects both
households' allocation of time between labor and leisure and households' alloca-
tion of disposable income between consumption and saving. Ultimately, changes
in labor supply and private saving aect the real wage and the real interest rate,
which in turn inuence the levels of employment and private investment.
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the dynamic macroeconomic eects
of scal policy, with a special focus on the role of public infrastructure investment.
To this end, Chapters 3 and 4 build a micro-founded macroeconomic model of a
small open economy. When assuming a small open economy, we have in mind
European Union member states. This assumption allows us to analyze the eect
of public investment on the inow of foreign portfolio capital and, consequently, on
the stock of foreign debt. Additionally, it greatly simplies the analysis by allowing
to treat the interest rate as exogenously given. Both chapters focus on the supply-
side eects of public investment. In Chapter 5, we turn to empirically investigating2 Introduction and Summary | Chapter 1
the long-term real interest rate eects of scal policy. Therefore, this chapter
abandons the assumption of a small open economy facing an exogenously given rate
of interest and considers instead a large economy (i.e., the United States), in which
the interest rate is domestically determined. Also, compared to Chapters 3 and
4, Chapter 5 shifts the focus to the short-run eects of scal policy by developing
a model that relates short-run interest rate changes to unexpected scal policy
shocks. This distinction between expected and unexpected scal policy changes is
empirically relevant in view of the quick reaction of interest rates to scal policy
announcements.
The direct eect of public capital on output of the private sector is governed by
the output elasticity of public capital, which plays a crucial role in macroeconomic
models of public investment. For purposes of numerical analysis and policy evalu-
ation of the macroeconomic eects of public investment, a precise measure of this
parameter is required. Building on Aschauer (1989a), a fairly large body of empir-
ical literature has focused on estimating the output elasticity of public capital by
means of the so-called production function approach. Very little consensus on its
size (and even sign) has emerged, however. Indeed, available estimates range from
highly negative to strongly positive, with many statistically insignicant measure-
ments falling in between. Chapter 2 of this dissertation quantitatively summarizes
this literature using a sample of 578 estimates collected from 68 studies. The ob-
jective of the analysis is to nd the average output elasticity of public capital and
uncover the determinants of excess variation around this value. We nd that the
`true' elasticity is not homogeneous. Larger output elasticities are found in the
long run, for core (rather than total) public capital and for public capital provided
at a regional (rather than national) level of government. We also show that some
study design characteristics|such as correction for endogeneity bias and control
for spillover eects|explain part of the variation across estimates.
Chapter 3 studies analytically the dynamic macroeconomic eects of public
infrastructure investment in a small open economy. We focus on the technology
role of public investment by comparing Hicks-neutral, Harrod-neutral (i.e., labor-
augmenting), and Solow-neutral (i.e., capital-augmenting) public capital. To this
end, we specify a general constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
function, which allows for non-unitary elasticities of substitution between private
capital and labor. We embed this production structure into the overlapping gener-
ations framework of Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985)|in which households are
nitely lived|extended to include a labor-leisure choice. The model is simulated3
using plausible parameters taken from the literature on open economy models and
from data for small open industrialized countries. We show that a permanent pub-
lic investment impulse nanced by lump-sum taxes crowds out private investment
in both the short and the long run for the empirically plausible case of Solow-
neutrality and low substitutability between private production factors. Because
of the resulting lower steady-state stock of private capital, the long-run output
multiplier is substantially smaller than in the standard case of a Hicks-neutral
Cobb-Douglas technology. In addition, an increase in public investment improves
both short-run and long-run welfare for a plausibly-sized public capital externality,
despite the short-run output contraction.
Chapter 4 also studies the dynamic macroeconomic eects of public invest-
ment in a small open economy. However, the focus of this chapter is shifted
away from the production technology to the macroeconomic implications of (dis-
tortionary) labor tax nancing. In practice, governments do not have access to
(non-distortionary) lump-sum taxes. Moreover, the recent sovereign debt crisis
has severely limited the room for public debt nancing in many OECD (especially
European) economies. In August 2011, the political leaders of France and Ger-
many called for constitutional amendments requiring eurozone nations to maintain
a balanced budget. In this context, an increase in government spending must be
nanced by higher distortionary taxes, of which labor income taxes are an impor-
tant component in industrialized countries. Therefore, a public investment impulse
may generate not only a positive externality on private sector production, but its
funding also distorts the labor market. We show that, for plausible parameter
values, the interaction of nite life spans, the wealth eect on labor supply and
the balanced budget scal rule gives rise to cyclical dynamic responses of output
and other variables to the public investment impulse. Public investment expands
output in the long run, although at the cost of an even larger short-run contrac-
tion. Our numerical results suggest that, for an output elasticity of public capital
of 0.08, the second-best optimal public investment ratio should be about 6 percent
of GDP, which is far above the ratios currently observed for OECD countries.
Finally, Chapter 5 empirically investigates the eects of unexpected temporary
changes in government consumption, public investment, and taxes on long-term
interest rates in a large economy. The conventional belief is that scal expansions
(contractions) raise (lower) interest rates. The Ricardian equivalence theorem,
in contrast, posits that only unexpected temporary government spending shocks
matter; the timing of (lump-sum) taxes is immaterial. The empirical literature4 Introduction and Summary | Chapter 1
has provided extremely mixed results. This chapter argues that the relationship
between scal policy and interest rates is nonlinear. Using Markov-switching mod-
els on quarterly U.S. data (1960:1-2008:4), we show that, while the eects of scal
policy shocks are in accordance with the conventional view at times of low/declin-
ing level of public debt, these eects can be reversed at times of high/rising public
debt. The reason is that a high stock of public debt makes households expect
a high level of future taxes. If taxes are distortionary, a scal expansion lowers
households' lifetime income. Because households respond by strongly cutting on
private consumption, the increase in private saving more than compensates the
decrease in public saving, causing a decrease in the real interest rate. We show
that failing to isolate these periods of `unconventional' interest rate eects leads
to the misleading conclusion that the Ricardian equivalence holds. Also, we show
that public investment and government consumption often exert opposite eects
on interest rates.
From a macroeconomic policy viewpoint, the results of this dissertation sug-
gest that public investment is an important instrument for improving long-run
macroeconomic performance and welfare in OECD economies. Based on the pro-
duction function approach, the meta-estimates of the output elasticity of public
capital imply marginal returns to public investment (especially in core public cap-
ital installed at lower levels of government) that exceed the marginal user cost of
public capital. However, in small open economies, increasing public investment
may crowd-out private capital formation, if public capital is private capital aug-
menting and the degree of substitutability between private capital and labor is
low. Moreover, countries that have little room for debt-nancing may need to
nance public investment by raising labor taxes, which distorts the labor market.
However, even if countries have to resort to distortionary taxation, we show that
the optimal (welfare maximizing) public investment ratio is well above the actual
ratios in OECD economies. Therefore, from a welfare perspective, more public
investment is desirable. Additionally, it is shown that, in closed (or large open)
economies, scal policy changes aect long-term interest rates, albeit in a nonlin-
ear manner. In particular, the timing of taxes matters, which is at odds with the
predictions of the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. More generally, this result
suggests that the power of the government to inuence aggregate demand is larger
than what the supporters of such hypothesis advocate.5
The chapters of this dissertation are based on the following research papers:
 Chapter 2: Bom, P. R. D., and J. E. Ligthart (2008): \How Productive
is Public Capital? A Meta-Analysis," CESifo Working Paper No. 2206,
CESifo, Munich.
 Chapter 3: Bom, P. R. D., B. J. Heijdra, and J. E. Ligthart (2010): \Output
Dynamics, Technology, and Public Investment," CentER Discussion Paper
No. 10-58, Tilburg University, Tilburg.
 Chapter 4: Bom, P. R. D., and J. E. Ligthart (2011): \Public Infrastructure
Investment, Output Dynamics, and Balanced Budget Fiscal Rules," CentER
Discussion Paper No. 11-92, Tilburg University, Tilburg.
 Chapter 5: Bom, P. R. D. (2010): \Unconventional Eects of Fiscal Policy
on Long-Term Interest Rates," mimeo, Tilburg University, Tilburg.Chapter 2
The Output Elasticity of Public
Capital: A Meta-Analysis
Abstract: The last three decades have witnessed a great deal of research eort
devoted to measuring the private output elasticity of public capital. However, the
wide range of available estimates precluded any consensus so far. This chapter
reconciles the empirical ndings of the literature by quantitatively analyzing a
sample of 578 estimates collected from 68 studies for the 1983{2008 period. Using
meta-regression analysis, we nd an average output elasticity of public capital of
0.082. We show that a large fraction of the variation across estimates is explained
by study design characteristics, publication bias, and, most important, true eect
heterogeneity. In addition, we nd a short-run output elasticity of public capital
supplied at the central government level of 0.051. This estimate is roughly doubled
if primary studies only consider core public capital installed at a regional/local
level of government and is about three times larger in the long run. Our results
suggest that core public capital is undersupplied in OECD economies.8 The Output Elasticity of Public Capital: A Meta-Analysis | Chapter 2
2.1 Introduction
What is the quantitative eect of public capital1 on private output? Providing
a solid answer to this question is of vital importance to policymakers as well as
macroeconomic researchers. In the policy arena, the debate on the productivity
of public capital has ared up globally following the recent world economic and
nancial crisis. Most industrialized countries have adopted scal stimulus mea-
sures to address the economic crisis. Specically, three-quarters of G-20 countries
have increased public spending on infrastructure, predominantly on transportation
networks (IMF, 2009). On the research side, many endogenous growth models2
and structural macroeconomic and regional general equilibrium models feature the
output elasticity of public capital as a fundamental parameter; knowledge of its
exact magnitude is thus required to numerically analyze the eects of scal policy
shocks.
The literature has devoted a great deal of eort to measuring the output elas-
ticity of public capital by estimating a production function that includes public
capital as an input.3 Aschauer (1989a,b, 1990) uses this approach in an attempt
to explain the productivity growth slowdown in the United States in the 1970s.4
Indeed, in the United States and various OECD countries, investments in the
public capital stock fell and aggregate labor productivity growth declined slightly
later. Aschauer (1989a) found that a 1 percent increase in the public capital stock
increased private output by 0.39 percent, suggesting that public capital is an im-
portant determinant of output. Since then, many studies have been undertaken
for the United States and various other OECD countries. More recently, attention
has also been focused on the productivity eects of public capital in developing
countries (e.g., Ram, 1996).
Despite all these measuring eorts, remarkably little consensus has emerged in
the literature. Indeed, the output elasticity of public capital diers substantially
1Public capital is generally dened as the tangible capital stock owned by the public sector
excluding military structures and equipment. See Section 2.2.2.1 for a further discussion.
2This strand of the literature builds on the theoretical contributions of Barro (1990) and
Glomm and Ravikumar (1994, 1997).
3See the literature reviews by Munnell (1991, 1992), Gramlich (1994), Pfahler, Hofmann, and
Bonte (1996), Button (1998), Sturm, Kuper, and De Haan (1998), Button and Rietveld (2000),
Mikelbank and Jackson (2000), IMF (2004), and Romp and De Haan (2007).
4Mera (1973) was the rst to estimate a production function including some form of public
capital, which he refers to as `social capital,' for nine Japanese regions. This work was followed
by Ratner (1983), Da Costa, Ellson, and Martin (1987), and Aschauer (1989a). The latter is the
seminal paper in the eld.Section 2.1 | Introduction 9
across studies, ranging from ￿1:7 for New Zealand to 2:04 for Australia (see Fig-
ure 2.1 below). In between these extremes, a nonnegligible share of the reported
estimates are statistically not dierent from zero. Although the majority of es-
timates are positive and cluster within a smaller range of values, it is virtually
impossible to get an idea of the size of the output elasticity of public capital by
glancing through the literature. The rst objective of this chapter is therefore
to quantify the contribution of public capital to private sector production. Our
analysis shows, however, that there is no unique `true' output elasticity of public
capital. Estimates of the output elasticity of public capital dier across studies,
not only because studies employ dierent data and econometric methods but also
because the population eect is itself heterogeneous. Hence, the second objec-
tive of the chapter is to identify the sources of heterogeneity and study design
characteristics underlying the large variation of reported estimates. To this end,
we apply meta-analytical techniques to a sample of primary studies. Drawing on
Stanley and Jarrell (1989) and Stanley (2001), meta-analysis|broadly dened to
include meta-regression analysis|can be dened as a body of statistical methods
to summarize, evaluate, and analyze empirical results across studies; it presents a
systematic and objective way to explain and control for the study-to-study varia-
tion.5 Our study is the rst to conduct a systematic meta-regression analysis to
quantify the output elasticity of public capital.6
We focus on studies using the so-called production function approach, which
includes the stock of public (infrastructure) capital as an additional input in the
production function. Although other approaches exist, we focus on the production
function approach because it yields a comparable measure of the eect size of
interest.7 The meta-sample consists of 578 estimates of the output elasticity of
public capital collected from 68 primary studies, spanning the 1983{2008 period.
We develop a meta-regression model to estimate the average output elasticity
of public capital and identify the sources of variation across estimates. Because
5Meta-analysis has not been applied much in the public nance eld. Notable exceptions are,
amongst others, De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) and Nijkamp and Poot (2004).
6The studies by Button (1998) and Ligthart and Su arez (2011) also try to quantitatively
summarize the literature on the output elasticity of public capital. However, they do not make
use of meta-regression analysis (see below for a further discussion), but instead employ standard
regression analysis. In addition, their analyses are rather incomplete in the coverage of the
empirical literature (e.g., Button's (1998) study consists of 26 data points) and modeling of
observed heterogeneity.
7See Sturm et al. (1998) for an overview of other approaches to estimating the output
elasticity of public capital.10 The Output Elasticity of Public Capital: A Meta-Analysis | Chapter 2
primary studies use samples of dierent sizes, the resulting estimates dier in
terms of precision. To maximize the estimation eciency of the meta-regression
model, larger weights should be assigned to more precise estimates. Therefore,
we estimate the meta-regression model using weighted least squares (WLS). We
consider both xed and random eects models.8 However, because unobserved
heterogeneity across observations in the meta-sample is statistically nonnegligible,
the latter is preferred.
When estimating the average output elasticity of public capital, it is important
to bear in mind that researchers/editors are more likely to report/publish statis-
tically signicant results than insignicant ones. As a result, the meta-sample
may not be representative of the true population of estimates. This so-called pub-
lication bias is widely recognized to inate the size of the estimated coecients
available to the meta-analyst. Indeed, estimates obtained from small samples tend
to have large standard errors. Because, in this case, only large (in absolute value)
estimates are statistically signicant, the meta-sample is biased toward large val-
ues. Fortunately, meta-analytical techniques enable us to lter out publication
bias by eliminating the correlation between estimates and standard errors (see
Stanley, 2005). The meta-analysis literature typically assumes publication bias to
be unidirectional. In our case, however, measurements take on both positive and
negative values, suggesting that publication bias can go in both directions. For
this reason, we extend the meta-regression model to allow bidirectional publication
bias.
After correcting for publication bias, we nd an unconditional (average) output
elasticity of public capital of 0.082. The true output elasticity is rather heteroge-
neous, however. In the short run, the output elasticity of public capital installed
at the central level of government is only 0.051. This value is larger if primary
studies consider: (i) public capital installed by regional/local governments; (ii)
core public capital (i.e., roads, railways, airports, and utilities); and (iii) a long-
run horizon. Conditional on these three dimensions, the output elasticity of public
capital rises to 0.173. This estimate is only half the size of those found by Aschauer
(1989a) and other early time-series studies, however. Because these studies make
use of nonstationary data without properly testing for cointegration, our results
suggest that their estimates are likely to be spurious. Moreover, we nd that other
study design characteristics|such as model specication, denition of variables,
8The meaning of the adjectives xed and random in the meta-analysis literature diers from
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and correction for endogeneity and spillover eects|explain part of the variation
across estimates.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the
production function approach and discusses the key methodological issues that are
raised in this literature. Section 2.3 describes the meta-sample and analyzes publi-
cation bias informally. Section 2.4 sets out the meta-regression model. Section 2.5
discusses the meta-regression results. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.
2.2 The Production Function Approach
Following the work of Aschauer (1989a), the production function approach is the
most widely used in measuring the output elasticity of public capital. This section
describes the empirical methodology underlying the production function approach.
In addition, it discusses the main methodological issues raised in the empirical
literature. The latter serves as input into dening the explanatory variables used
in the meta-regression analysis of Sections 2.4 and 2.5.
2.2.1 The Empirical Model
The corner stone of the production function approach is a technological relation-
ship that incorporates the stock of public capital of region/country i at time t
(denoted by Git) as an additional input:
Yit ￿ AitF pKit;Lit;Gitq; (2.1)
where Yit is aggregate private sector output of region/country i at time t, Ait is
an index of (Hicks-neutral) factor productivity,9 Kit denotes the stock of (non-
residential) private xed capital, and Lit denotes employment (typically measured
by total hours worked). In this setup, an increase in public capital may aect
output directly (i.e., BYit{BGit ¡ 0), but also indirectly through its eect on the





An example of an indirect eect is the `crowding in' or `crowding out' of private
investment by public investment.10 The general idea of the production function
9Note that the technology index may potentially depend on Git (cf. Duggal, Saltzman, and
Klein, 1999). In the context of a Cobb-Douglas production function (which is most commonly
used, see below), it does not make a dierence whether public capital is treated as a third input
or as a factor aecting the technology index.
10The sign of the relationship between public capital and private capital productivity is not a
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approach is that the services of public capital|which are hypothesized to boost
private output|are proportional to the stock of public capital, which is usually
assumed to be a pure public good. Note that the production function approach is
partial in nature; for example, the nancing method of public investment is not
taken into account.
For empirical purposes, a specic functional form of (2.1) is chosen. The Cobb-







it; 0 ￿ ; ￿ 1: (2.2)






Yit , which is typically hypothesized to be positive.11 The denition
of  assumes that all other inputs and technology are held constant; any indirect
eects of public capital on output therefore cannot be measured. Note that the
Cobb-Douglas functional form imposes a unitary elasticity of substitution between
factors of production, which is relaxed by more exible functional forms like the
translog.12 In addition, technological progress in (2.2) is always of the Hicks-
neutral type, that is, technology contributes equally to the productivity of all
factors.
To arrive at an equation that can be estimated by linear methods, we take
natural logarithms on both sides of (2.2). Subsequently, we assume that lnAit ￿
a0￿t￿i￿"it, where a0 denotes a constant, t is a time-specic eect (represent-
ing shocks common to all units, for example, technological progress), i denotes
an unobserved unit-specic xed eect (e.g., the eect of climate or geographical
location on productivity), and "it is a stochastic technology shock. In its most
basic form, the regression equation is
lnYit ￿ a0 ￿ t ￿ i ￿ lnKit ￿  lnLit ￿ lnGit ￿ "it: (2.3)
The basic model has been extended in several directions. Some studies (e.g.,
Boarnet, 1998) account for interregional spillover eects of public capital by incor-
porating the capital stock of neighboring jurisdictions. Besides the basic factors
of production, some studies add further controls (e.g., the business cycle, energy
11Traditional growth theory typically assumes diminishing returns with respect to reproducible
factor inputs by imposing the restriction  ￿  ￿ 1.
12The transcendental logarithmic (translog) production function includes quadratic and inter-
action terms for each input, giving rise to a non-unique output elasticity of public capital. Early
adopters of the translog specication are, amongst others, Merriman (1990), Pinnoi (1994), and
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prices, or education). Taking these extensions into consideration|which will be
further discussed in Section 2.2.2|yields (2.3) in comprehensive form:
lnYit ￿ a0 ￿ t ￿ i ￿ lnKit ￿  lnLit ￿ lnGit ￿ #ln ~ Git ￿ 
1Zit ￿ it; (2.4)
where ~ Git represents (a weighted average of) public capital of neighboring regions,
# is a parameter measuring the interregional spillover eects of public capital,
Zit is vector of additional control variables,  is the vector of coecients of the
additional control variables, and it is an error term. Note that some studies
split total public capital into several components (see below), in which case Git
and |written here as scalars, for simplicity|represent vectors of public capital
components and their output elasticities, respectively. As will be demonstrated
below, most studies estimate a special case of (2.4).
In estimating , authors have employed time-series, cross-section, and panel
data models. The time-series approach xes i for one jurisdiction (typically a
country) and exploits the time variation; t is either replaced by a linear time trend
(i.e., t ￿ t) or is simply not included. The seminal work of Aschauer (1989a)
analyzes time-series data and sets t ￿ t and # ￿  ￿ 0. Cross-section studies
keep t xed and exploit the variation across jurisdictions (typically states/regions;
e.g., Da Costa et al., 1987). In this context, i cannot be estimated. Finally, panel
data models (featuring both i and t) are employed either at the regional level
for a single country or at the country level for country groupings. In the panel
context, some studies treat the unobserved unit-specic eect (i) as xed eects
(e.g., Evans and Karras, 1994a) or as random eects (e.g., Andrews and Swanson,
1995). Alternatively, various authors use pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) so
that i is simply ignored. A few studies (e.g., Boarnet, 1998) exclude i by long
dierencing the data.
2.2.2 Key Issues in the Literature
This section provides an overview of key issues in the literature on the production
function approach, which yields a number of hypotheses on study characteristics
that will be tested in Section 2.5.14 The Output Elasticity of Public Capital: A Meta-Analysis | Chapter 2
2.2.2.1 Dening Public Capital and Output
The Introduction provided a very general denition of public capital, which em-
phasized the government's ownership role and the stock nature of the capital.13
More specically, public capital consists of core infrastructure, hospitals, educa-
tional buildings, and other public buildings.14 Core infrastructure is generally
perceived to be more productive than other types of public capital, such as ed-
ucational and oce buildings and hospitals. Indeed, studies employing a broad
denition of public capital (which necessarily includes less productive components)
typically nd a lower output elasticity of public capital than studies focusing on
core infrastructure only. Mas et al. (1994), for example, disaggregate public capi-
tal in core and non-core components. Sturm and De Haan (1995) include various
subcomponents of public capital into the equation all at once [see (2.4)] as well
as one at a time. Some studies focus on transportation infrastructure only (e.g.,
Garcia-Mil a and McGuire, 1992), which is a subcomponent of core infrastructure.
In countries with a scally decentralized government structure (e.g., the United
States), dierent layers of government may be involved in the provision of pub-
lic capital. Consequently, authors studying federal countries have consolidated
their public capital stock data to diering degrees. The majority of studies em-
ploy public capital stocks dened at the national level including public capital
provision at all levels of government (e.g., Aschauer, 1989a), whereas others deal
with capital stocks estimated for regions based on consolidated regional data (e.g.,
Garcia-Mil a and McGuire, 1992). Some studies only consider capital that is owned
by local/regional governments (e.g., Evans and Karras, 1994a), and thus do not
take into account regionally installed capital owned by the federal/central govern-
ment. Because lower levels of government can better target spending on public
investment, it is plausible that output elasticities are larger for this type of public
capital. We test this hypothesis in Section 2.5.
The output measure used as dependent variable varies across studies. Most
studies use real gross output of the private sector (e.g., Ratner, 1983) or real Gross
13Statistics on the public capital stock are not readily available. To arrive at an estimate
of the public capital stock, researchers determine an initial value of the capital stock to which
they add gross investment ows and subtract technical depreciation of the existing capital stock
(based on the expected life spans of its components). See Sturm and De Haan (1995) for further
details on this so-called perpetual inventory method.
14Some authors use a very broad denition of public capital by also including health and
welfare facilities (e.g., Mera, 1973). The latter components are hard to measure, explaining why
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Domestic Product (GDP) exclusive of public sector output (e.g., Finn, 1993),
where the former does not include taxes and subsidies on products.15 Private
output may also be dened according to the economic sector where it is generated.
Da Costa et al. (1987), for instance, report estimates for the manufacturing and
non-agricultural sectors together with an estimate for all sectors. When the data
are at the state level for the United States, real Gross State Product (GSP) is
employed. Although the literature primarily deals with measuring the contribution
of public capital to private output, some studies nevertheless employ a measure of
total output (including public sector production). The latter is typically the case
of studies using data for emerging markets or developing countries, where the only
available measure of output is total GDP (e.g., Ram, 1996).16
2.2.2.2 Returns to Scale Restrictions
Incorporating public capital into the production function raises the issue of returns
to scale in production. A large number of studies impose some type of restriction
on the coecients of the production function. In a few cases, constant returns
to scale in private capital and labor is assumed (i.e.,  ￿  ￿ 1; see, e.g., Otto
and Voss, 1994), giving rise to increasing returns to scale across all inputs. If
one assumes, for simplicity, that the production function is given by (2.3) (with
t ￿ i ￿ 0), then imposing constant returns to scale across private inputs boils
down to estimating
lnpYit{Kitq ￿ a0 ￿  lnpLit{Kitq ￿ lnGit ￿ ~ "it; (2.5)
where ~ "it ￿ "it￿p￿￿1qlnKit. Hence,  is inconsistently estimated if constant
returns to scale in private inputs is incorrectly assumed. If  ￿  ￿ 1, then  is
overestimated if private and public capital are negatively correlated. Conversely,
 is underestimated if private and public capital are positively correlated.
Aschauer (1989a) argues that congestion eects may be severe enough to render
the assumption of increasing returns to scale across all inputs inappropriate. For
15Some studies employ (real) gross value added of the private sector (which equals net output
of the private sector because intermediate inputs have been subtracted).
16Because government output is typically not exchanged on markets, it is hard to measure.
The 1993 United Nations System of National Accounts measures the value of government out-
put (and of non-market output more generally) based on the inputs used in production. In
applied econometric analyses, the wage bill of the public sector is typically used to approximate
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this reason, most studies assume constant returns to scale restriction across all
inputs (i.e.,  ￿  ￿  ￿ 1q. To impose this restriction, (2.5) is written as
lnpYit{Kitq ￿ a0 ￿  lnpLit{Kitq ￿ lnpGit{Kitq ￿ ^ "it; (2.6)
where ^ "it ￿ "it ￿ p ￿  ￿  ￿ 1qlnKit. Therefore,  is underestimated (overes-
timated) if constant returns to scale across all inputs is assumed while, in fact,
 ￿  ￿  ¡ 1 ( ￿  ￿  ￿ 1).
The question then arises as to whether output elasticities from studies (incor-
rectly) imposing some type of constant returns to scale are larger or smaller than
otherwise. If the true production function is characterized by  ￿  ￿  ￿ 1 and
private capital is negatively (positively) correlated with public capital, then stud-
ies imposing  ￿  ￿ 1 overestimate (underestimate) . Conversely, if the true
production function features  ￿  ￿ 1, but  ￿  ￿  ￿ 1 is imposed, then  is
underestimated. These hypotheses are empirically investigated below.
2.2.2.3 Spillover Eects of Public Capital
The rst author studying the output eect of public capital in a regional context is
Mera (1973), who uses very broadly dened public capital, which includes health
and welfare facilities. It was not until Aschauer's (1989a) analysis that various
authors started applying his methodology to regional data using a standard def-
inition of public capital.17 They nd elasticities at the regional level that tend
to be smaller than those from analyses using aggregate data for a single country.
This nding can be attributed to spillover eects of public capital, that is, some
of the benecial eects of public capital accrue to neighboring regions.18
Most studies do not include neighboring regions' public capital stock in the
home jurisdiction's production function. The small number of studies that do
(e.g., Boarnet, 1998) typically employ the weighted public capital stock of neigh-
boring jurisdictions, where the weights are exogenously given. Estimating this
extended equation [see (2.4)] yields an estimate of #. Alternatively, some studies
(e.g., Mas et al., 1994, 1996) include neighboring regions' public capital into the
denition of Git (i.e.,  ￿ # is implicitly assumed). No consensus has been reached
on the signicance of spillover eects. The study by Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz
17Authors that take a regional approach are: Munnell (1990b), Eisner (1991), Garcia-Mil a and
McGuire (1992), Evans and Karras (1994a), and Holtz-Eakin (1994).
18The theory on scal federalism demonstrates that in a Nash equilibrium, these spillovers
are not internalized. Consequently, both regions end up with a less than socially optimal public
capital stock.Section 2.2 | The Production Function Approach 17
(1995b) nds little evidence of spillover eects, whereas Boarnet (1998) obtains
a signicantly negative spillover coecient. This result is not surprising because
studies at this level of aggregation measure only the net eect. Backwash eects,
such as congestion and resource exploitation, or displacement eects (i.e., new
infrastructure shifts economic activity to other locations) may exceed any positive
gross benets of infrastructure.
2.2.2.4 Stationarity of Variables
Some of the early studies (e.g., Aschauer, 1989a,b) have been criticized for not
properly accounting for stochastic trends. Generally, time series on private output,
public capital stock, and other private inputs are nonstationary. If this is the case,
the usual test statistics have non-standard distributions, so that standard inference
procedures may give rise to misleading results (see Granger and Newbold, 1974).
In particular, one may nd spurious (or non-existing) relationships between the
levels of private output and factor inputs.
Two methodological solutions have been implemented to address these nonsta-
tionarity concerns. A rst group of studies (e.g., Aaron, 1990; Tatom, 1991; and
Sturm and De Haan, 1995) eliminate stochastic time trends by rst dierencing
the data. The literature criticizes this method by pointing to the information loss
that may arise. In fact, nonstationary variables may possess the same stochastic
trend|in which case they are said to be cointegrated|and thus be linked in the
long run. First dierencing the data discards this long-run relationship and shifts
the focus of the analysis away to the short-run eects of public capital. For this
reason, a second strand of studies investigates the cointegrating properties of the
data by employing either Engle and Granger's (1987) single-equation cointegra-
tion test (e.g., Otto and Voss, 1994) or Johansen's (1988) Vector Autoregressive
(VAR)-based approach (e.g., Otto and Voss, 1996). Given the multi-year nature of
public capital projects, it seems reasonable to expect higher output elasticities of
public capital in long-run (cointegrated) models than in short-run models. Section
2.5 compares not only short-run and long-run (cointegration) elasticities, but also
the long-run elasticities with those of the early time-series literature (which are
possibly spurious).18 The Output Elasticity of Public Capital: A Meta-Analysis | Chapter 2
2.2.2.5 Endogeneity Concerns
Equations (2.3) and (2.4) assume the public capital stock to be strictly exogenous,
implying that the causality runs from public capital to private output. Some
authors (e.g., Munnell, 1992; and Gramlich, 1994) argue that public capital is likely
to be an endogenous variable. Reverse causality occurs if a higher rate of output
growth boosts tax revenues, which facilitates an increase in public investment.
In this case, public capital is positively correlated with the error term, causing
the estimated coecients to be upward biased. However, this positive bias may
to some extent be oset if the scal authority follows a policy rule according to
which public investment reacts anti-cyclically to changes in private output.
Some authors solve the endogeneity problem by using an Instrumental Vari-
ables (IV) estimator (e.g., Holtz-Eakin, 1994; and Baltagi and Pinnoi, 1995). If
the positive (negative) eect running from output to public capital dominates,
then OLS estimates of  are higher (lower) than IV estimates. Baltagi and Pinnoi
(1995), for instance, use panel data for the United States to arrive at a pooled OLS
estimate of  of 0:16, whereas the IV estimate is only 0.02. Some authors (e.g.,
Evans and Karras, 1994a) also control for the endogeneity of other factors of pro-
duction, usually labor. A few studies (e.g., Ai and Cassou, 1995) derive moment
conditions from a dynamic model with optimizing rms to estimate production
function parameters using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator.
Determining the sign and size of the endogeneity bias is an empirical question, to
which we turn in Section 2.5.
During the last decade, various authors have employed VAR models with a
view to capturing the dynamic interactions between private output, labor, public
capital, and private capital.19 The VAR approach itself, however, does not solve
the endogeneity problem. VAR models are typically reduced-form models, in which
contemporaneous eects are concentrated out. If the VAR model is to be given a
structural interpretation, then the contemporaneous eects need to be uncovered.
The latter requires assumptions essentially equivalent to those necessary to dene
appropriate instruments in an IV context.
19The VAR approach models every endogenous variable as a function of its own lagged value
and the lagged values of the other endogenous variables. McMillin and Smith (1994), Otto and
Voss (1996), Batina (1998), Flores de Frutos, Diez, and Amaral (1998), Pereira and Roca Sagales
(1999, 2003), Sturm, Jacobs, and Groote (1999), and Ligthart (2002), amongst others, employ
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2.2.2.6 The Business Cycle
A number of studies (e.g., Aschauer, 1989a; Hulten and Schwab, 1991; and Sturm
and De Haan, 1995) control for the eect of the business cycle on factor use by
including the capital utilization rate|or, alternatively, the unemployment rate|
as an additional variable in (2.4).20 The eect of the capacity utilization rate
on output is hypothesized to be positive, whereas it is negative in the case of
the unemployment rate. Because authors use log-linear empirical models [recall
(2.4)], capacity utilization enters the equation in an additive fashion. In some
cases (e.g., Ratner, 1983), authors incorporate variables into their analysis that
are pre-adjusted for business cycle eects. An alternative way of dealing with
the capacity utilization issue is to employ a production frontier approach (e.g.,
Delorme, Thompson, and Warren, 1999). In this way, the expansionary eect of
public capital on the production possibilities frontier can be disentangled from the
production-ineciency reducing eect of public capital formation.21
Unless a long-run (cointegrating) relationship is estimated, ignoring the busi-
ness cycle may lead to downward biased estimates of . Intuitively, public capital
is perceived to be less productive during economic downturns because the econ-
omy is inside the production possibilities frontier. Technically, lnGit is negatively
correlated with "it in (2.3). This correlation vanishes in (2.4) if a measure of the
business cycle is included in Zit.
2.2.2.7 Additional Control Variables
Various authors have criticized Aschauer's model for being misspecied due to the
omission of relevant explanatory variables. Omitting variables that help explain
changes in output may bias the estimate of  if those variables are also correlated
with public capital. The study by Vijverberg, Vijverberg, and Gamble (1997)
proposes to add imported raw materials to equation (2.4). Some studies (e.g.,
Garcia-Mil a and McGuire, 1992) include education as an input. Tatom (1991)
makes a case for including energy prices in the production function to account for
supply shocks. For example, the rising oil prices of the 1970s|representing a neg-
ative supply shock|may have depressed output and capital use. Gramlich (1994)
20Some studies (e.g., Garcia-Mil a and McGuire, 1992) control for the business cycle by simply
including time xed eects. Note that time xed eects not only capture the business cycle but
also many other time-idiosyncratic shocks.
21Note that in an ecient steady state, the production frontier approach is equivalent to the
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criticizes Tatom's approach for mixing production functions and cost functions.
Instead of including energy prices, which typically feature as an argument of the
cost function, a measure of the quantity of energy use in production should be
employed. Most studies, however, do not include any variables in Zit.
2.3 The Meta-Sample
This section describes the meta-data set|which will be used in the regression
analysis of Sections 2.4 and 2.5|and analyzes informally whether publication bias
is present in the sample.
2.3.1 Constructing the Meta-Sample
Table 2.A.1 in the Appendix shows the studies that are included in our meta-
data set, which covers estimates of the output elasticity of public capital based
on the production function approach. In total, 68 studies are coded and included
in the meta-data set. Eight papers are unpublished, whereas the remaining 60
are published in academic journals, professional journals, or books. Out of 39
published journal papers seven are published in top-20 journals.22 The data set
encompasses single-country studies for 22 dierent countries and six cross-country
analyses. In total, 30 studies (44 percent) are based on data for the United States.
To obtain a sample of studies as representative as possible of the true popu-
lation of studies, we use a variety of searching methods.23 We start by checking
the references in overview papers, among others, Sturm et al. (1998) and Romp
and De Haan (2007), which together provide a very comprehensive coverage of
relevant papers up to 2004.24 From these sources, we obtain 47 usable references
(see below). We then search for papers citing Aschauer (1989a) in Thomson's
Web of Science, which allows us to add seven papers to our meta-data base. We
also use the Internet search engine Google Scholar and search for words such as
`public capital' and `public infrastructure,' each in combination with `output' or
`productivity,' which yields another 14 papers (of which six are working papers).
22Based on the journal quality ranking of Kodrzycki and Yu (2006). Note that many studies
in our data set do not appear on this journal list.
23See White (1994) for a review of the general procedures for searching and retrieving papers.
24In addition, we also checked the overview papers by Pfahler et al. (1996), Button (1998),
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We strive for including in the meta-sample only those studies that give rise to
a comparable measure of the output elasticity of public capital. Therefore, the fol-
lowing identied studies using a production function approach had to be dropped
from the data base of potential studies. First, studies that use physical measures of
public capital or employ public investment to proxy the public capital stock. Sec-
ond, studies based on the translog production function (which do not yield a single
measure of the output elasticity). Third, studies that do not distinguish between
private and public infrastructure capital. Finally, studies that take a pure VAR
approach, except those based on Johansen's VAR approach to estimate parameters
of cointegrated variables. Pure VAR studies are dropped from the meta-sample
not only because they usually report reduced-form parameter estimates|which
are dierent from the structural parameters of a production function|but also
because the lag structure of these models gives rise to a multitude of parameter
estimates (one for each lag).25
The issue of how many estimates (also known as `measurements') to include
from each study (when several are reported) is still controversial in meta-analysis.
Some authors (e.g., Bijmolt and Pieters, 2001) claim that all available measure-
ments should be used. In contrast, Van der Sluis, Van Praag, and Vijverberg
(2005) propose to select only one measurement per study and Stanley (1998, 2001)
advocates to average across multiple measurements per study. We follow the rst
approach and include all reported estimates in each study.26 This choice raises
two statistical problems, which will be addressed in Section 2.4. First, not all
estimates in a given study are of similar statistical quality, because authors often
report estimates based on `wrong' models or methods to justify the choice of an
alternative (better) model or method.27 We solve this problem by distinguishing
what authors explicitly consider to be non-credible (i.e., `wrong') estimates from
credible ones. Second, estimates both within a study and across studies that use
25On a more practical note, many VAR studies report impulse responses only (and thus neither
report parameter estimates nor standard errors). The latter are used as weighting factor in the
meta-analysis; see Section 2.4. Consequently, any study that does not report standard errors
(e.g., Mera, 1973) had to be dropped.
26Bom and Ligthart (2008) follow a dierent approach and select only the authors' preferred
estimate.
27Take panel data studies as an example. If there are xed eects in the data that are correlated
with some model regressor, as is often the case in practice, then both OLS and random eects
estimators are inconsistent. For comparison purposes, however, in such case researchers typically
report not only xed eects but also pooled OLS and random eects estimates.22 The Output Elasticity of Public Capital: A Meta-Analysis | Chapter 2
Figure 2.1: Histogram of the Output Elasticity of Public Capital
�
Frequency
Notes: The histogram consists of 578 estimates obtained from the 68 studies on the production
function approach, which are described in Table 2.A.1 in the Appendix.
data for the same country/region are likely to be correlated. We tackle this is-
sue by including a set of country dummies that control for country-specic xed
eects.
2.3.2 A Glance at the Meta-Sample
The meta-sample consists of 578 estimates of the output elasticity of public capital
(Table 2.A.1), varying from -1.726 to 2.040, with a simple average of 0.188 and a
standard deviation of 0.306. The large standard deviation reects the substantial
amount of variation across estimates. The vast majority of estimates|464, more
precisely|are positive, whereas only 114 are negative. The average of the within-
study averages (reported at the bottom of Table 2.A.1) is 0.184, which is virtually
identical to the simple average. The sample median of 0.120, being smaller than
the average, implies an asymmetric distribution of estimates, which potentially
indicates the presence of publication bias.Section 2.3 | The Meta-Sample 23
Figure 2.2: Funnel Plot: All Estimates
�
1/se(   )
�
Notes: The funnel plot considers the full sample of 578 estimates.
The main features of the distribution|i.e., small mean, large variance, and
right skewness|are apparent in Figure 2.1. Even after excluding some isolated
estimates at the tales of the distribution, we observe quite some variation in be-
tween -0.5 and 1, with almost half of the estimates falling in the vicinity of zero.
The histogram conveys the message that the true elasticity of public capital may
be: (i) quite heterogeneous; and (ii) much smaller than suggested by the early
literature. These hypotheses are corroborated by the funnel plot in Figure 2.2,
which depicts the estimates on the horizontal axis and the inverse of their stan-
dard errors on the vertical axis. As expected, the bottom of the funnel|which
consists of low precision estimates based on small samples|is rather wide; in ab-
solute terms, all large (negative and positive) estimates are located in this area of
the funnel. As larger samples are used and smaller standard errors are obtained,
the variation across estimates shrinks and the funnel converges to some value (or
values) not too far from zero. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 formally show that the true
output elasticity of public capital is indeed positive and heterogeneous.24 The Output Elasticity of Public Capital: A Meta-Analysis | Chapter 2
2.3.3 Publication Bias
Publication bias means that the sample of estimates available to the meta-analyst
is not representative of the true population. This problem arises when journals
are more likely to publish studies reporting statistically signicant results. Papers
reporting insignicant results may either not be submitted for publication (i.e.,
self-censoring by the author(s)) or rejected by the editors/referees (i.e., censoring
by peers). As a result, available estimates are biased toward large values (in
absolute value), especially in studies using small samples, for which standard errors
are naturally larger.
Even though papers are not published in academic journals they may still be
available as Working Papers or unpublished reports. Some authors (cf. Begg,
1994) suggest to include in the meta-sample as many unpublished studies as pos-
sible with a view to minimize the perverse eects of publication bias. This strategy,
however, is unable to completely eliminate publication bias. Indeed, self-censoring
by authors may be quite pernicious, inducing authors from making their ndings
available altogether.
To informally assess whether there is publication bias in our sample, we em-
ploy a second funnel plot (Figure 2.3). For ease of visualization, this funnel plot
excludes the 19 most precise estimates (3 percent of the total sample) and focuses
on the remaining 559 estimates. Also, we add two symmetric lines correspond-
ing to negative and positive statistical signicance at the 5 percent level, that is,
{sepq ￿ 1:96 if  ¡ 0, and {sepq ￿ ￿1:96 if  ￿ 0. In the absence of publica-
tion bias (and other sources of heterogeneity), estimates should lie symmetrically
around the true eect. However, a quick inspection of the funnel plot reveals two
features preventing this from being the case. First, estimates tend to concentrate
on the right-hand side of the funnel, suggesting that positive estimates|which
make more sense from a theoretical point of view|are more likely to be available
to the meta-analyst. Second, estimates tend to cluster around both lines of sta-
tistical signicance, implying that insignicant estimates are hardly reported. In
fact, the area at the bottom of the funnel in between the two lines of statistical
signicance|which would naturally be lled with insignicant estimates in the
absence of publication bias|is remarkably sparse. Therefore, the funnel plot sug-
gests that publication bias may: (i) be present in the meta-sample; and (ii) workSection 2.4 | The Meta-Regression Model 25
Figure 2.3: Funnel Plot: Most Precise Estimates Excluded
1/se(   )
�
�
Notes: The funnel plot excludes the 19 most precise estimates from the full sample of 578
estimates. Filled squares denote `bad' (non-credible) estimates, while solid lines represent the
relationship between  and sepq above which  is statistically signicant at the 5 percent level,
that is, 1{sepq ￿ 1:96{ if  ¡ 0 and 1{sepq ￿ ￿1:96{ if  ￿ 0.
in both positive and negative directions.28
2.4 The Meta-Regression Model
The descriptive analysis of the meta-sample in Section 2.3 revealed not only a
substantial amount of variation across estimates of the output elasticity of public
capital but also some informal indications of publication bias. This section devel-
ops a formal meta-regression model to estimate the average elasticity and uncover
28To motivate the plausibility of publication bias on the negative side, note that sampling error
alone may dictate a negative estimate even if the true population parameter is positive (but not
too large). To have publication bias on the negative direction, all we need is a preference for
statistically signicant results and an economic explanation for such outcome. Evans and Karras
(1994a), for instance, nd one in the following observation by Blinder (1990): \If my car and
my back absorb fewer shocks from potholes, I am surely better-o; but GNP may even decline
as a result of fewer car repairs and doctor's bills."26 The Output Elasticity of Public Capital: A Meta-Analysis | Chapter 2
the sources of heterogeneity while correcting for publication bias. Section 2.4.1
outlines the basic model. Section 2.4.2 derives the so-called funnel asymmetry
and precision eect tests. Section 2.4.3 extends the model by including observed
determinants of estimate heterogeneity.
2.4.1 Heterogeneity and Publication Bias
We start by postulating a relationship between each primary estimate ^ i and its
population parameter, which is denoted by i:
^ i ￿ i ￿ &i; @ i ￿ 1;:::;N; (2.7)
where N denotes the total number of estimates in the meta-sample. In the ab-
sence of publication bias, the meta-sample is representative of the population of
estimates, so that the error term &i captures pure sampling error and is such that
Er&i|is ￿ Ep&iq ￿ 0 and V r&i|is ￿ 2
&i. Note that &i is necessarily heteroscedastic,
because 2
&i depends negatively on the sample size used to derive ^ i.
If publication bias is present, however, the error term &i is correlated with
any selecting factor. As discussed in Section 2.3.3, we assume that publication
selection is primarily caused by statistical (in)signicance. Estimates based on
small samples tend to have large standard errors; because such estimates are less
likely to be statistically signicant, they are also less likely to be available to the
meta-analyst. As a consequence, &i is correlated with the (reported) standard error
of ^ i, which we denote by sep^ iq. We assume that &i ￿ gpsep^ iqq ￿ i, where i
denotes sampling error cleansed of publication bias and satises Eri|i;sep^ iqs ￿
Epiq ￿ 0 and V ri|i;sep^ iqs ￿ 2
i. Note that i, similarly to &i, is heteroscedastic
by denition. Taking publication bias into account, (2.7) is written as
^ i ￿ i ￿ gpsep^ iqq ￿ i: (2.8)
Intuitively, if the meta-sample is plagued by publication selection, then we should
observe a relationship between each estimate ^ i and its standard error sep^ iq. The
function gp￿q describes such a relationship and satises gp0q ￿ 0; that is, innitely
precise estimates do not contain publication bias. Furthermore, we assume bidi-
rectional publication bias, meaning that positive (negative) estimates increase (de-
crease) with the standard error, that is, g1psep^ iqq ¡ 0 if ^ i ¡ 0 and g1psep^ iqq ￿ 0
if ^ i ￿ 0. The functional form of gp￿q is unknown a priori. We follow Card and
Krueger (1995) and most of the meta-analysis literature (cf. Stanley, 2005) bySection 2.4 | The Meta-Regression Model 27
assuming a linear functional form, that is, gpsep^ iqq ￿ sep^ iq, where  is a param-
eter measuring publication bias. However, because positive and negative estimates
may suer from publication bias in opposite directions|as discussed in Section
2.3.3|we modify this specication and assume the following bidirectional publi-
cation bias term: gpsep^ iqq ￿ psep^ iqPpi￿nsep^ iqPni, where Ppi (Pni) is a dummy
variable that equals one if ^ i ¡ 0 (^ i ￿ 0) and zero otherwise, and p and n are
publication bias parameters to be estimated. Symmetric publication bias further
imposes p ￿ ￿n.
We model i as a heterogeneous parameter. In particular, we assume
i ￿   ￿ nIni ￿ i; (2.9)
where we explicitly control for non-credible estimates using the dummy variable
Ini, which equals one if estimate i is explicitly considered as senseless by the
author and zero otherwise (see Section 2.3.1). The parameter i describes the
heterogeneity of reported estimates around   and has zero mean independently
of the realization of Ini; formally, Epi|Iniq ￿ Epiq ￿ 0. Hence,   denotes
the average output elasticity across credible estimates, whereas n measures the
degree to which non-credible estimates depart from  . Substituting (2.9) and the
denition of gp￿q into (2.8) yields
^ i ￿   ￿ nIni ￿ psep^ iqPpi ￿ nsep^ iqPni ￿ i; (2.10)
where i ￿ i ￿ i is a heteroscedastic error term consisting of a heterogeneity
component (i) and a sampling error component (i). In order to estimate (2.10),
we need assumptions on the heterogeneity term i. Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 discuss
a number of cases.
2.4.2 Funnel Asymmetry and Precision Eect Tests
Regarding the heterogeneity component i, we rst consider two simple models.
The simplest (but least realistic) case is the assumption of homogeneity, that is,
i ￿ 0 for all i. Consequently, i ￿ i, so that V ri|Ini;sep^ iqs ￿ 2
i. This
assumption is valid if and only if all (credible) estimates are unbiased toward a
unique population eect (given by  ). Following the meta-analysis literature, we
shall refer to this as a xed eects model. The second case assumes that i is
independent and identically distributed, with V ri|Ini;sep^ iq;is ￿ V piq ￿ 2
,
either because the population eect is itself a random distribution with mean  ,28 The Output Elasticity of Public Capital: A Meta-Analysis | Chapter 2
or because estimates are randomly biased toward the unique population eect
 , or a combination of both. As a result, the variance of i contains the extra
component 2
, that is, V ri|Ini;sep^ iqs ￿ 2
i ￿ 2
. We shall refer to this as
a random eects model. In either case, (2.10) constitutes the basis of funnel
asymmetry and precision eect tests, which are commonly employed in the meta-
analysis literature (cf. Stanley, 2005).
Because the error term i is heteroscedastic, we estimate (2.10) using WLS,
where the optimal weights (wi) are given by the inverse of the variance of the
error term, that is, wi ￿ 1{V ri|Ini;sep^ iqs. Therefore, the weights are given by
wi ￿ 1{2
i in the xed eects model and wi ￿ 1{p2
i ￿ 2
q in the random eects
model. To implement WLS, we need estimates of 2
i and 2
. A natural estimate
of 2
i is sep^ iq2, that is, the variance of ^ i as reported in the primary studies.
For the random eects model, 2




i￿1 wi , where
Q, wi, and J are the residual sum of squares, estimation weights, and number of
estimated parameters, respectively, of the xed eects model (cf. Raudenbush,
1994). To choose between xed and random eects models, we apply the Q-test
of homogeneity (cf. Shadish and Haddock, 1994), which uses the fact that the
residual sum of squares of the xed eects model is 2
N￿J distributed under the
null hypothesis of homogeneity (cf. Raudenbush, 1994). Intuitively, this test
simply checks the statistical signicance of ^ 2
.
2.4.3 Observed and Unobserved Heterogeneity
This section extends the model by assuming that heterogeneity partly derives from





jDji ￿ i; (2.11)
where Dji is a moderator variable for study characteristic j of study i and j de-
notes its coecient. The error term i represents the remaining unobserved hetero-
geneity and is independent and identically distributed with Eri|Dji;Ini;sep^ iq;is ￿
Epiq ￿ 0 and V ri|Dji;Ini;sep^ iq;is ￿ 2
. Note also that 2
 ⁄ 2
, reecting
that part of the heterogeneity is observed and captured by the moderator variables.
Assuming (2.11), equation (2.10) generalizes to
^ i ￿   ￿
M ‚
j￿1
jDji ￿ nIni ￿ psep^ iqPpi ￿ nsep^ iqPni ￿ i; (2.12)Section 2.4 | The Meta-Regression Model 29
where the new error term i ￿ i ￿ i, similarly to i, consists of unobserved
heterogeneity (i) and sampling error (i), and satises Eri|Dij;Ini;sep^ iqs ￿
Epiq ￿ 0 and V ri|Dij;Ini;sep^ iqs ￿ 2
 ￿ 2
i. We center all moderator variables
by removing their mean across credible estimates, so that   still represents the
average output elasticity of public capital within this group; formally, because this
procedure ensures that Epi|Ini ￿ 0q ￿ 0, it follows from (2.9) that Epi|Ini ￿
0q ￿  .
We control for observed heterogeneity by including M moderator variables in
(2.12). Table 2.1 presents the complete list of variables|including their observed
frequency|used in the meta-regression model. We divide the variables into several
key empirical dimensions, reecting the observable heterogeneity across measure-
ments, as discussed in Section 2.2. Note that, because our list is fairly exhaustive,
some potentially relevant variables (e.g., a dummy variable for panel data studies)
are perfectly multicollinear with other included variables and had to be dropped.
With the exception of Sample-med (i.e., the median year of the sample) and Date
(i.e., the date of the study), which are continuous variables, all the remaining
variables are of the dummy type. Prior to demeaning, variables Dji of the dummy
type equal one if estimate i is described by characteristic j and zero otherwise.
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, we also include 20 country dummies29 to control for
dependency across measurements for the same country.30
We estimate (2.12) using WLS and OLS. Again, two cases regarding i are
considered. The rst case assumes that all heterogeneity is observed, that is, i ￿ 0
for all i, so that 2
 ￿ 0. This assumption gives rise to a xed eects model, where
the optimal estimation weights are given by wi ￿ 1{2
i. The second case allows
for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity, that is, 2
 ¥ 0, which gives rise to





 are obtained as discussed in Section 2.4.2; the signicance
of 2
 is tested using the Q-test outlined in the same section.
29Country-specic xed eects are included for the following countries (the number of estimates
for each country is given in parentheses): Australia (27), Belgium (3), Canada (25), Denmark
(2), Finland (2), France (19), Germany (11), Greece (2), Ireland (3), Italy (34), Japan (34),
the Netherlands (11), New Zealand (2), Norway (3), Portugal (15), Spain (73), Sweden (4),
Switzerland (1), United Kingdom (2), and United States (278).
30To address within-study dependency caused by unobserved study-specic heterogeneity,
some meta-analyses employ cluster-robust standard errors. However, this procedure requires
the clusters to be approximately balanced (cf. Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2008). As shown
in Table 2.A.1, our meta-sample is very far from meeting such requirement.30 The Output Elasticity of Public Capital: A Meta-Analysis | Chapter 2







Country k Data are for country k {
Denition of output
Private Dependent variable is gross output of the private sector 332
Manufact Dependent variable is output of the manufacturing sector 59
Agric Dependent variable is output of the agricultural sector 7
Type of public capital
Reg-gov Only public capital installed at the regional/local government
level is considered
126
Core Only core capital is used 72
Transp Only transportation capital is considered 125




Reg-data Regional data are used 347
Type of data
Cross Cross-section data are used 12
Empirical model
CRTS-all Constant returns to scale on all inputs is imposed 143
CRTS-priv Constant returns to scale on private inputs is imposed 30
Pfrontier A production frontier model is employed 3
Cap-util Capacity utilization is controlled for 225
Spill-disag Public capital of neighboring areas is included as an additional
regressor
56
Energy Energy prices are controlled for 20
Education A measure of education is included as an additional input 6
Estimation method
Coint Cointegration relationship is found 44
Spurious-ts Time-series data in levels are used without cointegration test 72
Spurious-pd Panel data in levels are used without cointegration test 282
Fixed-e Unit-specic xed eects are employed 139
Time-e Time-specic eects are employed 189
Trend A time trend is included in the model 165
Long-di Equation is estimated with the variables in long dierences 24
Endog Instrumental variables are employed 82
Sample
Sample-med Median year of the sample {
Publication
Published Estimate belongs to a published study 421
Date Date of the study (in years) {
Notes: aNumber of ones in the corresponding dummy variable (before demeaning).Section 2.5 | Meta-Regression Results 31
2.5 Meta-Regression Results
This section presents the meta-regression results. Section 2.5.1 addresses the re-
sults of the funnel asymmetry and precision eect tests, assuming both true eect
homogeneity (xed eects) and unobserved heterogeneity (random eects). Subse-
quently, Section 2.5.2 controls for observed heterogeneity by extending the model
to include various moderator variables.
2.5.1 Funnel Asymmetry and Precision Eect Tests
Table 2.2 reports the estimation results of equation (2.10) for both xed eects
(FE, where 2
 ￿ 0) and random eects (RE, where 2
 ¥ 0). For comparison
purposes, we also report estimation results using unweighted OLS. We consider
three special cases of equation (2.10): (i) no correction for publication bias and bad
estimates (i.e., n ￿ p ￿ n ￿ 0); (ii) bad estimates correction (i.e., p ￿ n ￿ 0)
only; and (iii) correction for bad estimates and publication bias (i.e., no parameter
restrictions). In the latter case, we distinguish between unidirectional publication
bias (i.e., p ￿ n) and bidirectional publication bias (i.e., no restrictions on p
and n).
For the rst specication, we nd a simple (unweighted) average of the output
elasticity of public capital of 0.188. Using WLS, however, the average elasticity
drops quite substantially, while maintaining its statistical signicance. This fall
is particularly pronounced in the xed eects model, in which case highly precise
estimates receive a relatively larger weight. Because more precise estimates tend
to be closer to zero (see Figure 2.2), the weighted average is smaller. However, the
large value of Q implies a sizable value of ^ 2
, suggesting that the random eects
estimate of 0.125 is preferable.
The average eect across `bad' (i.e., non-credible) estimates is signicantly
larger in all models. Isolating these estimates, however, causes a very small reduc-
tion in the estimate of  . In contrast, correcting for publication bias reduces the
random eects estimate of   by nearly a half, from 0.125 to 0.062. As expected, we
nd strong evidence of bidirectional publication bias. However, the estimate of  
is virtually invariant to the type of publication bias. This result may simply reect
the much larger number of positive estimates than negative ones. Hence, allowing
publication bias in the negative direction, although statistically signicant, is not
sucient to aect the estimate of  .32 The Output Elasticity of Public Capital: A Meta-Analysis | Chapter 2
Table 2.2: Funnel Asymmetry and Precision Eect Tests
No Correction `Bad' Estimates Correction PB Correction (RE)
OLS FE RE OLS FE RE Unid Bid
  0.188*** 0.048*** 0.125*** 0.173*** 0.045*** 0.118*** 0.062*** 0.062***
(0.013) (0.003) (0.008) (0.012) (0.003) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
n { { { 0.244*** 0.050 0.153*** 0.125*** 0.100***
(0.085) (0.031) (0.037) (0.035) (0.027)
 { { { { { { 1.274*** {
(0.167)
p { { { { { { { 2.212***
(0.146)
n { { { { { { { -2.107***
(0.226)
 R2 { { { 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.164 0.603
Q { { 13,927 { { 13,862 11,637 8,427
^ 2
 { { 0.006 { { 0.006 0.005 0.003
Notes: The number of observations is N ￿ 578. We report results for ordinary least squares
(OLS), xed eects (FE), and random eects (RE) estimators. In the last two columns, `PB'
stands for publication bias, which can be unidirectional (`Unid') or bidirectional (`Bid'). The
Breusch-Godfrey test always rejects the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity at the 1 percent
level (results not shown); we thus report White (heteroscedasticity-robust) standard errors in
parentheses. ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. Under
the null hypothesis of true eect homogeneity, Q follows a 2
N￿1 distribution; the p-values of
this test (not shown) are virtually zero in all cases.
2.5.2 Addressing Observed Heterogeneity
Table 2.3 reports the estimation results of the meta-regression model (2.12), which
extends equation (2.10) by including the moderator variables listed in Table 2.1.
We estimate the model using WLS, assuming both xed eects and random ef-
fects. For comparison purposes, we also report (unweighted) OLS estimates. The
Q-test indicates a statistically signicant value of ^ 2
, implying that the random
eects model is more appropriate. The last column of Table 2.3 reports estimation
results of a parsimonious specication that restricts the random eects model by:
(i) excluding insignicant variables; (ii) aggregating variables that capture similar
empirical dimensions into composite variables (see below); and (iii) imposing sym-
metric publication bias. All these restrictions are easily supported by the F-test,
which gives a p-value of 0.867. Therefore, we take the random eects model as
our benchmark and mainly focus on its restricted specication.
In general, the estimation results do not dier much across dierent weightingSection 2.5 | Meta-Regression Results 33
Table 2.3: Meta-Regression Results: Unobserved Heterogeneity
OLS Fixed Eects Random Eects Restricted
  0.103 (0.016)*** 0.089 (0.013)*** 0.082 (0.010)*** 0.082 (0.006)***
Reg-gov 0.022 (0.015) 0.036 (0.010)*** 0.037 (0.011)*** 0.037 (0.010)***
Core 0.045 (0.029) 0.041 (0.016)** 0.037 (0.022)* 0.033 (0.014)**
Transp -0.021 (0.022) -0.004 (0.012) -0.010 (0.013) {
Private -0.010 (0.016) 0.015 (0.010) -0.004 (0.014) {
Manufact -0.033 (0.034) -0.040 (0.018)** -0.055 (0.027)** -0.065 (0.026)**
Agric -0.140 (0.101) 0.004 (0.035) 0.002 (0.010) {
CRTS-all 0.021 (0.020) -0.014 (0.007)* -0.013 (0.014) {
CRTS-priv 0.044 (0.047) -0.020 (0.011)* 0.026 (0.023) {
Reg-data -0.055 (0.028)** -0.096 (0.019)*** -0.080 (0.019)*** -0.084 (0.012)***
Spill-agg -0.020 (0.025) -0.033 (0.020)* -0.026 (0.015)* -0.026 (0.011)**
Spill-disag -0.036 (0.027) -0.002 (0.006) -0.004 (0.013) {
Coint 0.002 (0.035) 0.039 (0.024)* 0.054 (0.024)** {
Spurious-ts 0.123 (0.039)*** 0.181 (0.025)*** 0.188 (0.022)*** 0.174 (0.019)***
Spurious-pd 0.003 (0.024) 0.021 (0.019) 0.030 (0.020) 0.029 (0.014)**
Long-di 0.062 (0.033)* 0.044 (0.028) 0.064 (0.025)*** {
Endog -0.062 (0.017)*** -0.038 (0.017)** -0.035 (0.014)** -0.043 (0.012)***
Fixed-e -0.003 (0.014) 0.012 (0.010) -0.004 (0.013) {
Time-e -0.026 (0.019) -0.002 (0.010) -0.017 (0.013) {
Trend -0.002 (0.019) -0.014 (0.010) -0.017 (0.013) {
Pfrontier -0.057 (0.070) 0.064 (0.065) 0.045 (0.041) {
Cap-util 0.020 (0.023) 0.041 (0.013)*** 0.018 (0.014) {
Energy -0.073 (0.030)** -0.092 (0.041)** -0.083 (0.041)** -0.083 (0.042)**
Education 0.014 (0.029) 0.029 (0.022) 0.020 (0.021) {
Cross 0.003 (0.048) -0.029 (0.043) -0.024 (0.040) {
Sample-med -0.004 (0.001)*** -0.005 (0.001)*** -0.005 (0.001)*** -0.005 (0.001)***
Date 0.008 (0.003)*** 0.004 (0.001)** 0.004 (0.001)*** 0.003 (0.001)***
Published -0.035 (0.012)*** -0.005 (0.005) -0.016 (0.008)** -0.018 (0.007)**
n 0.094 (0.046)** -0.029 (0.018) 0.009 (0.043) {
p 1.397 (0.190)*** 1.916 (0.211)*** 1.869 (0.167)*** 1.869 (0.094)***
n -1.551 (0.217)*** -2.484 (0.301)*** -1.831 (0.188)*** -1.869
Long-run { { { 0.053 (0.014)***
Cycle { { { 0.028 (0.008)***
 R2 0.735 0.677 0.703 0.707
Q { { 3,388 3,430
^ 2
 { { 0.001 0.001
Notes: The number of observations is N ￿ 578. The Breusch-Godfrey test rejects the hypothesis
of homoscedasticity at the 1 percent level in all cases (results not shown); White standard
errors are thus reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level, respectively. In the restricted model, we dene Long-run￿Coint+Long-di and
Cycle￿Pfrontier+Cap-util; furthermore, insignicant moderators are excluded and p ￿ ￿n is
imposed. Under the null hypothesis of true eect homogeneity, Q follows a 2
N￿J distribution;
the p-values of this test (not shown) are virtually zero in all cases.34 The Output Elasticity of Public Capital: A Meta-Analysis | Chapter 2
schemes; OLS, xed eects, and random eects models yield rather similar esti-
mates in terms of sign and size. The average output elasticity of public capital
( ) amounts to 0.082 in the random eects model, whereas it is slightly larger
in the other models. In contrast with the results of Section 2.5.1, we nd that,
except for the OLS case, n is small and insignicant, implying that bad mea-
surements are not signicantly larger than credible ones. We nd strong evidence
of bidirectional (approximately symmetric) publication bias in all models. The
restricted model imposes symmetric publication bias, which is easily supported by
the F-test (p-value=0.909). Notice, however, the smaller estimates of p and n,
when compared with those in Table 2.2. This observation implies that publication
bias is overestimated if observed heterogeneity is not properly controlled for. The
smaller size of publication bias is in turn reected in a larger estimate of  .
The type of public capital used in the analysis matters. The coecient of
Reg-gov is signicantly positive, implying that public capital provided by local
governments is more productive than capital provided by the central government.
This result may reect the ability of local governments to better target public
investment to the most productive alternatives. In the restricted model, the vari-
able Core is also signicantly positive, which conrms the hypothesis that core
public capital is more productive than other types of public capital. However, the
insignicant coecient of Transp suggests that transportation infrastructure does
not dier in productivity from other components of core public capital.
Regarding the denition of aggregate output, we include the moderator variable
Private to distinguish estimates based on output of the private sector from those
that also consider public sector output. The coecient of Private is small and
insignicant, suggesting that this distinction is not relevant for the results. We
also include the variables Manufact and Agric, which control for estimates based
on output of the manufacturing and agriculture sectors, respectively. The results
show that only the former is statistically signicant, implying that public capital is
less productive in the manufacturing sector. A possible explanation for this result
is that the degree of substitution between public and private capital is higher in
more capital-intensive sectors.
The coecients of the variables CRTS-all and CRTS-priv|measuring restric-
tions of constant returns to scale in all inputs (i.e.,  ￿  ￿  ￿ 1) and in private
inputs (i.e., ￿ ￿ 1), respectively|are statistically insignicant, indicating that
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We nd a signicantly negative coecient for Reg-data, meaning that measure-
ments based on data at the regional level are smaller than otherwise. Among this
group of studies, a few explicitly model spillovers eects, either by dening public
capital of a given region to include the capital of neighboring regions (Spill-agg)
or by including the capital of neighboring regions as an additional regressor (Spill-
disag). The coecients of these variables are both negative, although only the
former is statistically signicant. These results conrm the empirical relevance of
interregional spillovers of public capital. On the one hand, studies using data at
the regional level fail to internalize positive spillovers of public capital across re-
gions. In fact, the estimates obtained in these studies correspond to intraregional
output elasticities of public capital, which are smaller than those obtained from
data aggregated at the national level. On the other hand, if public investment is
positively correlated between neighboring regions, then not explicitly accounting
for interregional spillover eects causes the intraregional output elasticity of public
capital to be overestimated.
We nd the temporal focus of the analysis to be a fundamental source of het-
erogeneity. Estimates based on (long-run) cointegrating relationships (Coint) are
on average larger by 0.054 than otherwise. Likewise, panel data models employing
variables in long dierences (Long-di )|which also capture long-run eects|
increase estimates of the output elasticity by 0.064. The F-test easily supports
the null hypothesis that these two coecients are equal (p-value=0.763). There-
fore, we aggregate the variables Coint and Long-di into the composite variable
Long-run, which is included in the restricted model. As expected, the coecient
of Long-run is of similar size as the individual components. Public capital is more
productive in the long run than in the short run for two reasons. First, much of
the output eect of public capital is lagged and lasts for several periods, partially
reecting the multi-period nature of big infrastructure projects. Second, feedback
eects from private output to public capital formation are captured in the long
run.
The question then arises as to how long-run measurements relate with those
derived from time-series and panel data models employing variables in levels
but without conducting a cointegration test (i.e., potentially spurious estimates),
which we label Spurious-ts and Spurious-pd, respectively. The extremely large
coecient of Spurious-ts indicates that this category of studies typically nd esti-
mates that are much larger than those based on cointegration analysis. The coe-
cient of Spurious-pd is much smaller, re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is less of a problem in panel data studies. Note that the F-test strongly rejects the
null of equality between the coecients of Coint, Long-di, and Spurious-ts, with
a p-value of virtually zero. The same result holds if Spurious-pd is also included in
the test. Hence, we conclude that potentially spurious estimates|especially those
based on non-stationary time-series data|are actually spurious.
As expected, the endogeneity of public capital (Endog) is a relevant source of
heterogeneity across measurements. In fact, studies that correct for endogeneity
bias|by instrumenting the stock of public capital or by explicitly modeling feed-
back eects in a system of simultaneous equations|nd smaller estimates of the
output elasticity of public capital than studies that do not make this correction.
In contrast, neither xed unit eects (Fixed-e ) nor xed time eects (Time-e )
in panel data models play a signicant role. Including a time trend (Trend) in the
model does not signicantly aect the estimates either.
Studies that control for the business cycle|either by including some measure
of capacity utilization (Cap-util) or by employing a production frontier model
(Pfrontier)|nd larger elasticities. Individually, these variables have similar pos-
itive (but insignicant) coecients. Because the F-test easily supports the null
of equality between these two coecients (p-value=0.656), we aggregate Cap-util
and Pfrontier into the variable Cycle, which we include in the restricted model.
As expected based on the discussion in Section 2.2.2.6, its coecient is positive
and highly signicant. Including additional control variables in the model aects
the results. The signicantly negative coecient of Energy indicates that stud-
ies controlling for energy prices nd smaller output elasticities of public capital.
In contrast, including a measure of education (Education) does not signicantly
change the output elasticity of public capital.
The signicantly negative coecient of Sample-med reveals that studies using
more recent samples tend to nd lower output elasticities of public capital. In other
words, the output elasticity of public capital has declined over time. In contrast,
more recent studies nd higher elasticities, as implied by the positive coecient
of Date. We interpret these results as suggesting that the methodological and
econometric improvements experienced over the last few decades have made it
possible to better uncover a signicant but slowly falling output elasticity. In terms
of the quality of the empirical results, we nd that published studies (Published)
tend to nd slightly smaller output elasticities.
To facilitate the quantitative interpretation of the meta-regression results re-
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Table 2.4: Conditional Output Elasticities of Public Capital
Time period All Public Capital Core Public Capital
Regional National Regional National
Short run 0.087 0.051 0.120 0.084:
Long run 0.140 0.104 0.173 0.137
Notes: The conditional output elasticities of public capital are based on the estimated parameters
of the restricted model reported in Table 2.3. All results areobtained assuming a non-spurious
relationship (Spurious-ts=Spurious-pd=0), using data at the national level (Reg-data=0), with-
out further controlling for externalities (Spill-agg=Spill-disag=0), assuming a broad denition of
output (Manufact=0), correcting for endogeneity bias (Endog=1), excluding measures of energy
(Energy=0), and controlling for the business cycle (Cycle=1). Also, the conditional elasticities
are evaluated at the means of Sample-med and Date and assume that the primary estimates are
published (Published=1). The benchmark result (indicated by a dagger) is obtained assuming
further a short-run model (Long-run=0), featuring core public capital (Core=1) installed by the
national government (Reg-gov=0). The other results are derived by varying the relevant dummy
variable.
public capital that result from varying three key study characteristics: the time
horizon (short run versus long run), the denition of public capital (all public cap-
ital versus core public capital), and the level of government that provides public
capital (regional/local versus national). The results in Table 2.4 reect the sub-
stantial amount of heterogeneity across measurements documented in Table 2.3.
For broad public capital provided by the national level of government, our esti-
mate of the short-run output elasticity of public capital amounts to 0.051. This
estimate more than doubles (from 0.051 to 0.120) if public capital consists only of
its core component and is installed by lower levels of government. The estimate of
0.051 more than triples (reaching a value of 0.173) if we further consider a long-run
horizon.
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter has assessed the output elasticity of public capital by means of a
meta-regression analysis. The analysis focuses on studies employing the produc-
tion function approach, which analyzes the output elasticity of public capital by
including public capital as an input in the production function. The meta-sample
is composed by 578 estimates obtained from 68 studies for the 1983{2008 period.
Both xed and random e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average output elasticity of public capital and identify the sources of variation
across studies.
The average output elasticity of public capital amounts to 0.082, after correct-
ing for publication bias. This estimate is only indicative, however, since the true
output elasticity is rather heterogeneous. In fact, the short-run output elasticity
of public capital installed by the national government is only 0.051. In the long
run, however, if only core public capital is considered that is provided by lower
levels of government, the output elasticity of public capital goes up to 0.173. This
long-run estimate is still far below the results found in the early literature (e.g.,
Aschauer, 1989a), using non-stationary time-series without a cointegration test,
which suggests that the results in this literature are likely to be spurious. Simi-
larly, studies not correcting for endogeneity of public capital have found estimates
larger than those that do not correct for endogeneity. In contrast, studies using
regional data fail to fully capture the positive spillover eects of public capital
across regions, which causes the output elasticity to be severely underestimated.
The short-run output elasticity falls in the range of 0.051 to 0.120, depending
on the type of public capital and level of government at which it is provided.
Taking into account that the stock of public capital amounts to about 50 percent of
GDP in OECD countries (Kamps, 2006), these output elasticities imply marginal
returns of public capital in the range of 10 to 24 percent. Assuming a depreciation
rate of 10 percent and a long-term real interest rate of 4 percent,31 the marginal
user cost of public capital amounts to 14 percent. Hence, the marginal returns
of public capital exceed the marginal cost only for the core component of public
capital and/or public capital installed at regional levels of government (varying
from 17 to 24 percent), suggesting that, from a macroeconomic point of view,
public investment in this type of public capital should be encouraged. However,
this simple cost-benet analysis does not consider the eects of public investment
on private capital and labor, which requires a structural macroeconomic model.
This chapter only considers empirical studies assessing the role of public capi-
tal using the Cobb-Douglas production function approach. Within this approach,
some studies employ more exible functional forms (e.g., translog) of the pro-
duction function. Another strand of the literature employs the so-called behav-
ioral approach, that is, cost functions or prot functions or both. We believe
that a meta-analysis covering all these approaches can be an extremely valuable
31Long-term real interest rates of sovereign debt have been below 5 percent|with a downward-
sloping trend|since the mid-1990s in all OECD economies (see, e.g., Afonso and Rault, 2010).Section 2.A | Appendix 39
contribution to the public capital literature. To the best of our knowledge, such
work has not been undertaken yet. However, extending our meta-regression model
to include also measurements based on these approaches is not straightforward.
Translog production functions, for instance, give rise to non-unique output elastic-
ities of public capital. To compare empirical results across studies using dierent
methods, a feasible approach would be to look at standardized t-statistics and
F-statistics. Finally, in future work, we intend to develop methods to correct for
dependency across estimates taken from identical or very similar data sets, and
apply these methods to the public capital literature.
2.A Appendix
Table 2.A.1: Studies Included in the Meta-Data Set
Author(s) Countrya Estimates Min Max Mean
Ratner (1983)b US 1 0:277 0:277 0:277
Da Costa, Ellson, and Martin (1987) US 3 0:160 0:281 0:204
Aschauer (1989a) US 20 0:240 0:560 0:379
Ram and Ramsey (1989) US 2 0:191 0:240 0:216
Munnell (1990a) US 10 0:210 0:490 0:367
Munnell (1990b) US 9 0:060 0:360 0:128
Eisner (1991) US 19 ￿0:491 0:383 0:048
Tatom (1991) US 2 ￿0:075 0:042 ￿0:017
Berndt and Hansson (1992) SE 2 0:687 1:601 1:144
Garcia-Mil a and McGuire (1992) US 2 0:044 0:045 0:045
Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1993) ES 4 0:160 0:190 0:178
Finn (1993) US 1 0:158 0:158 0:158
Mas, Maudos, P erez, and Uriel (1993) ES 1 0:066 0:216 0:141
Munnell (1993) US 19 ￿0:004 0:380 0:111
Eisner (1994) US 1 0:270 0:270 0:270
Evans and Karras (1994a) US 12 ￿0:110 0:102 ￿0:023
Evans and Karras (1994b) 7 14 ￿0:465 0:182 ￿0:117
Ferreira (1994) 67 26 0:090 0:380 0:234
Holtz-Eakin (1994) US 15 ￿0:130 0:203 ￿0:027
Mas, Maudos, P erez, and Uriel (1994) ES 9 0:182 0:315 0:239
Otto and Voss (1994) AU 18 ￿0:260 2:040 0:427
Ai and Cassou (1995) US 14 0:295 0:321 0:308
Andrews and Swanson (1995) US 4 0:010 0:130 0:073
Baltagi and Pinnoi (1995) US 18 ￿0:080 0:390 0:071
De la Fuente and Vives (1995) ES 1 0:212 0:212 0:212
Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995a) US 5 ￿0:038 0:112 0:039
Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995b) US 14 ￿0:022 0:054 0:009
Sturm and De Haan (1995) US/NL 16 0:026 1:160 0:731
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Table 2.A.1 (continued)
Author(s) Country Estimates Min Max Mean
Garcia-Mil a, McGuire, and Porter (1996) US 6 ￿0:058 0:370 0:088
Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) US 2 ￿0:144 ￿0:132 ￿0:138
Khanam (1996) CA 6 0:090 0:170 0:118
Mas, Maudos, P erez, and Uriel (1996) ES 16 0:065 0:147 0:107
Prud`Homme (1996) FR 7 ￿0:012 0:087 0:041
Otto and Voss (1996) AU 2 0:168 0:296 0:232
Crowder and Himarios (1997) US 12 0:065 0:382 0:248
Kavanagh (1997) IE 2 ￿0:018 0:144 0:063
Kelejian and Robinson (1997) US 26 ￿0:193 0:146 ￿0:066
Moreno, Art s, L opez-Bazo, and Suri~ nach (1997) ES 11 ￿0:010 0:210 0:068
Vijverberg, Vijverberg, and Gamble (1997) US 4 0:465 0:550 0:496
Boarnet (1998) US 6 0:065 0:300 0:225
Erenburg (1998) US 5 0:240 0:500 0:342
Flores de Frutos, Diez, and Amaral (1998) ES 1 0:210 0:210 0:210
Nourzad (1998) US 1 0:340 0:340 0:340
Otto and Voss (1998) AU 4 0:058 0:065 0:060
Delorme, Thompson, and Warren (1999) US 3 0:176 0:276 0:222
Picci (1999) IT 8 ￿0:248 0:501 0:231
Bonaglia, La Ferrara, and Marcellino (2000) IT 10 ￿0:390 1:001 0:235
Charlot and Schmitt (2000) FR 7 0:040 0:321 0:202
Dessus and Herrera (2000) 28 2 0:110 0:130 0:120
Yamano and Ohkawara (2000) JP 2 0:034 0:148 0:091
Yamarik (2000) US 24 ￿0:061 0:119 0:045
Alonso-Carrera and Freire-S eren (2001) ES 1 0:126 0:126 0:126
Owyong and Thangavelu (2001) CA 11 0:308 1:147 0:676
Stephan (2001) DE/FR 4 0:083 0:128 0:102
Kemmerling and Stephan (2002) DE 3 0:169 0:170 0:169
Ligthart (2002) PT 14 ￿0:018 0:387 0:230
Bajo-Rubio, Rold an, and Montavez-Garc es (2002)ES 5 0:039 0:054 0:046
Stephan (2003) DE 4 0:385 0:651 0:530
Rodr guez-Valez and Yarias Sampedro (2004) ES 2 0:130 0:160 0:145
Cantos, Gumbau, and Maudos (2005) ES 10 ￿0:032 0:143 0:031
Kataoka (2005) JP 4 ￿0:065 0:313 0:139
Kawaguchi, Ohtake, and Tamada (2005) JP 16 ￿0:001 0:640 0:237
La Ferrara and Marcellino (2005) IT 13 ￿0:161 0:559 0:053
Berechman, Ozmen, and Ozbay (2006) US 9 ￿0:009 0:047 0:027
Cadot, Roller, and Stephan (2006) FR 3 0:080 0:086 0:083
Kamps (2006) 22 59 ￿1:726 1:369 0:395
Moreno and L opez-Bazo (2007) ES 9 ￿0:001 0:051 0:034
Creel and Poilon (2008) 6 9 0:050 0:140 0:093
Total 578
Average 0:184
Notes: aThe following country codes are used: `US' for the United States, `SE' for Sweden, `ES'
for Spain, `AU' for Australia, `NL' for the Netherlands, `CA' for Canada, `FR' for France, `IE'
for Ireland, `IT' for Italy, `JP' for Japan, `DE' for Germany, and `PT' for Portugal. For panel
data studies using data for more than one country, the number of countries in the panel is given.
bThe estimates considered are those replicated by Tatom (1991) using revised data for the same
period; Ratner's (1983) original estimate amounts to 0.056.Chapter 3
Output Dynamics, Technology,
and Public Investment
Abstract: This chapter studies how technology aects the output dynamics of
public infrastructure investment in a small open economy. We develop an over-
lapping generations model in which public capital enters the rm's production
function under various technological scenarios. We show that public investment
crowds out private investment in both the short and the long run for the empiri-
cally plausible case of Solow-neutral public capital (i.e., private capital augment-
ing) and low substitutability between private production factors. Because of the
resulting lower steady-state stock of private capital, the long-run output multiplier
is substantially smaller than in the standard case of a Hicks-neutral Cobb-Douglas
technology. In contrast to conventional results obtained from hysteretic models,
we nd non-monotonic output dynamics of a public investment impulse in our
non-hysteretic model. Our analysis also demonstrates that an increase in public
investment, despite reducing output in the short run, improves both short-run and
long-run welfare for a plausibly-sized public capital externality.42 Output Dynamics, Technology, and Public Investment | Chapter 3
3.1 Introduction
To address the economic and nancial crisis, many industrialized countries have
adopted scal stimulus measures. Most countries increased public spending on
infrastructure, in particular transportation networks (e.g., highways, mass transit,
and airports).1 The reason for this choice is the belief that public investment in
infrastructure not only stimulates aggregate demand in the short run, but also
contributes to expand the economy's production capacity in the long run. These
developments have revived interest in the debate on the supply-side eects of
public infrastructure investment. The present chapter contributes to this literature
by analyzing the short-run, transitional, and long-run output eects of public
investment for a small open economy. More specically, we analyze how various
assumptions on the rm's production technology and the household's labor supply
response aect the impulse responses and the size of long-run output multipliers
of public investment.
The notion that public capital generates benecial spillover eects to the pri-
vate sector is widely accepted in the empirical literature.2 The theoretical litera-
ture on the dynamic eects of public investment is less well developed, however.
Baxter and King (1993) calibrate a real business cycle model of a closed economy to
quantify the dynamic macroeconomic eects of permanent shocks to government
consumption and public investment. Turnovsky and Fisher (1995) analytically
investigate a model similar to that of Baxter and King, but assume that rms en-
joy positive spillovers from the ow (rather than the accumulated stock) of public
investment. Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) and Rioja (1999) explicitly focus on the
eects of public capital congestion.3 Little attention has been paid to the open
1Public infrastructure capital is dened to include, among others, highways, railways, airports,
sewerage and water systems, dams and other ood control structures, and lighthouse services.
Public capital in a broad sense also includes hospitals and educational buildings and other public
buildings.
2Aschauer's (1989a) seminal paper|which estimates an output elasticity of public capital of
0.39|gave a strong boost to the empirical literature on public capital. The meta-analysis by
Bom and Ligthart (2008) nds estimates of the output elasticity of public capital in the range
0.08{0.15.
3A second strand of literature considers models in which the assumption of constant returns
to scale to reproducible factors of production generates endogenous growth. Barro (1990) and
Glomm and Ravikumar (1994, 1997) use endogenous growth models featuring innitely-lived
households without a leisure-labor choice to derive the conditions of optimal scal policy along
the balanced growth path. Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2010) focus rather on the short-run and
long-run interhousehold distributional eects of public investment.Section 3.1 | Introduction 43
economy implications of public investment. A notable exception is Heijdra and
Meijdam (2002), to which our work is most closely related.
In this chapter, we add to the literature by focusing on the factor-augmenting
role of public capital, which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been analyzed
in a dynamic macroeconomic context yet.4 Public capital may enter the rm's
production function in two ways: (i) as a separate input (direct eect); and (ii)
via the index of factor productivity (indirect eect). The majority of studies
assume a Cobb-Douglas production function, in which case the direct and indirect
eects cannot be disentangled.5 More important, public capital is always assumed
to enter production in a Hicks-neutral fashion, that is, it aects both labor and
capital productivity to the same extent. However, the change in factor productivity
in the US economy during the 20th century has neither been Hicks neutral nor
Harrod neutral (i.e., labor augmenting).6 In addition, the elasticity of substitution
between private capital and labor is not necessarily unity. Empirical evidence on
this elasticity is mixed, ranging from 0 to 3.4, with the majority of estimates falling
into the range of 0.40{0.60 (cf. Chirinko, 2008). For this reason, we specify a more
exible production function that allows the elasticity of substitution to be below
unity. By choosing such a functional form, we are able to distinguish between
Harrod-neutral public capital and Solow-neutral (i.e., capital-augmenting) public
capital.
We develop a microfounded dynamic macroeconomic model for a small open
economy. In adopting the Yaari (1965){Blanchard (1985) overlapping genera-
tions framework|in which households face a constant probability of death|the
household sector of our model is similar to that of Heijdra and Meijdam (2002).
However, because we focus on input substitution and technology scenarios, we
depart from these authors by modeling endogenous labor supply and a more ex-
ible production technology. The model features an internationally traded bond,
ensuring that households can use the current account of the balance of payments
to smooth private consumption. Firms operate under perfect competition and en-
joy production spillovers from public capital. This production externality yields
4Feehan (1998) touches upon the issue, but employs a static two-factor, two-goods model
of a small open economy. In addition, he focuses on the ow rather than the stock of public
infrastructure.
5Because the Cobb-Douglas function yields constant output elasticities of inputs, the litera-
ture has strongly focused on this case (cf. Bom and Ligthart, 2008). Otto and Voss (1998) is a
notable exception.
6See David and Van de Klundert (1965) and Boskin and Lau (2000).44 Output Dynamics, Technology, and Public Investment | Chapter 3
a suboptimal market outcome, providing a justication for government interven-
tion. To limit the international mobility of physical capital, and thus to avoid
trivial capital dynamics, we postulate adjustment costs of both private and public
investment. The government balances its budget by employing lump-sum taxes.
We construct a simple graphical framework to analyze the qualitative steady-
state eects of a public investment shock. The framework is versatile because
it embeds as special cases the key specications employed in the literature (e.g.,
exogenous labor supply, Hicks-neutral public capital, a Cobb-Douglas production
technology, and innitely-lived households). To get insight into the quantitative
eects of public investment shocks over time, we numerically simulate the model
based on empirically plausible parameter values taken from the literatures on small
open economy models and public capital. We go beyond the standard practice of
using numerical impulse response functions by deriving analytical expressions for
the transition paths.
Innite-horizon models of a small open economy typically suer from a knife-
edge property, which says that the rate of interest should be equal to the pure
rate of interest for a meaningful steady state to exist. This model class yields a
hysteretic steady state. Introducing Yaari-Blanchard overlapping generations is a
convenient way to arrive at an endogenously determined (non-hysteretic) steady
state. Besides serving this technical objective, overlapping generations provide a
realistic description of the demographic structure of the household sector. A key
question is whether our hysteresis-eliminating device aects the impulse responses
of a scal shock. Therefore, another objective of this chapter is to compare the
impulse responses in the non-hysteretic model with those found in the hysteretic
version of our model. Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2003) show that non-stationary
and stationary models yield virtually identical impulse responses, irrespective of
the device used to remove the unit root property.7 More specically, we investigate
the robustness of Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe's (2003) claim to the presence of a
public capital externality.
We show that while the technology type of public capital does not matter
for the sign of the output multiplier, it does aect its size. In the empirically
7Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2003) employ a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
for a small open economy and therefore speak of stationary and non-stationary models. In
our deterministic setting, this terminology corresponds to non-hysteretic and hysteretic models.
Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2003) discuss four ways to `close' small open models: (i) an endogenous
discount factor; (ii) a debt-elastic interest rate premium; (iii) convex portfolio adjustment costs;
and (iv) complete asset markets.Section 3.2 | The Model 45
relevant case in which public capital is Solow neutral and the elasticity of substi-
tution between private inputs is small, a permanent increase in public investment
crowds out private investment not only in the short run but also in the long run.
Consequently, the stock of private capital is reduced in the long run, causing the
output multiplier to fall substantially short of its value for a Hicks-neutral Cobb-
Douglas technology. Irrespective of the elasticity of substitution, Harrod-neutral
public capital yields a long-run output multiplier equal to that found in the Cobb-
Douglas scenario. Long-run private consumption and welfare, however, are not
aected by the type of factor-augmentation. Second, the way in which public
capital aects factor productivity crucially matters for the dynamics of private
capital and net foreign assets, but yields qualitatively similar output dynamics.
Finally, we show that the impulse responses of a public investment shock in the
nite-horizon model are very dierent from those found in the innite-horizon
model. The combination of a public capital externality, endogenous labor supply,
and nite horizons gives rise to non-monotonic output dynamics. If any of these
three elements is dropped from the analysis, we nd the conventional result of
monotonic transition paths. Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe's (2003) result is not ro-
bust to the inclusion of production externalities and is therefore not as generally
valid as suggested.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 develops a dynamic macroeco-
nomic framework for a small open economy in which public capital enters the pro-
duction function in a factor-augmenting fashion. Section 3.3 studies the model's
steady state and develops a graphical framework. Section 3.4 analyzes analyti-
cally and graphically the long-run eects of a public investment shock nanced
by lump-sum taxes. Section 3.5 studies numerically the dynamic macroeconomic
eects of an unanticipated and permanent increase in public investment. Section
3.6 summarizes and concludes the chapter.
3.2 The Model
We consider a small open economy populated by overlapping generations of nitely-
lived households, innitely-lived rms, and a government, which we discuss in turn.46 Output Dynamics, Technology, and Public Investment | Chapter 3
3.2.1 Households
The household section of the model extends Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985)
by incorporating an endogenous labor-leisure choice along the lines of Heijdra
and Ligthart (2007). Individual households face a constant probability of death
 ¥ 0, which is assumed to equal the rate at which new agents are born.8 Because
population growth is absent, the size of the population can be normalized to
unity. Households are disconnected and therefore do not leave bequests. Ecient
nancial markets allow households to borrow and lend at the exogenously given
world rate of interest (denoted by r) adjusted for the probability of death.






where  is the pure rate of time preference and Upv;tq is a Cobb-Douglas utility
index dened over private consumption Cpv;tq and leisure 1 ￿ Lpv;tq:
Upv;tq ￿ Cpv;tq
"C r1 ￿ Lpv;tqs
1￿"C ; 0 ￿ "C ￿ 1; (3.2)
where Lpv;tq denotes labor supply. Note that total time available to the house-
hold has been normalized to unity. Equation (3.1) implies a unitary intertemporal
elasticity of substitution and (3.2) imposes a unitary intratemporal elasticity of
substitution between private consumption and leisure. The household's ow bud-
get constraint is
9 Apv;tq ￿ pr ￿ qApv;tq ￿ wptqLpv;tq ￿ Tptq ￿ Cpv;tq; (3.3)
where 9 Apv;tq ￿ dApv;tq{dt, Apv;tq denotes real nancial wealth, wptq is the (age-
independent) real wage rate, and Tptq are lump-sum taxes. Private consumption
is used as numeraire commodity whose price has been normalized to unity. House-
holds can contract actuarially fair `reverse' life insurance (cf. Blanchard, 1985),
implying an eective return on nancial wealth equal to r ￿ .
The representative household of cohort v, who is endowed with perfect fore-
sight, maximizes lifetime utility (3.1){(3.2) subject to its budget identity (3.3)
and a no-Ponzi game solvency condition. We solve the household's problem by
8This framework embeds the standard Ramsey model as a special case, which is obtained if
 ￿ 0 is imposed.Section 3.2 | The Model 47
two-stage budgeting. In the rst stage, the household decides on its consumption
over time, yielding the Euler equation for individual `full' consumption:9
9 Xpv;tq
Xpv;tq
￿ r ￿  ¡ 0; (3.4)
where full consumption is dened as
Xpv;tq ￿ PptqUpv;tq ￿ wptqr1 ￿ Lpv;tqs ￿ Cpv;tq; (3.5)
where Pptq is a `true' price index (to be derived below) and Upv;tq is the subutility
index given in (3.2). We study the case of a patient nation (i.e., r ¡ ), which
yields rising individual consumption proles. In the second stage, full consumption
is allocated over private consumption and leisure. The rst-order conditions yield





with (3.5), this expression gives rise to demand functions for goods consumption
and leisure:
Cpv;tq ￿ "CXpv;tq; (3.6)















Variables at the aggregate level can be calculated as a weighted sum of the
values for dierent generations. For example, aggregate nancial wealth is Aptq ￿
‡t
￿8 Apv;tqepv￿tqdv, where epv￿tq is the size of cohort v at time t. By aggre-
gating (3.4) over all existing generations, we arrive at aggregate full consumption:
9 Xptq
Xptq










Equation (3.9) says that aggregate consumption growth equals individual con-
sumption growth (the rst term) minus the `generational turnover eect' (the sec-
ond term), that is, the wealth redistribution caused by the passing away of genera-
tions. Intuitively, old generations have accumulated wealth over the course of their
9Further details on the mathematical derivations can be found in Bom, Heijdra, and Ligthart
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life, whereas new generations are born without nancial wealth (i.e., Apt;tq ￿ 0).
Consequently, the consumption level of new generations Xpt;tq falls short of the
average consumption level Xptq.10
3.2.2 Firms
The representative rm produces a homogeneous good Y ptq under perfect compe-
tition. Technology is described by a constant elasticity of substitution function,
which is linearly homogeneous in private capital Kptq and labor Lptq. The public
capital stock KGptq enters private production in a factor-augmenting fashion:











where 0 ￿ Y ! 8 is the elasticity of substitution between private capital and
labor, 0 ￿ "Y ￿ 1 is the eciency parameter of capital, and AKptq and ALptq are
technology functions:
Aiptq ￿ iKGptq
i; i ￿ tK;Lu; (3.11)
where i represents the elasticity of the technology function and i ¡ 0 is a scaling
factor. Hicks-neutral public capital can be represented by K ￿ L ￿  ¡ 0,11
Harrod-neutral (or labor-augmenting) public capital assumes L ¡ K ￿ 0, and
Solow-neutral (or capital-augmenting) public capital is described by K ¡ L ￿
0.12 If Y ￿ 1, then (3.10) collapses to a Cobb-Douglas function, in which case
the distinction between the various types of factor-augmenting public capital is
immaterial.
Equation (3.10) incorporates a public capital externality, which gives rise to




Y ptq ¡ 0 represents the output
10We use Xptq ￿ p ￿ qrAptq ￿ Hptqs and Xpt;tq ￿ p ￿ qHptq, where Hptq is `full'
human wealth, that is, the after-tax value of the household's time endowment: Hptq ￿ ‡8
t rwpq ￿ Tpqsepr￿qpt￿qd:
11Equation (3.11) boils down to ALptq ￿ AKptq ￿ KGptq, where L ￿ K ￿ . If we also
set Y ￿ 1, equation (3.10) reduces to Heijdra and Meijdam's (2002) production technology.
12Of course, intermediate cases such as K ¡ 0 and L ¡ 0 (with K ￿ L) are feasible. Here,
we focus on the pure types of factor-augmenting public capital only.Section 3.2 | The Model 49
elasticity of factor j ￿ tK;L;KGu.13 The output share of public capital can be
written as
Gptq ￿ KptqK ￿ LptqL: (3.12)
To ensure diminishing returns with respect to broad capital (and thus exclude
endogenous growth), we impose  ￿ G ￿ 1￿K in the case of Hicks-neutral public
capital. The Solow-neutral case requires Kp1 ￿ Kq ￿ 1, whereas no conditions
are needed for the Harrod-neutral case. For plausible parameter combinations,
these conditions are easily met (see Section 3.5.1).
To avoid trivial capital dynamics, we introduce adjustment costs in private
investment. Net capital formation is linked to gross investment Iptq according to











where  is the (constant) rate of capital depreciation and p￿q is the installation
cost function of private capital accumulation, which satises p0q ￿ 0; 1p￿q ¡ 0;
and 2p￿q ￿ 0 (where primes denote derivatives). The degree of physical capital
mobility of private capital is given by 0 ￿ A ￿ ￿ I
K
2p￿q
1p￿q ! 8. A small A|
representing a less concave installation cost function|characterizes a high degree
of physical capital mobility.





rY pq ￿ wpqLpq ￿ Ipqse
rpt￿qd; (3.14)
subject to the capital accumulation constraint (3.13) and the economy-wide stock
of public capital. The prices of output and investment goods are normalized to
unity. To allow for meaningful production spillovers, we require that the govern-
ment cannot charge a user fee on the services of public capital, for example, road
13Some authors assume constant returns to scale across all inputs (e.g., Aschauer, 1989a) with
a view to model congestion eects. In our context, however, public capital is modeled as a pure
public good.50 Output Dynamics, Technology, and Public Investment | Chapter 3
toll fees. The optimality conditions are






















where qptq denotes Tobin's q, which is dened as the market value of private capital
relative to its replacement costs, and Yjptq ￿
BY ptq
Bjptq ¡ 0 represents the marginal
productivity of factor j ￿ tK;L;KGu. Equation (3.15) describes labor demand,
(3.16) represents investment demand, and (3.17) shows the evolution of Tobin's




















If private production factors are gross substitutes (i.e., Y ¡ 1) and public capital
is capital-augmenting (i.e., K￿L ¡ 0), an increase in KGptq increases the relative
marginal product of private capital. Thus, public capital is biased toward private
capital. If private factors are gross complements (i.e., Y ￿ 1) and K￿L ¡ 0, an
increase in KGptq increases the relative marginal product of labor. Thus, public
capital is biased toward labor.
3.2.3 Government and Foreign Sector
The government invests in public capital IGptq and consumes goods CGptq. To fo-
cus solely on spillovers of public investment on the production side, we assume that
public consumption does not give rise to spillovers on the consumption side. Total
public spending is nanced by lump-sum taxes, implying that CGptq￿IGptq ￿ Tptq
holds at each instant of time. Just like private capital, public capital accumulates















14Without adjustment costs, we have p￿q ￿ Iptq{Kptq and 1p￿q ￿ 1, which yields A ￿ 0.
Equation (3.16) then reduces to q ￿ 1. In this case, Kptq adjusts instantaneously to its steady-
state level. Consequently, equation (3.17) reduces to YK ￿ r ￿ ; which is the familiar rental
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where G is the rate of depreciation of public capital and G p￿q is the installation
cost function of public capital, which satises Gp0q ￿ 0; 1
Gp￿q ¡ 0; and 2
Gp￿q ￿ 0.
The parameter G represents the elasticity of the public capital installation cost
function.
Foreign nancial capital is perfectly mobile across borders. The change in net
foreign assets 9 Fptq follows from the current account of the balance of payments:
9 Fptq ￿ rFptq￿Zptq; where rFptq denotes the return on net foreign assets and net
exports are given by: Zptq ￿ Y ptq ￿ Cptq ￿ CGptq ￿ Iptq ￿ IGptq.
3.2.4 Market Equilibrium
The domestic labor market clears at each instant of time. Similarly, goods markets
do not feature any rigidities, so that Y ptq ￿ Cptq ￿ CGptq ￿ Iptq ￿ IGptq ￿ Zptq.
Portfolio equilibrium amounts to Aptq ￿ V ptq ￿ Fptq, where V ptq ￿ qptqKptq
denotes the rm's stock market value. Assets in the household's portfolio are
assumed to be perfect substitutes. Initially, Ap0q ￿ V p0q ¡ 0 because Kp0q ¡ 0
and Fp0q ￿ 0, implying that the trade account of the balance of payments is
initially balanced; physical capital is thus fully domestically owned.
3.3 Solving the Model
This section studies the steady state and develops a graphical framework to analyze
the dynamic eects of a public investment impulse.
3.3.1 Steady State
To solve the model, we log-linearize it around an initial steady state in which
Fp0q ￿ 0. A tilde (~) denotes a relative change, for example, ~ Xptq ￿ dXptq{X0,
where X0 denotes the initial steady-state value of full consumption. Notable excep-
tions are nancial assets and lump-sum taxes. For nancial assets Aptq and Fptq,
we use ~ Aptq ￿ rdAptq{Y0 and 9 ~ Aptq ￿ rd 9 Aptq{Y0, whereas the change in lump-sum
taxes is scaled by steady-state output Y0 only, that is, ~ Tptq ￿ dTptq{Y0. Where
confusion cannot arise, we drop the zero subscripts to denote initial steady-state
values.
The reduced-form dynamic model contains two predetermined variables (i.e.,
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nancial assets) and two non-predetermined variables52 Output Dynamics, Technology, and Public Investment | Chapter 3
Table 3.1: Summary of the Log-Linearized Model
(a) Dynamic Equations:
9 ~ Kptq =
r!I
!A r~ Iptq ￿ ~ Kptqs (T3.01)
9 ~ qptq = r~ qptq ￿
rK
Y !Ar~ Y ptq ￿ ~ Kptq ￿ pY ￿ 1qK ~ KGptqs (T3.02)
9 ~ Xptq = pr ￿ q
￿





9 ~ Aptq = r
￿
~ Aptq ￿ !w ~ wptq ￿ ~ Tptq ￿ !X ~ Xptq
￿
(T3.04)
9 ~ KGptq = Gr~ IG ￿ ~ KGptqs (T3.05)
(b) Static Equations:
~ qptq = Ar~ Iptq ￿ ~ Kptqs (T3.06)
~ wptq = 1
Y
￿
~ Y ptq ￿ ~ Lptq ￿ pY ￿ 1qL ~ KGptq
￿
(T3.07)
~ Y ptq = K ~ Kptq ￿ L~ Lptq ￿ G ~ KGptq (T3.08)
~ Lptq = !LLr ~ wptq ￿ ~ Xptqs (T3.09)
~ Cptq = ~ Xptq (T3.10)
~ Fptq = ~ Aptq ￿ !Ar~ qptq ￿ ~ Kptqs (T3.11)
~ Tptq = !I
G~ IGptq ￿ !C
G ~ CGptq (T3.12)
(c) Denitions:
~ Pptq = p1 ￿ "Cq ~ wptq (T3.13)
Notes: The following denitions are used: K ￿ YKK{Y , L ￿ YLL{Y , G ￿ YGKG{Y , !A ￿
rpqK{Y q, !I ￿ I{Y , !C
G ￿ CG{Y , !I
G ￿ IG{Y , !w ￿ w{Y , !X ￿ X{Y , !LL ￿ p1 ￿ Lq{L,
A ￿ ￿pI{Kqp2{1q ¡ 0, and G ￿ IG1
Gp￿q{KG ¡ 0. A tilde (~) denotes a relative change,
for example, ~ Cptq ￿ dCptq{C for most variables. Financial assets, however, are scaled by steady-
state output and multiplied by r, for example, ~ Aptq ￿ rdAptq{Y . Lump-sum taxes are scaled by
output, that is, ~ Tptq ￿ dTptq{Y .
(i.e., Tobin's q and full consumption).15 By collecting variables in the vector
~ zptq ￿ r ~ Kptq ~ qptq ~ Xptq ~ Aptqs1 and shock terms in the vector  ptq ￿ r0 qptq 0 Aptqs1
we can write the dynamic system as
9 ~ zptq ￿ ~ zptq ￿  ptq; (3.20)
15Strictly speaking, the variable ~ A is not completely predetermined. The non-predetermined
part of it, however, is already determined by the investment system.Section 3.3 | Solving the Model 53











Y !A p1 ￿ ykq r ￿
rK
Y !Ayx 0
0 0 r ￿  ￿r￿
!A






where !A ￿ rA{Y denotes the output share of asset income, !I ￿ I{Y is the
output share of private investment, !w ￿ w{Y is the output share of wages,
!X ￿ X{Y denotes the output share of full consumption, and yk ¡ 0, yx ￿ 0,













￿ ~ IG ￿ r!
C
G ~ CG; (3.22)
where !C
G ￿ CG{Y and !I
G ￿ IG{Y . The sign of yg and wg is not a priori clear
(Appendix 3.A.1.1). Because we are studying a public investment impulse, we set
~ IG ¡ 0 and ~ CG ￿ 0.
The model has a unique and locally saddle-point stable steady state, featuring
two positive real roots and two negative real roots (Appendix 3.A.1.2). The sys-
tem (3.20) embeds various special cases. First, if labor supply is exogenous (i.e.,
 23 ￿ ￿
rK
Y !Ayx ￿ 0), the system is recursive, meaning that the investment subsys-
tem [~ qptq; ~ Kptq] can be solved independent of the savings subsystem [ ~ Xptq; ~ Aptq].
Second, if households are innitely lived (i.e.,  ￿ 0; in this case r ￿  must also
hold for a steady state to exist) then the third row of  consists of zeros only. A
hysteretic steady state is obtained if a zero root is present.
3.3.2 Graphical Framework
Figure 3.1 graphically summarizes the model's long-run equilibrium, which is si-
multaneously determined in four panels. The economy is initially at the steady-
state equilibrium E0. Panel (a) shows the equilibrium on the private capital mar-
ket. The long-run supply of private capital Ksprq is perfectly elastic in a small
open economy, and can thus be graphically represented by a horizontal line. Using54 Output Dynamics, Technology, and Public Investment | Chapter 3
the steady-state versions of (3.13) and (3.17), the long-run capital demand curve









which is downward sloping since BYK{BK ￿ 0. The intersection of capital supply
Ksprq and capital demand Kdpr;L0;KG0;q0q determines the initial steady-state
level of capital Kp0q ￿ K0 ¡ 0. The eect of public capital on private capital






rG ￿ KpY ￿ 1qs: (3.24)
Hence, an increase in public capital shifts the capital demand curve to the right
if G ￿ KpY ￿ 1q ¡ 0. In the Solow-neutral case, this condition implies that
Y ¡ L. We label the shift in the capital demand curve the capital-productivity
eect, which consists of the pure externality eect G and the Solow-substitution
eect KpY ￿ 1q. Only for K ¡ 0 and Y ￿ 1 does the Solow substitution
eect play a role; its value is small for complementary private inputs. Because
BYK{BL ¡ 0, the capital demand curve always shifts to the right if employment
increases.
Panel (b) depicts the equilibrium in the labor market. For a given level of full





which follows from (3.7) in aggregate form. A rise in full consumption induces
households to work less|the wealth eect on labor supply|and thus shifts the
labor supply curve to left, thereby pushing wages up and depressing employment.
The labor demand curve Ldpw;K0;KG0q is derived from the marginal productivity
of labor (3.15):
w ￿ YLpL;K0;KG0q; (3.26)
which is downward sloping because BYL{BL ￿ 0. For K ￿ K0, KG ￿ KG0,
and X ￿ X0, the equilibrium employment level and wage rate are L0 and w0,







rG ￿ LpY ￿ 1qs: (3.27)Section 3.3 | Solving the Model 55
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Notes: Panels (a){(d) depict the capital market, labor market, production function, and savings
subsystem, respectively. E0 denotes the initial (pre-shock) steady state and E8 represents the
new long-run equilibrium after the public investment shock. Panel (a) also shows the case of a
positive long-run private capital multiplier, as found under both Hicks and Harrod neutrality.
Similarly, Panel (c) depicts the production function, where the case of a negative net foreign
assets multiplier (distance between points M and N) is shown.
Thus, an increase in public capital shifts the labor demand curve to right if G ￿
LpY ￿ 1q ¡ 0, causing wages and employment to rise. We call this the labor-
productivity eect, which consists of the pure externality eect G and the Harrod-
substitution eect LpY ￿ 1q. Since BYL{BK ¡ 0, a larger private capital stock
also pushes the labor demand curve to the right.
Panel (d) determines initial full consumption and the stock of assets for given
wages and lump-sum taxes. The modied Keynes-Ramsey schedule XkrpAq gives






The XkrpAq schedule is upward sloping because of the generational turnover eect.
The variables X and A must also satisfy the steady-state household budget identity
XhbpA;w0;KG0q that follows from (3.3):
X ￿ rA ￿ w0 ￿ CG0 ￿ 
￿1pGqKG0; (3.29)
where we used the steady-state version of (3.19) and the government's budget
constraint. Given KG ￿ KG0 and w ￿ w0, the intersection of the XkrpAq and
XhbpA;w0;KG0q schedules determines the initial steady-state levels of full con-
sumption X0 and nancial assets A0. A rise in the wage rate shifts the Xhbp￿q
curve up, resulting in a higher equilibrium level of assets.
Finally, Panel (c) shows the production function Y p￿q, which relates output
to private capital given labor and public capital. For initial levels of inputs L0,
K0, and KG0, initial output is Y0. Panel (c) also depicts the line qK. Because
A0 ￿ qK0 (point G), foreign assets in the initial steady state are zero, that is,
F0 ￿ 0.
As a result of an investment shock, the value of Tobin's q deviates from qp0q ￿
qp8q in the short and medium run. To graphically analyze the dynamics during
this time period, we make use of Figure 3.2. The 9 q ￿ 0 locus in Panel (a) shows
combinations of qptq and Kptq for which Tobin's q is constant over time; it is also
given by (3.23) with xed r and variable q. The schedule is downward sloping
because a higher capital stock reduces the marginal product of capital and thus
yields lower dividends to shareholders. The 9 K ￿ 0 locus denotes combinations
of qptq and Kptq for which net investment is zero. The schedule is horizontal at
the unique value of Tobin's q for which p￿q ￿ . Panel (b) illustrates the labor
market dynamics by adding the short-run and medium-run labor-productivity and
wealth eects to Panel (b) of Figure 3.1. Recall that because the dynamic system
is not recursive the dynamic equilibrium paths are simultaneously determined in
the investment subsystem [Panel (a)] and saving subsystem (not shown), which
are connected by the endogenously determined level of employment (see Section
3.3.1).Section 3.3 | Solving the Model 57
Figure 3.2: Transitional Eects of Public Infrastructure Investment:




























































Notes: E0 denotes the initial (pre-shock) steady state, E1 shows the short-run equilibrium after
the public investment shock, E2 gives the medium-run equilibrium associated with the maximum
level of employment, and E8 denotes the new steady state. Since the dynamics of private
capital are qualitatively dierent under Harrod/Hicks neutrality and Solow neutrality, we use
the superscripts `H' and `S' to distinguish the respective equilibria in Panel (a); this distinction
is unnecessary in Panel (b).58 Output Dynamics, Technology, and Public Investment | Chapter 3
3.4 Analytical Long-Run Eects of Public In-
vestment
Section 3.4.1 analytically investigates the long-run allocation eects and Section
3.4.2 studies the welfare eects of a permanent and unanticipated increase in public
investment. The scal shock is unanticipated in the sense that it is simultaneously
announced and implemented. To keep its budget balanced, the government raises
lump-sum taxes.
3.4.1 Allocation Eects
The increase in public investment expands the steady-state stock of public capital








where yG ￿ Y {KG, !I
G ￿ IG{Y , and yG!I
G ￿ 
￿1
G pGq. Panel (b) of Figure 3.1
shows that the increase in public capital has two opposite eects on the labor
market. On the one hand, the labor-productivity eect shifts the labor demand
curve to the right from Ldpw;K0;KG0q to Ldpw;K8;KG8q, thereby boosting em-
ployment and wages. On the other hand, the wealth eect on labor supply causes
a leftward shift of the labor supply curve from Lspw;X0q to Lspw;X8q, further
increasing wages but partially osetting the increase in employment.16 The new
steady-state equilibrium is denoted by E8. The labor-productivity eect always



























where !LL ￿ p1￿Lq{L is the leisure-labor ratio (or intertemporal substitution elas-
ticity of labor supply). The rst term of (3.31) represents the labor-productivity
16The wealth eect derives from the fact that|for plausible parameter values|the rise in
gross wages dominates the increase in lump-sum taxes necessary to balance the government
budget. In Panel (d) of Figure 3.1, the Xhbp￿q curve shifts up to XhbpA;w8;KG8q, raising full
consumption to X8 and nancial assets to A8.
17Using equation (3.9) in steady state yields p￿q￿rpr￿q ￿ p￿qp!X ￿!Aq{!X ¡ 0,
where !X ￿ !A ¡ 0.Section 3.4 | Analytical Long-Run Eects of Public Investment 59
eect and the second term captures the wealth eect. Since both eects contribute
to raise the wage rate, the wage multiplier given by (3.32) is positive. Of course,
in the absence of a public capital externality (i.e., YG ￿ 0 and thus G ￿ 0), we
nd that wages are unaected.
Public capital has a direct eect on private capital demand, which is captured
by the capital productivity eect described by (3.24). Also, because labor and
private capital are cooperative factors, public capital has an indirect eect on























where y ￿ Y {K. The rst term of (3.33) is the capital-productivity eect. The
second and third terms capture the eect of public investment on employment
and correspond to the labor-productivity and wealth eects, respectively. If pub-
lic capital is Harrod neutral (i.e., K ￿ 0) or factors of production are gross
substitutes (i.e., Y ¡ 1) or both, then the multiplier of private capital tends to
be positive (see also Section 3.5). Graphically, public investment shifts the capital
demand curve to the right for a given interest rate|as depicted in Panel (a) of
Figure 3.1|causing an increase in the long-run stock of private capital from K0
to K8. However, if public capital is Solow neutral and factors of production are
strong gross complements, then the negative Solow-substitution eect dominates
the positive pure externality eect so as to render the capital-productivity eect
also negative. In this case, the net eect of public investment on private capital
may be negative if the negative capital-productivity eect more than osets the
positive indirect eect spilling over from the labor market.
If employment, private capital, and public capital increase, then output also























where we have totally dierentiated (3.10) and made use of (3.30), (3.31), and
(3.33). The two terms in the rst line of (3.34) correspond to the capital and
labor-productivity eects, whereas the negative term in the second line represents60 Output Dynamics, Technology, and Public Investment | Chapter 3
the wealth eect. The most important result from (3.34) is that the output mul-
tiplier is smaller if private inputs are gross complements (i.e., Y ￿ 1) and public
capital is Solow neutral (i.e., K ¡ 0). In this case, public capital is biased toward
the relatively expensive factor (labor) and substitutability to the relatively cheap
factor (private capital) is rather limited, which leads to lower private capital ac-
cumulation. In contrast, if public capital is labor-augmenting (i.e., L ¡ 0 and
K ￿ 0), then the elasticity of substitution between private inputs is irrelevant to
the size of the multiplier, reecting the availability of private capital at a xed
user cost.
Equation (3.34) embeds several other special cases. First, if labor supply is
exogenous (i.e., !LL ￿ 0) the second and third terms of (3.34)|whose net eect
is positive|drop out, implying that the output multiplier is larger if labor supply
is endogenous.18 Second, if agents are innitely-lived (i.e.,  ￿ 0 and r ￿ )
the wealth eect is less negative, which implies an even larger output multiplier.
Finally, if public capital is not productive (i.e., YG ￿ G ￿ K ￿ 0), then only
the negative component of the wealth eect remains; we thus obtain the output







Panel (c) of Figure 3.1 shows the long-run eect of public investment on output.
The increase in employment and public capital shifts up the production function
Y pK;L0;KG0q to Y pK;L8;K8q. The new steady-state equilibrium is denoted by
E8, with a larger private capital stock K8 and higher output Y8. The slope of
the production function is the same at E8 and E0, since I{K, IG{KG, Tobin's q,
and thus YKp￿q [see (3.17)] are xed in the long run. The stock market value of
domestic rms increases to qK8 (point N). However, Panel (d) shows that public
investment also raises total domestic nancial assets to A8 [point M in Panel (c)].
Thus, the dierence (represented by the distance between N and M) gives the
long-run eect of public investment on net foreign assets, which may be either
positive or negative, depending on the long-run change in the stock of private
capital relative to the change in domestic nancial assets.20
18It can easily be shown that since the labor-productivity eect dominates the wealth eect
in equation (3.31), so does it in (3.33) and (3.34).
19The macroeconomic eects of unproductive public investment and public consumption are
identical. In this case, the positive output multiplier stems entirely from the wealth eect;
intuitively, the lump-sum tax increase causes households to feel poorer, inducing them to supply





20Panel (c) of Figure 3.1 shows the case dFp8q{dIG ￿ 0, which holds for reasonable parameter
values in the cases of Hicks-neutral public capital (with Y ￿ 1) and Harrod-neutral public
capital. See Section 3.5.3.Section 3.5 | Quantitative Analysis of the Eects of Public Investment 61
3.4.2 Welfare Eects
The eect public investment on long-run aggregate utility follows from dierenti-





















Equation (3.35) shows that a public investment impulse improves welfare if the
utility derived from higher long-run private consumption (the rst term in brack-
ets) outweighs the disutility from more labor supply (the second term). Two
important aspects are worth noting. First, the welfare eect of public invest-
ment depends neither on the type of factor-augmenting public capital nor on the
elasticity of substitution between private inputs (Y). Second, public investment
improves long-run welfare if and only if the size of the public sector externality
(G) exceeds the threshold level  G (i.e., G ¥  G), which is given by
 G ￿
Lp ￿ q
Lp ￿ q ￿ p1 ￿ Lqrpr ￿ q
!
I
G ¡ 0: (3.36)
Clearly, unproductive public investment (i.e., G ￿ 0) decreases long-run welfare.
In the case of exogenous labor supply (i.e., L ￿ 1), innite horizons (i.e.,  ￿ 0 and
r ￿ ) or both, (3.36) boils down to  G ￿ !I
G ¡ 0, implying that public investment
is welfare improving if and only if the output elasticity of public capital exceeds
the public investment-to-GDP ratio.
3.5 Quantitative Analysis of the Eects of Pub-
lic Investment
To quantify and visualize the dynamic macroeconomic eects of an increase in
public investment, we perform a simulation based on plausible parameter values
for a typical OECD country. Section 3.5.1 describes the parameters, Section 3.5.2
illustrates the transitional dynamics, and Section 3.5.3 provides numerical results
on both the short-run and long-run eects.
21Analyzing intergenerational welfare eects is beyond the scope of this chapter. Heijdra and
Meijdam (2002) provide this analysis for the case of exogenous labor supply and a Cobb-Douglas
production technology.62 Output Dynamics, Technology, and Public Investment | Chapter 3
3.5.1 Parameters
Table 3.2 shows the parameter values used in the numerical analysis. The time
unit represents a year. In assigning values to !LL, r, and , we follow Mendoza
(1991), who calibrates a real business cycle model for the Canadian economy. In
the benchmark model, the intertemporal substitution elasticity of labor supply
!LL is set to 2:00, the rate of interest takes on a value of 0.04, and the rate of
depreciation of private and public capital is 0.1. Based on an average expected
life span of 55 working years, we assume a probability of death  of 1.82 percent.
Following Baxter and King (1993), the ratio of public consumption to GDP is set
to 20 percent, which is in line with the average value for OECD countries. The
ratio of public investment to GDP takes on a value of 5 percent, which is slightly
above the OECD average. Based on Bom and Ligthart's (2008) meta-analysis of
67 empirical studies on the output elasticity of public capital, we use G ￿ 0:08.
Initially, we set Y to unity, which is in line with the Cobb-Douglas specication
used in most empirical studies.
We employ a logarithmic specication for both the private and public instal-
lation cost function:
pxq ￿  z ln
x ￿  z
 z
; Gpxq ￿  zG ln
xG ￿  zG
 zG
; (3.37)
where  z and  zG are exogenous constants, x ￿ I{K, and xG ￿ IG{KG. From
(3.37) and the denitions of A and G, we derive A ￿ x{px ￿  zq and G ￿
 zGxG{pxG￿ zGq. We set the steady-state values for x at 0.11 and choose  z ￿ 0:532,
implying steady-state adjustment costs of about 0.2 percent of output. Similarly,
we use xG ￿ 0:11 and pick  zG ￿ 0:532 to yield identical adjustment costs for public
capital as for private capital. The degree of private capital mobility is A ￿ 0:171.
The elasticity of the public installation function is G ￿ 0:091.
Given the xed rate of interest, our parametrization under nite horizons yields
rising individual consumption proles, that is, r ¡  ￿ 0:0388, where  is used
as a calibration parameter to arrive at A0 ￿ q0K0. Note that for the special
case of innite horizons, we set  ￿ 0 and r ￿ . Once we choose !C ￿ 0:55,
we nd the implied steady-state spending shares !I ￿ 0:20 and !Z ￿ 0 and the
preference weight "C ￿ 0:28. The implied ratio of output to private capital (y) is
0.55, which is slightly lower than the value found by Cooley and Prescott (1995).
For the public capital stock, we derive Y {KG ￿ 2:20, which is roughly in line with
Kamps (2006), who nds a value of around 2 for OECD countries. In addition,Section 3.5 | Quantitative Analysis of the Eects of Public Investment 63
Table 3.2: Chosen and Implied Parameter Values in the Benchmark Model
Description Parameter/Share Value
Panel (a): Chosen Values
Birth rate  0.018
Rate of interest r 0.040
Depreciation rate of private capital  0.100
Depreciation rate of public capital G 0.100
Output elasticity of public capital G 0.080
Parameter of the installation function for private capital  z 0.532
Parameter of the installation function for public capital  zG 0.532
Public consumption-to-GDP ratio !C
G 0.200
Public investment-to-GDP ratio !I
G 0.050
Private consumption-to-GDP ratio !C 0.550
Leisure-labor ratio !LL 2.000
Elasticity of substitution between labor and private capital Y 1.000
Panel (b): Selected Implied Values
Private investment-private capital ratio I{K 0.110
Public investment-public capital ratio IG{KG 0.110
Output-private capital ratio Y {K 0.550
Output-public capital ratio Y {KG 2.200
Tobin's q q 1.210
Output elasticity of private capital K 0.288
Output elasticity of labor L 0.712
Private capital weight in production function "Y 0.288
Elasticity of the private accumulation function A 0.171
Elasticity of the public accumulation function G 0.091
Preference weight of private consumption in utility function "C 0.278
Pure rate of time preference  0.039
Stable root 1 h￿
1 0.158
Stable root 2 h￿
2 0.017
Unstable root 1 r￿
1 0.058
Unstable root 2 r￿
2 0.198
Notes: Panel (a) shows the parameter and shares of the benchmark analysis. Panel (b) presents
implied values of selected economic variables and shares.
on the production side, we derive L ￿ 0:71, K ￿ 0:29, and "Y ￿ 0:29. The
conditions  ￿ 1￿K ￿ 0:71 and Kp1￿Kq ￿ 0:37 ￿ 1 are thus easily met. Also,
 G ￿ 0:046 ￿ G ￿ 0:08 [see (3.36)], which implies a positive long-run welfare eect
of public investment. Depending on the type of factor-augmenting public capital,
we can derive K or L using (3.12); that is, K ￿ G{K ￿ 0:276 and L ￿ 0 for
Solow-neutral public capital, L ￿ G{L ￿ 0:113 and K ￿ 0 for Harrod-neutral
public capital, and K ￿ L ￿ 0:08 for Hicks-neutral public capital. Of the four
characteristic roots, two are stable (￿h￿
1 ￿ ￿0:1576 and ￿h￿
2 ￿ ￿0:0172) and two
are unstable (r￿
1 ￿ 0:0584 and r￿
2 ￿ 0:1976).64 Output Dynamics, Technology, and Public Investment | Chapter 3
3.5.2 Impulse Responses
To visualize the impulse responses of a permanent and unanticipated rise in public
investment nanced by lump-sum taxes, we use the analytical expressions (3.59{
3.62) in Appendix 3.A.2.2 together with the log-linearized equations of Table 3.1.
We plot the impulse response functions for 200 time periods, which allows us to
accommodate dierences in transition speed of variables. The impact (or short-
run) eect of the scal shock occurs at t ￿ 0 and the steady-state (or long-run)
eect materializes at t ￿ 8. The size of the scal shock amounts to ~ IG ￿ 0:1.
We rst discuss the dynamic linkages between the variables for the Hicks-neutral
Cobb-Douglas technology, which allows us to focus on the eect of endogenous
labor supply. Subsequently, we relax the Hicks-neutrality assumption and turn
to our parametrization of interest, that is, Solow-neutral public capital and low
substitutability between private inputs.
3.5.2.1 Hicks-Neutral Public Capital
The dotted lines in Figure 3.3 show the transitional dynamics for the Hicks-neutral
Cobb-Douglas technology case. On impact, Tobin's q jumps up, in anticipation of
the future increase in the marginal productivity of private capital. Consequently,
private investment rises. In Panel (a) of Figure 3.2, the economy moves from E0
to EH
1 . Given the (future) increase in after-tax wages and increased stock market
value of physical capital, households experience a rise in total wealth, inducing
them to reduce labor supply.22 As a result, wages increase and employment falls
on impact. Graphically, in Panel (b), the labor supply curve shifts to the left to
Ls
1, while the labor demand schedule remains unaected, yielding the short-run
equilibrium E1. In view of the predetermined private capital stock, the private
capital-labor ratio rises and output falls in the short run. The rise in short-run
domestic absorption (denoted by ~ Cp0q ￿ ~ Ip0q ￿ ~ IG ¡ 0) together with the fall in
output implies that the country's net exports fall (i.e., ~ Zp0q ￿ 0).
The increase in public investment expands the public capital stock over time.
Similarly, the private capital stock rises gradually, owing to the larger private
investment rate. In terms of Panel (a) of Figure 3.2, the economy gradually
moves from EH
1 to EH
2 along the dynamic path DPH. Because private capital and
22Private investment `crowds in' private consumption; this result is in contrast to the con-
ventional negative consumption eect of public consumption as found by Heijdra and Ligthart
(2007).Section 3.5 | Quantitative Analysis of the Eects of Public Investment 65
Figure 3.3: Permanent Public Investment Shock under Various Public Capital
Technologies
~ Y ptq ~ qptq
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Notes: The dashed line denotes the scenario of Y ￿ 0:5 and K ￿ 0 (Harrod-neutral case), the
solid line represents Y ￿ 0:5 and L ￿ 0 (Solow-neutral case), and the dotted line represents
Y ￿ 1 and K ￿ L (Hicks-neutral case). The other parameters are set at their benchmark
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labor are cooperative factors of production, the marginal productivity of labor
rises. In Panel (b), the labor demand curve shifts to the right from Ld
0 to Ld
2.
Labor supply shifts further to the left, reecting a rise in full consumption. The
employment path during transition is non-monotonic. Initially, during periods
10-30, the labor-productivity eect of both private and public capital is rather
strong and dominates the wealth eect. Graphically, the rightward shift of the
labor demand curve dominates the leftward shift of the labor supply schedule,
causing a net increase in wages and employment. Once the economy reaches the
temporary equilibrium E2, employment attains its maximum. Eventually, during
periods 30 and beyond, the rise in wages boosts the wealth eect on labor supply.
Graphically, the labor supply curve shifts to the left to a greater extent than in the
initial periods|which is represented by a move from Ls
2 to Ls
8|pushing wages
further up, but depressing the employment increment. However, both employment
and wages increase in the long run, as indicated by the location of the new steady
state E8 to the Northeast of E0.
The drop in the employment increment in the medium run together with the
rise in the private capital stock causes the capital-labor ratio to rise. As a result,
Tobin's q gradually decreases over time, eventually returning to its initial steady-
state value at EH
8. Therefore, the transition in Tobin's q|and thus in the private
capital stock|is also non-monotonic. Both private and full consumption, how-
ever, increase monotonically during transition, reecting a continuous rise in wage
income. The rise in domestic absorption boosts imports, deteriorates the trade
balance, and creates a short-run current account decit. Hence, the country accu-
mulates net foreign debt. During transition, the current account decit shrinks,
giving rise to a non-monotonic path of net foreign assets. In the new steady state,
the current account of the balance of payments is balanced again (i.e., 9 Fp8q ￿ 0),
where a surplus on the trade account osets the interest payments on net foreign
debt.
3.5.2.2 Solow-Neutral and Harrod-Neutral Public Capital
To distinguish between dierent types of factor-augmentation, we relax Y ￿ 1
and focus on the case of 0 ￿ Y ￿ 1. The dashed and solid lines in Figure 3.3
present impulse responses of a public investment shock for Harrod-neutral public
capital and Solow-neutral public capital, respectively. Section 3.4 showed that
the elasticity of substitution between inputs is irrelevant in the long run if publicSection 3.5 | Quantitative Analysis of the Eects of Public Investment 67
capital is Harrod neutral; apart from slight short-run dierences, it turns out that
also the transitional dynamics are virtually identical to the Cobb-Douglas case.23
In contrast, under Solow neutrality the transitional dynamics dier qualitatively
for private capital and foreign assets, but are only quantitatively dierent for
output.
In the Solow-neutral case, Tobin's q jumps down to ES
1, resulting in a decrease
in private investment in the short run. Consequently, the stock of private capital
gradually reduces. As the public capital stock expands, the marginal productivity
of labor increases, which boosts employment (recall from (3.18) that in this case
public capital is biased toward labor). The increase in labor use raises the marginal
productivity of private capital, Tobin's q, and thus private investment. Eventually,
net private investment turns positive so that the private capital stock expands back
in the direction of the pre-shock level, causing the graphical swing in Panel (a)
from ES
1 to ES
2 along the dynamic path DPS. However, over time the decrease in
the employment increment causes Tobin's q and private investment to fall again,
which creates a drop in long-run private capital accumulation. Graphically, the
economy follows the dynamic path DPS from ES
2 to the new steady state ES
8.
In the Harrod-neutral case, Tobin's q jumps down from E0 to some point
(not shown) above ES
1 in Panel (a) of Figure 3.2, which temporarily depresses
private investment to a smaller extent than in the Solow-neutral case. As public
capital accumulates, the marginal productivity of private capital increases, thereby
pushing Tobin's q up. Consequently, private investment rises and the private
capital stock expands, which moves the economy in the direction of EH
2 , following
a dynamic path similar to DPH. Just like in the Hicks-neutral Cobb-Douglas
case, once employment attains its maximum at E2 in Panel (b), Tobin's q starts
adjusting back to its original level. In Panel (a), the economy moves along the
dynamic path DPH from EH
2 to the new steady-state equilibrium EH
8.
The dynamics of net foreign assets also depend on the technology scenario.
Under Solow-neutral public capital, the stock of net foreign assets increases in
the new steady state, whereas it drops in the Harrod-neutral case. The reason
lies in the larger rise in imports due to the higher private investment rate under
Harrod neutrality. In contrast to the dynamics for private capital and net foreign
assets, the impulse responses for labor are nearly identical across specications.
23In both technology cases, the Solow-substitution eect KpY ￿ 1q of equation (3.24) drops
out, leaving only the pure externality eect on the medium-run marginal productivity of private
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Although the short-run eects on labor are slightly dierent for various values of
Y and i, the three lines for employment coincide in the long run. Intuitively, the
steady-state eect on wages and employment is only aected by YGp￿q, that is, the
size of the pure public capital externality [see equations (3.31){(3.32)].
3.5.2.3 Comparison of Hysteretic and Non-Hysteretic Models
Output shows a non-monotonic transition path in the benchmark scenario, which
crucially depends on the assumptions made on the labor supply elasticity, the
life span of agents, and the presence of a public capital externality. The dotted
lines in Figure 3.4 show monotonic transition paths for output if labor supply is
exogenous, households have innite horizons, and public capital does not give rise
to a production externality. If labor supply is exogenous (i.e., !LL ￿ 0), there is
no wealth eect on labor supply. In this case, output and private consumption
do not react on impact.24 In the long run, consumption and output multipliers
are both positive. If households have innite life spans (i.e.,  ￿ 0 so that r ￿
), full consumption dynamics is degenerate, that is, 9 X ￿ 0. In that case, full
consumption jumps on impact and stays constant over time. Intuitively, all future
changes in disposable income are fully anticipated and already reected in the
initial jump in full consumption, so that there are no further leftward shifts in
the Lspw;Xq curve during transition. Consequently, no wiggle is present in the
output path. Panel (c) reveals that the presence of a public capital externality is
a key factor in generating a non-monotonic output path.
Although not analyzed by Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2003), nite horizons
can be used to arrive at an endogenously-determined steady state. A key question
is whether using a hysteresis-eliminating device, such as overlapping generations,
aects the impulse responses. Panel (b) of Figure 3.4 shows that the impulse
responses of the hysteretic (innite-horizon) model|as represented by the dotted
lines|are very dierent from those found in the non-hysteretic (nite-horizon)
model. This result contradicts Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe's (2003) primary nding
that the non-stationary model and the stationary model yield nearly identical
impulse responses. Only in the absence of a production externality can we replicate
their result. Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe's (2003) result is thus not as generally valid
as suggested.
24The rise in wages without a wealth eect is smaller than in the benchmark case with a wealth
eect present.Section 3.5 | Quantitative Analysis of the Eects of Public Investment 69
Figure 3.4: Impulse Responses of a Permanent Public Investment Shock: Var-
ious Values of !LL, , and G
Panel (a): ~ Y ptq and ~ Cptq for various !LL values














































Panel (b): ~ Y ptq and ~ Cptq for various  values
















































Panel (c): ~ Y ptq and ~ Cptq for various G values















































Notes: In Panel (a), !LL takes on the values 0 (dotted line), 0:50 (dashed line), and 2:00 (solid
line). In Panel (b),  takes on the values 0 (dotted line), 0:0182 (solid line), and 0:05 (dashed
line), respectively. In Panel (c), G takes on the values 0 (dotted line), 0:05 (dashed line), and
0:08 (solid line). The other parameters are set at their benchmark values.70 Output Dynamics, Technology, and Public Investment | Chapter 3
3.5.3 Quantitative Short-Run and Long-Run Eects
Table 3.3 presents macroeconomic multipliers for the benchmark scenario and
alternative values of the output elasticity of public capital G and substitution
elasticity in production Y. The long-run output multiplier in the benchmark
scenario is 2.71, whereas the short-run multiplier is negative, suggesting substantial
long-run output gains from investment in public capital. The case of exogenous
labor supply (i.e., !LL ￿ 0) and a Cobb-Douglas technology specication|which
corresponds to Heijdra and Meijdam's (2002) model, but is not shown in the
table|yields a long-run output multiplier of 2.25. Abstracting from endogenous
labor supply thus understates the long-run output multiplier. Output multipliers
do not change sign across values of G and Y. A larger output elasticity of
public capital|and thus a larger production externality|increases the marginal
productivity of private capital. Consequently, the steady-state investment and
output multipliers both rise. If the public capital externality is absent, the long-
run output multiplier is only marginally above unity.25 In contrast to the case
with a public capital externality, short-run employment rises, reecting a fall in
aggregate household wealth induced by the rise in taxes necessary to balance the
government budget.
Although the sign of the long-run output multiplier is independent of the tech-
nology scenario, its size is substantially aected. The elasticity of substitution
plays an important role if public capital is Solow neutral. For Y ￿ 0:5, we nd
a long-run output multiplier of 1.59, which falls substantially short of its value of
2.71 in the Cobb-Douglas case. The reason lies in the negative multipliers of pri-
vate investment and private capital stock. In absolute terms, the response of net
foreign assets is much larger than that of physical capital. The long-run output
multiplier under Harrod neutrality is independent of Y and equal to that found
under the Cobb-Douglas technology. Once we relax the Cobb-Douglas assump-
tion, this equivalence breaks down. As expected from the analytical results, both
long-run wage and employment multipliers|and thus also the long-run welfare
change|are independent of Y and i.
25Note that the output multiplier may fall below unity if the labor supply elasticity is small.
For example, for G ￿ 0 and !LL ￿ 1, we nd an output multiplier of 0.85.Section 3.6 | Conclusions 71
Table 3.3: Macroeconomic and Welfare Multipliers of Public Investment
Y ￿ 1 G Y ￿ 0:50 Y ￿ 0:75
0 0.05 0.12 Hicks Harrod Solow Hicks Harrod Solow
dY p0q
dIG -0.8729 0.4808 -0.3653 -1.5498 -0.6541 -0.6464 -0.6730 -0.7860 -0.7816 -0.7967
dY p8q
dIG 2.7111 1.0600 2.0920 3.5367 2.3879 2.7111 1.5879 2.5495 2.7111 2.1495
dCp0q
dIG 0.5310 -0.2925 0.2222 0.9428 0.5432 0.5368 0.5590 0.5363 0.5334 0.5437
dCp8q
dIG 1.1077 -0.2915 0.5830 1.8073 1.1077 1.1077 1.1077 1.1077 1.1077 1.1077
dIp0q
dIG 0.0474 0.3721 0.1691 -0.1150 -0.1933 -0.0484 -0.5522 -0.0595 0.0090 -0.2290
dIp8q
dIG 0.5422 0.2120 0.4184 0.7073 0.3176 0.5422 -0.2384 0.4299 0.5422 0.1519
dFp0q
dIG 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
dFp8q
dIG -1.5292 -3.4883 -2.2639 -0.5497 0.9349 -1.5292 7.0340 -0.2972 -1.5292 2.7524
dLp0q
dIG -0.4085 0.2250 -0.1710 -0.7253 -0.3061 -0.3025 -0.3150 -0.3678 -0.3658 -0.3729
dLp8q
dIG 0.1549 0.3533 0.2293 0.0557 0.1549 0.1549 0.1549 0.1549 0.1549 0.1549
dKp0q
dIG 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
dKp8q
dIG 4.9287 1.9271 3.8031 6.4295 2.8868 4.9287 -2.1674 3.9077 4.9287 1.3806
dwp0q
dIG 0.7536 -0.4150 0.3153 1.3379 1.1293 1.1160 1.1620 0.9047 0.8997 0.9171
dwp8q
dIG 4.8000 0.0000 3.0000 7.2000 4.8000 4.8000 4.8000 4.8000 4.8000 4.8000
dqp0q
dIG 0.0490 0.3847 0.1749 -0.1189 -0.1999 -0.0500 -0.5708 -0.0615 0.0093 -0.2368
dqp8q
dIG 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
dUp0q
dIG 0.4493 -0.2475 0.1880 0.7977 0.3832 0.3787 0.3943 0.4232 0.4208 0.4290
dUp8q
dIG 0.2486 -0.3349 0.0298 0.5403 0.2486 0.2486 0.2486 0.2486 0.2486 0.2486
Notes: Unless indicated otherwise, all parameters are set at their benchmark values (Table 3.2).
Hicks-neutral public capital assumes  ￿ L ￿ K ￿ 0:08. Harrod-neutral public capital is
given by L ￿ 0:12 and K ￿ 0, whereas Solow-neutral public capital is dened as L ￿ 0 and
K ￿ 0:29.
3.6 Conclusions
The chapter develops a dynamic microfounded macroeconomic model of a small
open economy to study the transitional dynamics of a balanced-budget increase in
public investment. Public capital gives rise to an externality by entering private
production in a factor-augmenting fashion. Various forms of factor-augmentation
of public capital are distinguished. The household side of the model extends
a Yaari-Blanchard overlapping generations model|which gives rise to a non-
hysteretic steady state|by introducing a wealth eect on labor supply.
The chapter shows that the factor-augmenting role of public capital matters
for the size of the long-run output multiplier, but does not aect its sign. The72 Output Dynamics, Technology, and Public Investment | Chapter 3
output multiplier for the empirically plausible case of Solow-neutral (i.e., capital-
augmenting) public capital and low input substitutability amounts to 1.59, which is
substantially smaller than the value of 2.71 that is found for the Cobb-Douglas (and
thus Hicks-neutral) technology. Irrespective of the elasticity of input substitution,
Harrod-neutral public capital yields an output multiplier identical to that found
in the Cobb-Douglas case. Endogenous labor supply and larger elasticities of
substitution boost the long-run output multiplier.
The technology role of public capital matters only quantitatively to the transi-
tional output dynamics of a public investment impulse. However, transition paths
for private capital and net foreign assets dier also qualitatively across technology
scenarios. If factors of production are gross complements and public capital is
Solow neutral, the path of the private capital stock shows an initial fall, followed
by a rise, and a subsequent decline in the new steady state. Long-run net foreign
assets increase, sustaining a long-run current account surplus. If public capital is
Harrod or Hicks neutral, then the non-monotonic path for private capital always
lies above the zero axis, whereas the stock of net foreign assets always falls.
In contrast to conventional results obtained in hysteretic (innite-horizon)
models for a small open economy, the output dynamics of a public investment
shock in the non-hysteretic (nite-horizon) model are non-monotonic. A neces-
sary condition for this result is the simultaneous presence of a public capital ex-
ternality, endogenous labor supply, and nite horizons of households. Our results
demonstrate that Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe's (2003) central nding|i.e., the im-
pulse responses of hysteretic and non-hysteretic models are virtually identical|is
not as generally valid as suggested. Impulse responses of the hysteretic and the
non-hysteretic model are only identical without a production externality.
Our study does not analyze the intergenerational welfare eects of an increase
in public investment, which we leave for further research. Also, the analysis as-
sumes that the government has access to lump-sum taxes. In future work, we
intend to study the dynamic macroeconomic and welfare eects of labor tax and
debt nancing. Finally, the model can easily be extended to a real business cycle
setting.Section 3.A | Appendix 73
3.A Appendix
This Appendix derives the log-linearized model, analyzes stability, and solves for
the short-run, transitional, and long-run eects of a public investment shock. Fur-
ther details are provided in Bom, Heijdra, and Ligthart (2010b).
3.A.1 The Reduced-Form Model
We log-linearize the nite-horizon model around an initial steady state in which
Fp0q ￿ 0 so that Ap0q ￿ qp0qKp0q.26 The results are reported in Table 3.1 in the
main text. A tilde (~) denotes a relative change, for example, ~ Xptq ￿ dXptq{X0,
where X0 denotes the initial steady-state value of full consumption. For nancial
assets Aptq and Fptq, we use ~ Aptq ￿ rdAptq{Y0 and 9 ~ Aptq ￿ rd 9 Aptq{Y0. Lump-sum
taxes are scaled by steady-state output Y0 only, that is, ~ Tptq ￿ dTptq{Y0.
3.A.1.1 The Quasi-Reduced Form of the Static System
Conditional on the state variables and the policy shocks, equations (T3.07){

























Y L ~ KGptq
~ K￿ptq




where !LL ￿ p1 ￿ Lq{L ¥ 0 is the leisure-labor ratio and ~ K￿ptq denotes broad
capital:
~ K
￿ptq ￿ K ~ Kptq ￿ G ~ KGptq: (3.39)
Using ~ KGptq ￿ p1 ￿ e￿Gtq ~ IG, we nd
~ K
￿ptq ￿ K ~ Kptq ￿ G
￿
1 ￿ e
￿Gt￿ ~ IG: (3.40)




























26In the special case of innite horizons ( ￿ 0 and thus r ￿ ), we set Fp0q ￿ ￿qp0qKp0q to
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GpY ￿ !LLq ￿ p1 ￿ Yq!LLLL
Y ￿ !LLK
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!LLrG ￿ LpY ￿ 1qs
Y ￿ !LLK
;




¡ 0; wx ￿
!LLK
Y ￿ !LLK
¡ 0; wg ￿
G ￿ LpY ￿ 1q
Y ￿ !LLK
:
3.A.1.2 Stability of the Dynamic System
Solving the dynamic system (3.20) gives rise to a fourth-order characteristic poly-
nomial:
Ppsq ￿ |sI ￿ | ￿ psq  psq ￿  12 23 34 41 ￿ 0; (3.42)
where I is the identity matrix and psq and   psq are
psq ￿
￿
s ￿  33
￿￿
s ￿  22
￿
￿  34 43; (3.43)
  psq ￿ s
￿
s ￿  22
￿
￿  12 21: (3.44)




2 ￿ a1s ￿ a0 ￿ 0; (3.45)
where the ai's are dened as
a3 ￿ ￿trpq ￿ ￿p2 22 ￿  33q ￿ 0; (3.46)
a2 ￿  
2
22 ￿  12 21 ￿ 2 22 33 ￿  34 43; (3.47)
a1 ￿  12 21p 22 ￿  33q ￿  22
￿ 34 43 ￿  22 33
￿
; (3.48)




p!X ￿ !Aq ¡ 0: (3.49)
The positive determinant may indicate various cases: (i) two positive roots and
two negative roots; (ii) four positive roots (in which case the system is unstable);Section 3.A | Appendix 75
and (iii) four negative roots, giving rise to an indeterminate steady state (cf.
Benhabib and Farmer, 1994, p. 30). The third case is excluded because of trpq ¡
0. Based on the numerical results in Section 3.5, we nd that the system (3.20) has
a unique and locally saddle-point stable steady state. There are two stable real
roots (￿h￿
1 ￿ 0 and ￿h￿
2 ￿ 0) and two unstable real roots (r￿
1 ¡ 0 and r￿
2 ¡ 0).27
3.A.2 Solving for the Comparative Dynamics
3.A.2.1 The Transformed Model
We will make use of the Laplace transform technique to analyze the model (cf.






Intuitively, Ltx;su represents the present value of xptq using s as the discount rate.




















~ qp0q ￿ Ltq;su
~ Xp0q
















where adjpsq is the adjoint matrix of psq. By pre-multiplying both sides of























~ qp0q ￿ Ltq;su
~ Xp0q









27The four characteristic roots in the innite-horizon case are: ￿h￿
1 ￿ pr￿
a
r2 ￿ 4 12 21q{2 ￿
0, r￿
1 ￿ r, h￿
2 ￿ 0; and r￿
2 ￿ pr ￿
a
r2 ￿ 4 12 21q{2 ¡ 0.
28We have made use of Lt9 ~ q;su ￿ sLt~ qptq;su ￿ ~ qp0q. In addition, we note that ~ Kp0q ￿ 0 and
~ Ap0q ￿ 0 due to unanticipated capital gains/losses, that is, ~ Ap0q ￿ !A~ q p0q.76 Output Dynamics, Technology, and Public Investment | Chapter 3
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3.A.2.2 Impulse Response Functions
We have two jumping variables [~ qptq and ~ Xptq] so that we need to impose only
two initial conditions. The values of ~ q p0q and ~ Xp0q are such that the right-hand
side of (3.53) is of the 0 ￿ 0 type for both unstable roots r￿
1 and r￿
2.29 Using the
rst row of adjpsq, for example, we get for s ￿ r￿
1 and s ￿ r￿
2
￿
psq ￿  23 34!A
￿
~ q p0q ￿  23
￿
s ￿  22
￿ ~ X p0q ￿ psqLtq;su ￿  23 34LtA;su:








1q ￿  23 34!A  23
￿
r￿
1 ￿  22
￿
pr￿
2q ￿  23 34!A  23
￿
r￿













The transitional dynamics follow from the analytical impulse response func-
tions, which can be derived following the steps set out in Bom, Heijdra, and
Ligthart (2010b). As can be seen from (3.21){(3.22), the most general shock takes
the form
i ptq ￿ ip ￿ ite





ryg ￿ pY ￿ 1qKs ~ IG; qt ￿ ￿
rK
Y!A






￿ ~ IG; At ￿ r!wwg~ IG:
29The denominator on the right-hand side of (3.53) is zero. The only way to obtain bounded
solutions for the four key variables is that the numerator on the right-hand side is also zero.Section 3.A | Appendix 77
We employ the following denitions for the temporary transition terms Tlp:q for































; x ￿ u: (3.58)
The paths for the private capital stock and Tobin's q are
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The impulse response functions for full consumption and nancial assets are
~ Xptq ￿
￿
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Public Investment and Balanced
Budget Fiscal Rules
Abstract: We study the dynamic output and welfare eects of public infras-
tructure investment under a balanced budget scal rule, using an overlapping
generations model of a small open economy. The government nances public in-
vestment by employing distortionary labor taxes. We nd a negative short-run
output multiplier, which (in absolute terms) exceeds the positive long-run output
multiplier. In contrast to conventional results regarding public investment shocks,
we obtain dampened cycles in output and the labor tax rate. The cyclical dynam-
ics are induced by the interaction of households' nite life spans, the wealth eect
on labor supply, and the balanced budget scal rule. Finally, we show that, for a
plausible calibration of our model, households' lifetime welfare improves.80 Public Investment and Balanced Budget Fiscal Rules | Chapter 4
4.1 Introduction
Many governments of industrialized nations have resorted to scal stimulus pack-
ages to help weather the recent global economic crisis. Public infrastructure
investment|which is narrowly dened to include highways, airports, bridges, rail-
ways, sewerage and water systems, and dams other ood control structures (Bom
and Ligthart, 2008)|were a key component of the scal stimulus measures. With-
out any osetting tax and expenditure measures, more public investment boosts
public spending, which in turn causes the short-run scal balance to deteriorate.
In view of rising scal decits in various OECD countries, some governments have
been discussing whether to put legal bounds on their annual budget balance. The
debate in the United States, for example, has focused on balanced budget amend-
ments for the federal government.1 More recently, in Europe, the political leaders
of France and Germany called for all eurozone nations to enact constitutional
amendments requiring balanced budgets.2 Can public investment be eective in
stimulating output and in improving welfare if the government has to adhere to
a balanced budget rule? What do the transitional dynamics induced by a public
investment impulse look like? The present chapter addresses these questions.
Most contributions on the dynamic macroeconomic eects of public investment
employ an innitely-lived representative agent framework for a closed economy
without a leisure-labor choice. Baxter and King (1993) and Turnovsky and Fisher
(1995), however, endogenize labor supply, but do not discuss second-best welfare
eects. Other contributions explicitly focus on the growth eects of public capital
by assuming constant returns to scale in reproducible factors of production. Key
contributions in this area are those by Barro (1990) and Glomm and Ravikumar
(1994, 1997). The theoretical literature has not yet paid much attention to the
output dynamics of public investment when households are nitely lived. Such a
specication does not only provide a realistic description of the household sector
but is also instrumental in arriving at an endogenously determined (non-hysteretic)
1See Poterba (1995) for a background to this discussion. Note that the majority of the states
are required to balance their current budgets at the end of the scal year, whereas some states
balance their budgets on a two-year cycle (cf. Poterba and Rueben, 2001). States can borrow,
however, for capital account purposes.
2Eurozone countries have adopted the euro and have signed on to the Stability and Growth
Pact, which prescribes a ceiling on annual budget decits of 3 percent of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP).Section 4.1 | Introduction 81
steady state in a small open economy context.3 Heijdra and Meijdam (2002) and
Bom, Heijdra, and Ligthart (2010a) employ models of nitely-lived households,
but assume public investment to be nanced by lump-sum taxes.4 In practice,
countries do not have access to lump-sum taxes and fund their spending by dis-
tortionary taxes. In fact, labor income taxes account for about one third of total
tax revenues and almost 10 percent of GDP in OECD countries (OECD, 2010).
Labor income taxes aect households' consumption-leisure tradeo and therefore
have important labor market and welfare eects. This chapter investigates how
labor market distortions interact with the positive spillovers of public investment.
In view of this labor market and welfare focus, it is pivotal to provide a realistic
description of households' preferences.
So far, the public capital literature has employed a rather restrictive specica-
tion of households' preferences and therefore has not come to grips with the labor
dynamics of public investment. Heijdra and Meijdam (2002) ignore the house-
hold's labor-leisure choice by assuming exogenous labor supply. Heijdra, Van der
Horst, and Meijdam (2002) endogenize labor supply, but assume Greenwood, Her-
cowitz, and Human (1988) preferences, which do not feature a wealth eect on
labor supply. Bom, Heijdra, and Ligthart (2010a) in turn employ a Cobb-Douglas
utility function. In this chapter, we employ a more general preference specica-
tion, that is, the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function, which
allows us to separate the intratemporal substitution eect on labor supply from the
intertemporal substitution eect on labor supply. This distinction is important
in view of the emphasis the Real Business Cycle (RBC) literature has put on the
intertemporal labor supply eect for shock propagation (cf. Prescott, 2006). More
important, recent empirical evidence (cf. Kimball and Shapiro, 2008) shows that
the size of the intertemporal substitution eect in labor supply is non-negligible.
We develop a dynamic macroeconomic model of a small open economy that
includes a public capital spillover on the production side. On the household side,
we build a labor-leisure tradeo into the Yaari (1965)-Blanchard (1985) framework
of nitely-lived households. The government adheres to a balanced budget scal
policy rule by employing distortionary labor taxes to nance public investment. To
3Small open economy models of the Ramsey type yield a hysteretic steady state, reecting
the requirement that the rate of interest should equal the pure rate of time preference for a
meaningful steady state to exist.
4A notable exception is the unpublished paper by Heijdra, Van der Horst, and Meijdam
(2002), who employ a very restrictive preference specication based on Greenwood, Hercowitz,
and Human (1988). See the discussion below.82 Public Investment and Balanced Budget Fiscal Rules | Chapter 4
avoid trivial capital dynamics, we postulate adjustment costs of both private and
public investment. In line with the literature on open economy macroeconomics,
there is an internationally traded bond, which guarantees that households can use
the current account of the balance of payments to smooth private consumption.
Although a large number of our key results can be derived analytically, we provide
a numerical simulation based on plausible parameters for a typical small open
economy in the OECD area.
We nd that a balanced budget increase in public investment induces damp-
ened cycles in output and other key macroeconomic variables, whereas existing
public investment studies obtain monotonic impulse responses. The dampened cy-
cles arise from the interaction of households' nite planning horizons, the wealth
eect on labor supply, and the government's balanced budget rule. The non-
monotonic transition paths do not depend on the presence of the public capital
externality. However, in a framework of innitely-lived households the cycles dis-
appear, owing to the absence of a wealth eect on labor supply during transition.
We show that private investment, employment, and output fall in the short run,
reecting the reduction in labor supply caused by distortionary labor taxes. How-
ever, more public investment increases long-run output. In the benchmark case,
we nd an output multiplier of 2.25, which falls short of the value of 2.71 found
in the lump-sum tax nancing case (cf. Bom, Heijdra, and Ligthart, 2010a). In
the long run, employment increases as long as the elasticity of substitution be-
tween consumption and leisure is larger than unity. On the one hand, this positive
employment eect reinforces the long-run output eect. On the other hand, the
higher intratemporal elasticity of labor supply increases labor market distortions
and exacerbates the short-run output contraction. Finally, our numerical analysis
reveals that a balanced budget public investment impulse improves households'
lifetime welfare in the benchmark calibration. This result suggests that public
investment should be encouraged even if labor tax nancing is distortionary.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 sets out the dynamic macroeco-
nomic framework for a small open economy. Section 4.3 analyzes the steady state
and its stability and presents a simple graphical framework. Section 4.4 studies
the long-run macroeconomic and welfare eects of a balanced budget public in-
vestment impulse. Section 4.5 analyzes numerically the transitional dynamics and
long-run eects of a public investment shock. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes the
chapter.Section 4.2 | The Model 83
4.2 The Model
This section develops a micro-founded dynamic macroeconomic model for a typical
industrialized small open economy. Subsequently, it discusses the behavior of
individual households, aggregate households, rms, and the government.
4.2.1 Individual Households
The economy is inhabited by nitely-lived households, who face a constant proba-
bility of death equal to their rate of birth (denoted by ). Because the population
size is constant, we can normalize it to unity. There are innitely many discon-
nected generations, reecting the absence of bequests. Expected lifetime utility at






￿p￿qp￿tqd;  ¡ 0;  ¥ 0; (4.1)












where 0 ￿ "C ￿ 1 is the consumption weight in utility, Cpv;tq denotes private
consumption, Lpv;tq is hours of labor supplied,5 and C ¥ 0 is the elasticity
of substitution between private consumption and leisure. By choosing a CES
specication of sub-utility, we model nonseparability between consumption and
labor and embed the Cobb-Douglas specication for C ￿ 1. Equation (4.2)
introduces a wealth eect on labor supply; that is, labor eort depends on the
intertemporal consumption-savings choice.
We dene `full' consumption as the market value of private consumption and
leisure:
Xpv;tq ￿ PptqUpv;tq ￿ Cpv;tq ￿  wptqr1 ￿ Lpv;tqs; (4.3)
where Pptq is the utility-based consumer price index (see [4.11) below],  wptq ￿
wptqr1 ￿ tLptqs is the after-tax real wage rate, wptq represents the before-tax real
5The total time available to the household has been normalized to unity so that 1 ￿ Lpv;tq
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wage rate, and tLptq is a proportional labor income tax. We use private consump-
tion as numeraire commodity, whose price has been normalized to unity. The
household's ow budget constraint is
9 Apv;tq ￿ pr ￿ qApv;tq ￿  wptq ￿ Xpv;tq; (4.4)
where 9 Apv;tq ￿ dApv;tq{dt, with Apv;tq denoting real nancial wealth, and r
denotes the exogenously given world rate of interest. In keeping with Blanchard
(1985), households contract actuarially fair `reverse' life insurance. While alive,
households receive an eective rate of return r ￿  on their nancial wealth. In
the event of death, the insurance company appropriates all the wealth of the
household.
The representative household of cohort v, who is endowed with perfect fore-
sight, maximizes lifetime utility (4.1){(4.2) subject to its budget identity (4.4)
and a no-Ponzi game solvency condition. We solve the household's problem by
two-stage budgeting. In the rst stage, the household decides on its consumption









￿ r ￿ : (4.5)
We study the case of a patient nation (i.e., r ¡ ), which generates rising indi-
vidual consumption proles. Equation (4.5) says that full consumption growth
rises with the real rate of interest and falls with the pure rate of time preference.
By integrating (4.4), we obtain full consumption as a constant proportion of the
household's wealth portfolio:
Xpv;tq ￿ p ￿ qrApv;tq ￿ Hpv;tqs; (4.6)






which equals the present discounted value of the current and future after-tax re-
turns to labor.
In the second stage, the household allocates Cpv;tq and 1 ￿ Lpv;tq such that








 wptqC: By substituting this optimality condition into
(4.3), we obtain
Cpv;tq ￿ r1 ￿ !NptqsXpv;tq; (4.8)
 wptqr1 ￿ Lpv;tqs ￿ !NptqXpv;tq; (4.9)Section 4.2 | The Model 85
where !Nptq is the (time-varying) share of leisure in full consumption:






; 0 ￿ !Nptq ￿ 1: (4.10)
Equations (4.8) and (4.9) relate private goods consumption and leisure consump-
tion to the level of full consumption. Households supply more hours of labor if
gross wages rise, the labor tax rate falls, the share of leisure in full consumption
drops, or full consumption falls. By substituting (4.8) and (4.9) into (4.2), we







C ￿ p1 ￿ "CqC  wptq1￿Cs
1








for C ￿ 1
: (4.11)
4.2.2 Aggregate Households
The size of cohort v at time t is a fraction epv￿tq of the total population.6
Therefore, the relationship between aggregate full consumption and individual




















The expression after the second equality sign says that aggregate full consump-
tion growth equals individual full consumption growth (the rst term) minus the
`generational turnover eect' (the second term), that is, the wealth redistribution
caused by the passing away of generations. Intuitively, old generations have ac-
cumulated wealth over the course of their life, whereas new generations are born
without nancial wealth (i.e., Apt;tq ￿ 0). Consequently, the full consumption
level of new generations Xpt;tq falls short of the average full consumption level
Xptq.
6We assume large cohorts, so that frequencies and probabilities coincide by the law of large
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4.2.3 Firms
The representative rm hires Lptq hours of labor and rents Kptq units of capi-
tal services to produce homogeneous output Y ptq according to the Cobb-Douglas
technology
Y ptq ￿ Kptq
"Y Lptq
1￿"Y KGptq
; 0 ￿ "Y ￿ 1;  ¥ 0; (4.14)
where "Y is the output elasticity of private capital,  is the output elasticity
of public capital, and KGptq denotes the public capital stock. The public capital
stock is assumed to give rise to a positive production externality, which is measured
by .7 Heijdra and Meijdam (2002) and most other authors also employ a Cobb-
Douglas technology, which implies that public capital augments the private factors
of production in a Hicks-neutral fashion.8 The restriction 0 ￿  ￿ "Y ￿ 1 ensures
diminishing returns with respect to private and public capital taken together, thus
excluding endogenous growth.
To allow non-trivial capital dynamics, we model adjustment costs in private











Kptq; p0q ￿ 0; 
1p￿q ¡ 0; 
2p￿q ￿ 0; (4.15)
where  is the rate of depreciation of private capital and p￿q is the installation
cost function of private capital. The degree of physical capital mobility of private
capital is given by 0 ￿ A ￿ ￿ I
K
2p￿q
1p￿q ! 8, where a small A characterizes a high
degree of physical capital mobility.




rY pq ￿ wpqLpq ￿ Ipqse
￿rp￿tqd; (4.16)
subject to the capital accumulation constraint (4.15) and the stock of public capi-
tal. Note that we have normalized the prices of nal output and investment goods
7The government cannot charge a user fee on the rm's use of public capital.
8Bom, Heijdra, and Ligthart (2010a) employ a more general CES technology to analyze the
factor-augmenting role of public capital.Section 4.2 | The Model 87
to unity. Solving the rm's optimization problem yields the rst-order conditions

































where qptq denotes Tobin's q, which is dened as the market value of the pri-
vate capital stock relative to its replacement costs. Equation (4.17) describes a
downward sloping labor demand relationship in the pw;Lq space. Equation (4.18)
represents the investment-capital ratio as a function of Tobin's q. Finally, equation
(4.19) captures the evolution over time of Tobin's q, which shows that the return
on investment in private capital (left-hand side)|consisting of the shadow capital
gain/loss and the marginal product of private capital|should equal the user cost
of private capital (right-hand side).9
4.2.4 Government
The government invests IGptq in infrastructure capital and consumes CGptq goods.
We study the case in which the government commits to a balanced budget at each
instant of time by levying a proportional labor income tax:
IGptq ￿ CGptq ￿ tLptqwptqLptq: (4.20)
Just like rms, the government faces convex adjustment costs in gross investment.











where G is the rate of depreciation of public capital and G p￿q is the installation
cost function of public capital, which satises Gp0q ￿ 0, 1
Gp￿q ¡ 0, and 2
Gp￿q ￿ 0.
The parameter 0 ￿ G ￿
IG1
Gp￿q
KG ! 8 represents the elasticity of the public capital
installation cost function.
9Without adjustment costs, we have p￿q ￿ Iptq{Kptq and 1p￿q ￿ 1. Equation (4.18) then
reduces to q ￿ 1. In this case, Kptq adjusts instantaneously to its steady-state level. Conse-
quently, equation (4.19) reduces to "Y
Y ptq
Kptq ￿ r￿; which is the familiar expression for the rental
rate derived in a static framework.88 Public Investment and Balanced Budget Fiscal Rules | Chapter 4
4.2.5 Foreign Sector and Market Equilibrium
Foreign nancial capital Fptq is perfectly mobile across borders. The change in net
foreign assets is determined by the balance on the current account of the balance
of payments:
9 Fptq ￿ rFptq ￿ Zptq; (4.22)
where rFptq denotes the return on net foreign assets and Zptq are net exports.
The goods market, which does not feature any rigidities, clears at each instant
of time, yielding Y ptq ￿ Cptq ￿ CGptq ￿ Iptq ￿ IGptq ￿ Zptq. Similarly, the labor
market equilibrates instantly via a fully exible real gross wage. Asset market
equilibrium is dened as
Aptq ￿ V ptq ￿ Fptq; (4.23)
where V ptq ￿ qptqKptq denotes the rm's stock market value. Assets in the house-
hold's portfolio are assumed to be perfect substitutes. Initially, Ap0q ￿ V p0q ¡ 0
because Fp0q ￿ 0 and Kp0q ¡ 0. Physical capital is thus fully domestically owned.
4.3 Solving the Model
We now turn to solving the model outlined in the previous section. Section 4.3.1
derives the reduced-form model, Section 4.3.2 analyzes numerically the model's
steady state and stability, and Section 4.3.3 develops a simple graphical framework.
4.3.1 Deriving the Reduced-Form Model
We log-linearize the model around an initial steady state with Fp0q ￿ 0 (implying
that the current account is initially balanced). The log-linearized equations are
reported in Table 4.1. A tilde (~) denotes a relative change, that is, ~ Xptq ￿
dXptq{X, where X is the steady-state value of Xptq. Variables with a tilde and
a dot represent the time rate of change relative to the initial steady state, that
is, 9 ~ Xptq ￿ d 9 Xptq{X ￿ 9 Xptq{X. For nancial assets and human capital, we use
a slightly dierent notation: ~ Aptq ￿ rdAptq{Y and 9 ~ Aptq ￿ rd 9 Aptq{Y . Finally, for
the labor tax rate we employ: ~ tLptq ￿ dtLptq{p1 ￿ tLq.
The dynamic equations of the model can be reduced to a model in two pre-
determined variables (i.e., the private capital stock and nancial assets) and two
non-predetermined variables (i.e., Tobin's q and full consumption). By collectingSection 4.3 | Solving the Model 89
Table 4.1: Summary of the Log-Linearized Model
(a) Dynamic Equations:




~ Iptq ￿ ~ Kptq
￿
(T4.01)




~ Y ptq ￿ ~ Kptq
￿
(T4.02)
9 ~ Xptq = pr ￿ q
￿





9 ~ Aptq = r
￿
~ Aptq ￿ !  w ~  wptq ￿ !X ~ Xptq
￿
(T4.04)
9 ~ KGptq = G
￿




~ qptq = A
￿
~ Iptq ￿ ~ Kptq
￿
(T4.06)
~ wptq = ~ Y ptq ￿ ~ Lptq (T4.07)
~ Y ptq = "Y ~ Kptq ￿ p1 ￿ "Yq~ Lptq ￿  ~ KGptq (T4.08)
~ Lptq = !LL
￿
~  wptq ￿ ~ !Nptq ￿ ~ Xptq
￿
(T4.09)
~ Cptq = ￿
!N
1￿!N ~ !Nptq ￿ ~ Xptq (T4.10)
~ Fptq = ~ Aptq ￿ !A
￿
~ qptq ￿ ~ Kptq
￿
(T4.11)















~ Pptq = !N ~  wptq (T4.13)
~ !Nptq = p1 ￿ Cq
￿
~  wptq ￿ ~ Pptq
￿
(T4.14)
~  wptq = ~ wptq ￿ ~ tLptq (T4.15)
Notes: The following denitions are used: !A ￿ rpqK{Y q, !I ￿ I{Y , !C
G ￿ C{Y , !I
G ￿ IG{Y ,
!w ￿  w{Y , !LL ￿ p1￿Lq{L, !X ￿ X{Y , A ￿ ￿pI{Kqp2{1q ¡ 0, and G ￿ IG1
Gp￿q{KG ¡ 0.
A tilde (~) denotes a relative change, for example, ~ Cptq ￿ dCptq{C. However, for nancial assets
we scale by steady-state output and multiply by r (e.g., ~ Aptq ￿ rdAptq{Y ) and for labor taxes
we use ~ tLptq ￿ dtLptq{p1 ￿ tLq.
relative changes of variables in the vector ~ zptq ￿ r ~ Kptq ~ qptq ~ Xptq ~ Aptqs1 and shock
terms in the vector  ptq ￿ r0 qptq 0 Aptqs1, we write the reduced-form dynamic
system as
9 ~ zptq ￿ ~ zptq ￿  ptq; (4.24)
where  is a 4 ￿ 4 Jacobian matrix (see Appendix 4.A.1).
Let us rst focus on a number of special cases giving rise to characteristic roots
that are real. The trivial case of exogenous labor supply yields a dynamic system
that can be decomposed in two independent subsystems, that is, an investment90 Public Investment and Balanced Budget Fiscal Rules | Chapter 4
subsystem [~ qptq; ~ Kptq] and a savings subsystem [ ~ Xptq; ~ Aptq]. The model is saddle-
path stable; we obtain two positive and two negative real roots.10 If households
have innite life spans (i.e.,  ￿ 0), the generational turnover eect drops from
(4.13). For a steady state to exist, the knife-edge condition r ￿  should hold,
implying that the third row of  consists of zeros only. In that case, there is a
zero root in full consumption, one negative real root, and two positive real roots.
The model features a hysteretic steady state.
For the general case of endogenous labor supply, the dynamic system is non-
recursive. The dynamic properties of the system depend crucially on !LL; C; ,
and tL. The solution of the characteristic polynomial corresponding to (4.24) may
potentially yield complex-valued roots. To get insight into the properties of the
roots, we pursue a numerical analysis.
4.3.2 Solving the Model Numerically
This section investigates the model numerically based on plausible parameter val-
ues taken from the literature and data.
4.3.2.1 Parameter Values
We choose parameter values in such a way as to match the characteristics of
a typical small open economy in the OECD area (Table 4.2). The time unit
represents a year. We assume a probability of death  of 1.82 percent to reect
an average expected life span of 55 working years. The world rate of interest is
xed at 4 percent. We assume that both private and public capital depreciate
at the rate of 10 percent. Following Baxter and King (1993), the ratio of public
consumption to GDP (!C
G) is set to 20 percent. In addition, the ratio of public
investment to GDP (!I
G) takes on a value of 5 percent, which is somewhat above
the average for industrialized countries, but more closely in line with data for
southern European member states. Our quantitative results depend crucially on
the size of the output elasticity of public capital . Based on Bom and Ligthart's
(2008) meta-analysis of estimated values of , we employ  ￿ 0:08. We perform a
sensitivity analysis on this parameter later on.
Because our model features labor market distortions of public investment, its
quantitative implications depend to a great extent on the size of the Frisch elas-
ticity of labor supply  !LL ￿ !LLr1 ￿ pC ￿ 1qp1 ￿ !Nqs (which also captures
10Bom and Ligthart (2011) provide the derivations.Section 4.3 | Solving the Model 91
Table 4.2: Chosen and Implied Parameter Values in the Benchmark Model
Description Parameter/Share Value
Panel (a): Chosen Values
Birth rate  0.018
Rate of interest r 0.040
Depreciation rate of private capital  0.100
Depreciation rate of public capital G 0.100
Output elasticity of public capital  0.080
Parameter of the installation function for private capital  z 0.532
Parameter of the installation function for public capital  zG 0.532
Public consumption-to-GDP ratio !C
G 0.200
Public investment-to-GDP ratio !I
G 0.050
Private consumption-to-GDP ratio !C 0.550
Leisure-labor ratio !LL 2.000
Elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure C 1.000
Panel (b): Selected Implied Values
Private investment-private capital ratio I{K 0.110
Public investment-public capital ratio IG{KG 0.110
Output-private capital ratio Y {K 0.550
Output-public capital ratio Y {KG 2.200
Tobin's q q 1.210
Balanced budget labor income tax rate tL 0.350
Output elasticity of private capital "Y 0.288
Elasticity of the private accumulation function A 0.171
Elasticity of the public accumulation function G 0.091
Preference weight of private consumption in utility function "C 0.370
Leisure-full consumption ratio !N 0.630
Frisch elasticity of labor supply  !LL 2.000
Pure rate of time preference  0.039
Stable root 1 h￿
1 0.158
Stable root 2 h￿
2 0.017
Unstable root 1 r￿
1 0.198
Unstable root 2 r￿
2 0.058
Notes: Panel (a) shows the parameters and shares of the benchmark analysis. Panel (b) presents
implied values of selected economic variables and shares.
the intratemporal substitution elasticity of labor supply) and on the leisure-labor
ratio !LL ￿ p1 ￿ Lq{L (which governs the intertemporal elasticity of labor sup-
ply).11 Kimball and Shapiro (2008) claim that `[modest long-run elasticities of
labor supply are] one of the best-documented regularities in economics' (p. 1).
In our model, a zero long-run (uncompensated) elasticity of labor supply implies
 !LL ￿ !LL, which in turn requires a unitary elasticity of substitution between
11The Frisch labor supply elasticity holds the marginal utility of wealth constant.92 Public Investment and Balanced Budget Fiscal Rules | Chapter 4
consumption and leisure (i.e., C ￿ 1).12 Kimball and Shapiro (2008) report esti-
mates of the Frisch elasticity of about one and refer to a number of papers nding
smaller estimates. RBC models, on the other hand, typically require larger elas-
ticities; Prescott (2006), for instance, assumes Frisch elasticities of at least two.13
However, Prescott (2006) claims that this feature of RBC models is not necessarily
incompatible with the evidence at the micro level, as adjustments at the extensive
margin generate larger elasticities at the aggregate level than at the individual
level. In the baseline case, we assume  !LL ￿ !LL ￿ 2 and C ￿ 1. Later on, we
investigate the sensitivity of our results to dierent values of !LL and C.






￿  z ln
I







￿  zG ln
IG
KG ￿  zG
 zG
; (4.25)
where  z and  zG are constants. From (4.25) and the denitions of A and G,
we derive A ￿ pI{Kq{pI{K ￿  zq and G ￿ pIG{KGq zG{pIG{KG ￿  zGq. Setting
 z ￿ 0:532 and using  ￿ 0:10 yields I{K ￿ 0:11 in the steady state. The latter
together with  z implies steady-state adjustment costs of about 0.2 percent of GDP.
Similarly, choosing  zG ￿ 0:532 and using G ￿ 0:10 gives rise to IG{KG ￿ 0:11.
In this way, we arrive at adjustment costs of similar size for public capital. These
parameters imply A ￿ 0:171 and G ￿ 0:091.
Given the xed rate of interest, our calibration yields rising individual con-
sumption proles, where  is used as a calibration parameter to arrive at A ￿ qK.14
Once the parameters are set, all other information on the relevant macroeconomic
ratios, initial tax rate, and technology and preference parameters can be derived.
By setting the output share of private consumption to 0.55, we nd a ratio of in-
vestment to output of 0.20. The implied output elasticity of private capital is 0.29,
implying that the condition  ￿ 1 ￿ "Y ￿ 0:71 is easily met. The implied ratio of
output to private capital is 0.55, which is slightly lower than the value found by
Cooley and Prescott (1995). For the public capital stock, we derive Y {KG ￿ 2:20,
which is roughly in line with Kamps (2006), who nds a value of around 2. In
keeping with the average for OECD countries, the balanced budget labor income
tax rate is 0.35. The implied preference parameters are !N ￿ 0:63 and "C ￿ 0:37.
12Much of the microeconomic evidence points to a C smaller than one (Pencavel, 1986), which
is at odds with the implied elasticity of aggregate labor supply. However, RBC models are often
calibrated with values of C close to one. We follow the latter approach.
13Uhlig (2010) works with a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of unity.
14For the special case of the innite-horizon model, we set r ￿ .Section 4.3 | Solving the Model 93
4.3.2.2 Roots and Stability
Panel (a) of Figure 4.1 analyzes model stability for various values of !LL and C.
The negatively sloped solid curve represents the upper bound on the parameter
region that yields a stable solution. Provided !LL is not too large for a given C,
the model has a unique and locally saddle-point stable steady state. We nd two
negative roots and two positive roots that are potentially complex valued. In the
stable complex case (in which case the roots feature two negative and two positive
real parts), the analytical solution for the transition paths of the variables includes
cosine and sine terms, which give rise to endogenously determined dampened os-
cillations in key variables (Bom and Ligthart, 2011). The dotted line demarcates
the upper bound of the stable, non-cyclical region; it approaches the C-axis only
if C ￿ 8, whereas it intersects the vertical axis at the benchmark value of !LL.
Point C (C ￿ 1;!LL ￿ 2) indicates the benchmark calibration, which lies within
the stable, cyclical region. The solid line distinguishes the stable region with
dampened cycles from the unstable region. To obtain cyclical dynamics, a smaller
value of C needs to be compensated by a higher !LL.
Panel (b) of Figure 4.1 shows that, for the case of innitely-lived households
(i.e.,  ￿ 0) and small values of the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply, we
never end up in the cyclical region, reecting the real nature of the roots. For
 ￿ 0 and !LL ￿ 2, the innite-horizon model is unstable. However, in the
calibration point C ( ￿ 0:018;!LL ￿ 2) we nd stable, cyclical dynamics. The
dotted line shows that for smaller values of , a higher value of !LL is needed to
take the economy into the stable region with dampened cycles. Conversely, the
solid line indicates that for smaller values of , a smaller value of !LL is needed
to stay within the stable, cyclical zone.
Figure 4.2 studies stability for various combinations of tL and C. The dotted
line represents the upper bound of the stable, non-cyclical region, whereas the
lower solid line demarcates the lower bound of the unstable region. The dark grey
region in between the dashed lines shows combinations of points on the negatively
sloping segment of the Laer curve [see (4.30) and (4.33) below]. Areas with light
grey coloring are unstable. The white upper north-east corner in the gure|
which is bounded by the solid and dashed lines|represents a stable, non-cyclical
region. However, this zone does not yield economically meaningful parameter
combinations. The dotted line shows that for smaller values of C, a higher value
of tL is required to yield a stable, cyclical outcome. The calibration point C94 Public Investment and Balanced Budget Fiscal Rules | Chapter 4
Figure 4.1: Stability Regions for Various Values of !LL; C; and 




































Notes: The dotted line represents the upper bound of the stable, non-cyclical region and the
solid line demarcates the lower bound of the unstable region. The area in between the solid line
and the dotted line represents parameter combinations for which the model yields stable, cyclical
dynamics. Point C denotes the benchmark calibration.Section 4.3 | Solving the Model 95
Figure 4.2: Stability Regions for Various Values of tL and C
Notes: The dotted line represents the upper bound of the stable, non-cyclical region and the
lower solid line demarcates the lower bound of the unstable region. The light grey area represents
an unstable zone and the dark grey area in between the dashed lines shows combinations of points
on the negatively sloped segment of the Laer curve [see (4.30) and (4.33)]. The upper north-
east corner|which is bounded by the solid and dashed lines|represents a stable, non-cyclical
region. Point C denotes the benchmark calibration.
pC ￿ 1;tL ￿ 0:35q is located in the stable, cyclical region, where the economy
operates on the upward sloping segment of the Laer curve.
In sum, endogenous labor supply, nite planning horizons, and a suciently
high initial labor tax rate are necessary to give rise to dampened cyclical dynamics.
See Section 4.5 for an economic explanation. Because we consider a Cobb-Douglas
production function, the characteristic roots do not depend on the size of the
production externality. Intuitively, in the Cobb-Douglas case, a rise in the size of
the spillover eect does not induce a direct substitution between private capital and
labor.15 Once we introduce public debt to keep the labor tax rate constant|and
15If one considers a more general production function, such as a CES, public capital yields a
direct substitution eect. See Bom, Heijdra, and Ligthart (2010a) for an exposition of this case
under lump-sum taxation.96 Public Investment and Balanced Budget Fiscal Rules | Chapter 4
thus relax the balanced budget rule|the cyclical dynamics disappear. However,
this tax smoothing scenario takes us beyond the scope of the current chapter.16
4.3.3 Graphical Framework
We develop a simple graphical apparatus that will help us in analyzing the transi-
tional dynamics of a public investment impulse. More specically, the framework
describes the dynamic interaction between full consumption, nancial assets, and
the labor market.
Panel (a) of Figure 4.3 depicts the equilibrium in the labor market (E0) con-
ditional on the private capital stock, the public capital stock, the labor tax rate,
and full consumption. Equation (4.17) describes the labor demand curve (labeled
Ld
0), which is a positive function of both private and public capital. The aggregate
version of (4.9) yields the compensated or Frisch labor supply curve (labeled Ls
0),
which depends negatively on full consumption and the labor tax rate. The slope
of the labor supply curve assumes a positive (intratemporal) substitution eect on
labor supply (see Section 4.4 for a further discussion).
Panel (b) of Figure 4.3 displays the savings system|consisting of the variables
Xptq and Aptq|conditional on the private capital stock. The MKR locus presents
the modied Keynes-Ramsey (MKR) rule, which corresponds to (4.13) in steady
state. The household budget identity (HBI) locus is given by the steady-state
aggregate version of (4.4). The intersection of the MKR and HBI loci determines
the pX0;A0q equilibrium.
4.4 Analytical Long-Run Eects of Public In-
vestment
This section studies the long-run allocation and welfare eects of an unanticipated
and permanent increase in public investment (i.e., dIG ¡ 0). We assume a second-
best world in which the government has to resort to a distortionary labor income
tax to balance its budget at each instant of time. The policy shock occurs at time
t ￿ 0 and the economy reaches a new steady state at t ￿ 8. The policy change is
unanticipated in the sense that it is simultaneously announced and implemented.
16The tax smoothing scenario requires public debt to be introduced into the analysis. The
results and Matlab program are available upon request.Section 4.4 | Analytical Long-Run Eects of Public Investment 97
Figure 4.3: The Dynamic Eects of a Public Investment Impulse: The Labor
























































Notes: The top panel depicts labor market equilibrium. Aggregating equation (4.9) yields the
labor supply curve Ls, whereas equation (4.17) gives the labor demand curve Ld. The bottom
panel displays the savings system. The MKR locus denotes the modied Keynes-Ramsey rule
(4.13) and the household budget identity (HBI) is given by the aggregate version of (4.4).98 Public Investment and Balanced Budget Fiscal Rules | Chapter 4
4.4.1 Capital and Labor Markets
The increase in public investment boosts|via the accumulation function of public









We note that (4.15), (4.21), and (4.18) imply that the I{K ratio, the IG{KG ratio,
and Tobin's q are xed in the long run. By using (4.19) it also follows that the













where  y ￿ Y {K and we have made use of (4.26). Equation (4.27) shows a posi-
tive relationship between the long-run private capital multiplier and the long-run
employment multiplier. The size of the intercept is positively aected by the size
of the public capital externality and negatively by the public investment-to-GDP
ratio.
By totally dierentiating (4.19), while using (4.26) and (4.27), we nd the















The long-run wage multiplier is always positive as long as there is a public capital
externality. Clearly, if  ￿ 0, the gross wage rate is xed by the world rate of
interest.










1 ￿ tLp1 ￿  Lq
￿
; (4.29)
where  L ￿  !LL￿!LL denotes the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply.
Using the denition of  !LL, we nd




￿ 0 if 0 ￿ C ￿ 1
￿ 0 if C ￿ 1
¡ 0 if C ¡ 1
;
for !LL ¡ 0. The employment multiplier is zero if  L ￿ 0, which is the case
if the elasticity of substitution between private consumption (in which case the
substitution eect of an after-tax wage change is exactly oset by the income eect)Section 4.4 | Analytical Long-Run Eects of Public Investment 99
or the intertemporal labor supply eect is zero (i.e., !LL ￿ 0) or both. Panel (a)
of Figure 4.3 shows that a rise in public investment shifts the labor demand curve
to the right and moves the labor supply curve to the left, leaving the long-run
level of employment unchanged (i.e., L0 ￿ L8). The sign of the bracketed term in
(4.29) depends on the chosen parametrization. The numerator of the expression
is positive if public capital is suciently productive (i.e.,  ¡ !I
G), where  ￿ !I
G
corresponds to the `golden rule' of public investment in a rst-best world (Fisher








1 ￿ tLr1 ￿ !LLp1 ￿ !Nqs
tL!LLp1 ￿ !Nq
¡ 1: (4.30)
Assuming that  ¡ !I
G, we can consider three cases: (i) if 0 ￿ C ￿ 1, which
represents the perverse case of a backward bending uncompensated labor supply
curve, it follows that dLp8q{dIG ￿ 0; (ii) if 1 ￿ C ￿ U
C, we nd dLp8q{dIG ¡ 0;
and (iii) if C ¡ U
C, we arrive at dLp8q{dIG ￿ 0. For unproductive public capital
( ￿ 0) in special case (ii), the employment multiplier is negative. Intuitively,
private factors of production do not benet from public capital spillovers, but are
negatively aected by the distortionary labor tax. To foot the bill of the rise in
public spending, the labor tax rate has to rise, which induces households to work
less.
4.4.2 Labor Taxes and Output





















The rst term between straight brackets represents the tax rate eect, whereas
the second and third terms capture tax base eects (which only materialize for
tL ¡ 0). If the term between brackets is positive, the long-run Laer curve is
upward sloping in the pT;tLq-space. The labor tax rate is adjusted to keep the
government budget balanced, implying that the left-hand side of (4.31) is set to
zero. Using (4.29) and (4.28) into (4.31), imposing dTp8q{dIG ￿ 0, and rewriting









G ￿ tLp1 ￿  Lq
1 ￿ tLp1 ￿  Lq
￿
: (4.32)100 Public Investment and Balanced Budget Fiscal Rules | Chapter 4
If initial labor tax rates are zero, the term in square brackets in (4.32) is unam-
biguously positive, so that a rise in public investment increases the labor tax rate.
Hence, the economy operates on the upward-sloping segment of the Laer curve.
If tL ¡ 0, the sign of the numerator is ambiguous. By setting this expression to











￿ 1 if !I
G ￿ tL
￿ 1 if !I
G ￿ tL
¡ 1 if !I
G ¡ tL
: (4.33)
If tL ¡ 0 and  ¡ !I
G, then L
C ￿ U
C. In this case, the long-run labor tax multiplier
(4.32) is positive if C ￿ L
C or C ¡ U
C and negative if L
C ￿ C ￿ U
C. Note that
the region C ¡ U
C is not very meaningful from an economic point of view. The
threshold cases C ￿ L
C and C ￿ U
C give rise to horizontal and vertical long-run
Laer curves, respectively.
Having derived the long-run changes in all inputs, we can now derive the long-










 Lp ￿ !I
Gq
1 ￿ tLp1 ￿  Lq
￿
; (4.34)
where the rst term in brackets corresponds to the private capital eect and the
second term describes the employment eect. If public capital is unproductive
(i.e.,  ￿ 0), only the negative part of the employment eect remains, so that the
output multiplier is also negative (provided  L ¡ 0). If household preferences are
Cobb-Douglas (i.e.,  L ￿ 0), the employment eect drops completely, implying
that the long-run output eect is not aected by the size of the intertemporal
labor supply elasticity.
4.4.3 Full Consumption, Net Foreign Assets, and Welfare
Plugging (4.28) and (4.29) into the dierentiated household budget constraint















1 ￿ tLp1 ￿  Lq
￿
; (4.35)Section 4.5 | Quantitative Dynamic Eects of Public Investment 101
where !A ￿ rA{Y denotes the output share of asset income and !X ￿ X{Y
denotes the output share of full consumption. If  ¡ !I
G, the full consumption
multiplier is positive provided that C ￿ U
C and negative if C ¡ U
C.
Finally, to derive the eect on long-run foreign assets, we totally dierentiate
(4.23), while using (4.27) and (4.35) and noting that Tobin's q is at its initial value









p1 ￿  Lqp ￿ !I
Gq
1 ￿ tLp1 ￿  Lq
￿
; (4.36)
where we have used that A ￿ qK in the initial steady state.
The long-run instantaneous welfare eect of public investment follows from





p1 ￿ tLqrLp ￿ q ￿ p1 ￿ Lqrpr ￿ qsp ￿ !I
Gq
PL!I
Gr1 ￿ tLp1 ￿  Lqsrp ￿ q ￿ rpr ￿ qs
; (4.37)
which implies that public investment is welfare improving in the long run if and
only if  ¡ !I
G, provided that C ￿ U
C. Clearly, unproductive public investment
(i.e.,  ￿ 0) decreases long-run welfare.
4.5 Quantitative Dynamic Eects of Public In-
vestment
To quantify and visualize the dynamic macroeconomic eects of an unanticipated,
permanent, and balanced budget increase in public investment, we perform a sim-
ulation analysis based on the parameter setting of Section 4.3.2.1. Section 4.5.1
illustrates the transitional dynamics and Section 4.5.2 presents numerical results
on both the short-run and long-run eects.
4.5.1 Impulse Responses
In generating the impulse responses of a public investment shock, we use the
analytical transition paths derived in Bom and Ligthart (2011) based on the log-
linearized model summarized in Table 4.1. To accommodate dierences in the
adjustment speed of variables, we plot impulse response functions for 200 time
periods. The public investment impulse amounts to ~ IG ￿ 0:1 and occurs at time102 Public Investment and Balanced Budget Fiscal Rules | Chapter 4
t ￿ 0. Because the labor tax base changes over time, the labor tax rate is endoge-
nously varied to keep the government budget balanced at each instant of time.
4.5.1.1 Allocation Eects in the Benchmark Case
Figure 4.4 shows the impulse responses for various values of the intertemporal la-
bor supply elasticity; that is, !LL takes on values of 2.00 (solid line), 1.00 (dashed
line), and 0 (dotted line). Let us rst focus on the benchmark scenario of !LL ￿ 2.
On impact, employment falls, the gross wage rate rises, and the labor tax rate
increases. In terms of Panel (a) of Figure 4.3, the labor supply curve Ls
0 shifts
to the left to Ls
1, whereas the labor demand curve Ld
0 remains unaected, thereby
pushing up the gross wage rate. Intuitively, the rise in the labor tax rate that
is required to balance the government budget induces households to substitute
toward more leisure consumption. However, the fall in wealth|which prompts
households to work harder and consume less private goods|alleviates the drop
in employment. In Panel (b) of Figure 4.3, the economy moves along the dotted
dynamic path to point E1. Given that private capital is a predetermined variable,
the private capital-labor ratio rises. On impact, Tobin's q jumps down|reecting
a fall in the (future) marginal product of private capital|thereby depressing pri-
vate investment. Although both short-run domestic absorption and output fall,
the latter dominates so that short-run net imports rise. It is important to note
that the short-run drop in private consumption and private investment follows
from the distortionary nature of labor taxes; indeed, the opposite result obtains if
lump-sum tax nancing is considered (cf. Bom, Heijdra, and Ligthart, 2010a).
Shortly after the shock, the private capital stock starts falling, reecting de-
pressed private investment. Because labor and private capital are cooperative
factors of production, the labor demand curve shifts to the left from Ld
1 to Ld
2 in
Panel (a) of Figure 4.3. The private capital-labor ratio rises further, taking the
economy from E1 to E2 via the dotted dynamic path. The rise in gross wages as-
sociated with the larger K{L-ratio increases full consumption; see the move from
E1 to E2 along the dynamic path in Panel (b) of Figure 4.3. Tobin's q eventually
recovers, thereby increasing private investment and thus boosting private capi-
tal accumulation. Together with the continuous expansion of the stock of public
capital, this accumulation of private capital causes employment to rise, which is
represented by a shift of the labor demand curve from Ld
2 to Ld
3. Consequently,
output increases substantially. The labor tax base expands, allowing a reductionSection 4.5 | Quantitative Dynamic Eects of Public Investment 103
Figure 4.4: Dynamic Eects of a Permanent Public Investment Impulse:
Various Values of !LL
~ Y ptq ~ qptq
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Notes: The vertical axis reports the relative change in the respective macroeconomic variable.
The solid line denotes the benchmark scenario of !LL ￿ 2, the dashed line represents !LL ￿ 1,
and the dotted line represents !LL ￿ 0. The other parameters are set at their benchmark values
(Table 4.2). The size of the public investment impulse amounts to ~ IG ￿ 0:1.104 Public Investment and Balanced Budget Fiscal Rules | Chapter 4
in the labor tax rate during periods 20 to 60. Because the after-tax return on
working increases, households supply more labor; that is, the labor supply curve
shifts to the right from Ls
2 to Ls
3. The employment increment reaches its maximum
in point E3, which roughly coincides with the peaks of private capital stock and
output at about period 35. Panel (b) of Figure 4.3 reveals that nancial assets
and full consumption also increase as the economy moves from point E2 to E3.
The economy enters into a new cycle in which the absolute increment in the
capital stock and employment is smaller than in the previous cycle. Intuitively,
the labor tax rate needs to rise to oset the fall in the labor tax base. However, to
balance the public budget, the tax base falls by less than in the previous cycle. In
Panel (a) of Figure 4.3, the labor supply curve moves to the left to eventually|
after going through a number of smaller oscillations|settle in the new steady
state. Panel (b) of Figure 4.3 shows that full consumption and nancial assets
also spiral toward E8. In the new steady state, employment is not aected by the
public investment impulse, whereas output, the public capital stock, the private
capital stock, private consumption, and the labor tax rate are larger than in the
initial steady state.17 In addition, the country has accumulated foreign debt in
the new equilibrium. Both gross and after-tax wages have risen, whereas Tobin's
q returns to its initial steady-state value.
The benchmark case of endogenous intertemporal labor supply shows damp-
ened cyclical dynamics. Assuming the economy is within the stable region, a
larger intertemporal labor supply elasticity increases the amplitude of the cycles.
Ignoring the intertemporal margin of labor supply (i.e., !LL ￿ 0) yields monotonic
transition paths for all the variables. Because all three cases presented in Figure
4.4 assume C ￿ 1, long-run employment is not aected by the public investment
impulse. Nevertheless, long-run output rises, reecting the increased stocks of
private and public capital.
4.5.1.2 Other Specications
Panels (a){(c) of Figure 4.5 show the responses of output and private consumption
to a permanent public investment impulse for the special cases of innitely-lived
households (i.e.,  ￿ 0), unproductive public spending (i.e.,  ￿ 0), and elastic
substitution between private consumption and leisure (i.e., C ¡ 1). In each case,
17The positive relationship between changes in private consumption and output is in line with
evidence from vector autoregressive (VAR) models (cf. Perotti, 2004).Section 4.5 | Quantitative Dynamic Eects of Public Investment 105
we allow the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply to assume the values !LL ￿ 0
(dotted line), !LL ￿ 1 (dashed line), and !LL ￿ 1:75 (solid line).18 Panel (a) shows
that the cycles disappear in the innite-horizon model.19 Because intergenerational
spillovers are absent, all future costs and benets of public investment accrue to
the innitely-lived representative agent, who adjusts full consumption once and
for all at the time of the shock. The wealth eect triggers a negative response of
labor supply|which in turn causes a temporary drop in employment and output|
but only at impact. During transition, the wealth eect is switched o, thereby
eliminating the cyclical responses of employment and output. Notice that the
absence of cycles is independent of !LL.
Panel (b) depicts the case of unproductive public spending (i.e.,  ￿ 0). If
labor supply is inelastic, output is insensitive to unproductive public spending.
Private consumption, however, falls over time, reecting the higher labor tax rate
required to balance the government budget. If labor supply is elastic, unproductive
public spending generates a small temporary fall in output, which returns to its
initial steady state in the long run. In this case, private consumption drops at
impact, but decreases only slightly over time to the new (lower) steady state. The
dampened cycles remain as long as labor supply is suciently elastic, pointing to
the role of distortionary labor taxes in generating non-monotonic dynamics.20
Finally, Panel (c) considers a larger elasticity of substitution between leisure
and private consumption (i.e., C ￿ 1:25 ¡ 1). Values of C larger than unity|
which correspond to a positive uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply|
increase the amplitude of the output eect. Intuitively, the labor supply elasticity
 L increases, yielding a more elastic labor supply response to a change in the tax
rate. As a result, the labor tax base becomes more elastic too, which generates
a larger tax base eect. To balance the government budget, the labor tax rate
has to change by more than under a small uncompensated wage elasticity of labor
supply. The assumption of !LL ￿ 1:75 gives rise to output dynamics qualitatively
18Note that the benchmark value of the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply (i.e., !LL ￿ 2)
gives rise to unstable dynamics in the innite-horizon model (i.e.,  ￿ 0); see Panel (b) of Figure
4.1.
19In contrast to the ndings of Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2003), the hysteretic and non-
hysteretic model give rise to very dierent transitional dynamics. Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe
(2003) employ a stochastic framework and speak of non-stationary and stationary models.
Whether the model is stochastic or deterministic does not aect their key point.
20Heijdra and Ligthart (2010) show that external economies of scale cause Schmitt-Groh e and
Uribe's (2003) key result to break down. The cycles in their framework disappear once the eect
of external economies of scale is switched o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Figure 4.5: Other Specications: Innite Horizons, Unproductive Public
Spending, and Elastic Substitution Between Consumption and Leisure
Panel (a): Innite-Horizon Model ( ￿ 0)
Panel (b): Unproductive Public Spending ( ￿ 0)
Panel (c): Elastic Substitution (C ￿ 1:25)
Notes: The left panels show the relative change in output and the right panels depict the relative
change in private consumption. The solid line denotes the scenario of !LL ￿ 1:75, the dashed
line represents !LL ￿ 1, and the dotted line represents !LL ￿ 0. The other parameters are set
at their benchmark values. The size of the public investment impulse amounts to ~ IG ￿ 0:1:Section 4.5 | Quantitative Dynamic E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similar to the benchmark case, reecting the fact that a larger C substitutes for
a lower !LL. In contrast to the benchmark case, however, the larger value of C
generates a positive short-run eect of public investment on private consumption.
4.5.1.3 Welfare Eects
Panel (a) of Figure 4.6 depicts the dynamic (instantaneous) welfare eects of a
change in public investment for !LL ￿ 2 (solid line), !LL ￿ 1 (dashed line), and
!LL ￿ 0 (dotted line). If the intertemporal labor supply elasticity is zero (i.e.,
!LL ￿ 0), the welfare prole is monotonically rising starting from zero at impact
to a positive long-run value. For !LL ¡ 0, however, the dynamic welfare eects
are non-monotonic, being positive in the short run and long run but negative in
the medium run. This negative medium-run welfare loss increases with !LL, being
especially pronounced for the case giving rise to dampened cyclical dynamics (i.e.,
!LL ￿ 2).
The question arises as to how the discounted sum of welfare gains/losses is
aected by parameter changes. Panel (b) of Figure 4.6 shows, for various values of
!LL, the second-best optimal public investment-to-GDP ratio, that is, the value
of !I
G that maximizes the present discounted value of instantaneous welfare given
the government's budget constraint. For !LL ￿ 0|in which case labor taxes do
not distort the labor market|the optimal level of public investment is around 7.5
percent of GDP. For !LL ¡ 0, the optimal share of public investment decreases
to about 6 percent, slightly increasing with !LL up to about !LL ￿ 2:2, above
which the dynamic system is no longer stable. The benchmark calibration point
C lies within the area of welfare gains, suggesting that, from a welfare perspective,
public investment should be increased to around 6 percent of GDP.
The welfare eects of public investment critically depend on the size of the
public capital externality. Panel (c) displays the welfare eects for  ￿ 0:10
(dotted-dashed line),  ￿ 0:08 (solid line),  ￿ 0:05 (dashed line), and  ￿
0 (dotted line). Again, the welfare proles display dampened cycles. If public
capital is unproductive, the welfare eects are always negative. Productive public
investment generates welfare gains in the both the short and long run and welfare
losses in the medium run. Note that larger values of  increase not only the
positive short- and long-run welfare eects but also|due to the wealth eect on
labor supply|the medium-run welfare losses. Nevertheless, as shown in Panel
(d), the second-best optimal !I
G rises linearly with the size of the public capital108 Public Investment and Balanced Budget Fiscal Rules | Chapter 4
Figure 4.6: Dynamic Welfare Eects of Public Investment and Optimal Public
Investment-to-GDP Ratio
















Notes: Panels (a) and (c) depict the dynamic welfare eects for various parameter values. Panels
(b) and (d) show the optimal public investment-to-GDP ratio for various values of !LL and ,
respectively. In Panel (a), the solid line denotes the scenario of !LL ￿ 2 (benchmark), the
dashed line represents !LL ￿ 1, and the dotted line represents !LL ￿ 0. In Panel (c), the
dotted-dashed line shows  ￿ 0:10, the solid line depicts  ￿ 0:08 (benchmark), the dashed
line represents  ￿ 0:05, and the dotted line represents  ￿ 0. The other parameters are set
at their benchmark values (Table 4.2). The area below the dots in Panels (b) and (d) denotes
the parameter combinations for which a lifetime welfare gain is obtained. Point C denotes the
calibration point. The size of the public investment impulse amounts to ~ IG ￿ 0:1:Section 4.5 | Quantitative Dynamic E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spillover. Note that the slope of the line is below unity, showing that a given 
sustains a smaller second-best optimal GDP share of public investment, reecting
the deadweight loss of labor tax nancing.
4.5.2 Quantitative Short-Run and Long-Run Eects
Table 4.3 presents the short-run and long-run eects of the balanced budget public
investment shock. In the benchmark case, the long-run output multiplier amounts
to 2.25, which falls naturally short of the value of 2.71 obtained by Bom, Heijdra,
and Ligthart (2010a), who assume a non-distortionary nancing scenario. The
positive output multiplier reects the larger stocks of public and private capital in
the long run. In fact, the long-run private capital multiplier amounts to 4.08, owing
to `crowding-in' of public investment by private investment. In contrast, because
the benchmark case sets C ￿ 1 (so that  L ￿ 0), the long-run employment
multiplier is zero [see (4.29)]. The long-run output expansion comes at the cost
of a much larger short-run contraction, however. Indeed, the distortionary nature
of labor taxes together with the wealth eect on labor supply generate a short-
run employment multiplier of -1.72 and a short-run output multiplier of -3.68.
Moreover, compared with Bom, Heijdra, and Ligthart (2010a), the labor market
distortions give rise to stronger short-run crowding-out of private investment by
public investment.
Varying the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply aects only the wage multi-
plier in the long run. In fact, because Cobb-Douglas preferences are assumed (i.e.,
C ￿ 1), the long-run employment multiplier is zero irrespective of !LL. Conse-
quently, the long-run multipliers of private capital, output, private consumption,
private investment, foreign assets, and labor tax rate are also independent of !LL.
In the short run, however, the employment multiplier is less negative for lower
values of !LL. As a result, the short-run output contraction is much less severe for
!LL ￿ 1 than for !LL ￿ 2 and absent altogether for !LL ￿ 0. Likewise, in absolute
terms, the short-run negative multiplier of private investment falls substantially
for !LL ￿ 1, and even turns positive for !LL ￿ 0.
An elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure (C) slightly
larger (smaller) than one yields a positive (negative) long-run employment multi-
plier. As a consequence, all long-run multipliers excepting that of the real wage
are (in absolute value) somewhat larger (smaller) than in the benchmark case. In
the short run, the economically meaningful case of a small positive uncompensated110 Public Investment and Balanced Budget Fiscal Rules | Chapter 4
Table 4.3: Macroeconomic Multipliers and Welfare Eects of a Permanent
Increase in Public Investment
!LL C 
Benchmark 0 1 0.75 1.25 0 0.05 0.10
Panel (a): Macroeconomic Multipliers
dY p0q
dIG -3.6756 0.0000 -1.6334 -3.2082 -4.1838 -0.0866 -2.3297 -4.5728
dY p8q
dIG 2.2464 2.2464 2.2464 2.0265 2.5157 0.0000 1.4040 2.8080
dCp0q
dIG -0.0473 0.0000 -0.0515 -0.2835 0.2062 -1.1629 -0.4657 0.2316
dCp8q
dIG 0.7139 0.7139 0.7139 0.5468 0.9185 -1.1898 0.0000 1.1898
dIp0q
dIG -1.8411 0.2734 -0.4110 -1.3845 -2.6118 -0.1206 -1.1959 -2.2712
dIp8q
dIG 0.4493 0.4493 0.4493 0.4053 0.5031 0.0000 0.2808 0.5616
dFp0q
dIG 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
dFp8q
dIG -2.0806 -2.0806 -2.0806 -1.8591 -2.3518 -4.7460 -3.0801 -1.4143
dLp0q
dIG -1.7202 0.0000 -1.1466 -1.5015 -1.9580 -0.0405 -1.0903 -2.1401
dLp8q
dIG 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0733 0.0897 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
dKp0q
dIG 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
dKp8q
dIG 4.0839 4.0839 4.0839 3.6841 4.5733 0.0000 2.5524 5.1048
dwp0q
dIG 3.1730 0.0000 0.9400 2.7695 3.6117 0.0748 2.0112 3.9475
dwp8q
dIG 4.8000 1.6000 3.2000 4.8000 4.8000 0.0000 3.0000 6.0000
dtLp0q
dIG 2.6941 1.4040 1.9773 2.5301 2.8725 1.4344 2.2217 3.0091
dtLp8q
dIG 0.6155 0.6155 0.6155 0.6927 0.5210 1.4040 0.9112 0.4184
Panel (b): Welfare Eects
~ ULp0q 0.0079 0.0000 0.0050 0.0076 0.0083 -0.0038 0.0035 0.0108
~ UHp0q 0.0035 0.0000 0.0031 0.0034 0.0037 -0.0020 0.0014 0.0049
~ ULp8q 0.0024 0.0065 0.0035 0.0022 0.0027 -0.0040 0.0000 0.0040
~ UHp8q 0.0030 0.0065 0.0042 0.0028 0.0033 -0.0027 0.0009 0.0044
dL
Rp0q 0.0177 0.0351 0.0185 0.0143 0.0236 -0.0959 -0.0249 0.0461
dH
Rp0q 0.0280 0.0351 0.0355 0.0232 0.0329 -0.0674 -0.0077 0.0519
Notes: Unless indicated otherwise, all parameters are set at their benchmark values (Table 4.2),
where !LL ￿ 2, C ￿ 1, and  ￿ 0:08. ~ Uiptq denotes the relative change in instantaneous
utility at time t for i ￿ tH;Lu, where H and L stand for lump-sum tax nancing and labor tax
nancing, respectively. i
Rptq represents the present discounted value of utility of an innitely-
lived representative agent: i
Rptq ￿
‡8
t lnUpqe￿p￿tqd.Section 4.6 | Conclusions 111
wage elasticity of labor supply (i.e., C ￿ 1:25) yields a positive eect of public
investment on private consumption, although at the cost of further depressing
employment, private investment, and output.
Under Cobb-Douglas preferences, unproductive public spending (i.e.,  ￿ 0)
does not aect the steady-state level of output, since neither employment nor
capital react to public investment in the long run. As the size of the public capital
externality increases, the long-run output multiplier expands, although again at
the cost of an even larger short-run output contraction. As in the case of C ¡ 1,
a suciently large value of  generates a positive short-run response of private
consumption, but exacerbates the negative short-run eects on employment and
private investment. The long-run multiplier of the stock of foreign debt is negative
and decreases with .
The bottom section of Table 4.3 displays the short-run and long-run eects
on instantaneous aggregate utility (which are denoted by ~ Up0q and ~ Up8q, respec-
tively) that follow from using ~ Uptq ￿ ~ Xptq ￿ ~ Pptq. In addition, the table presents
the change in lifetime utility of an innitely-lived representative agent, dRp0q,
which is derived from (4.1) with  ￿ 0 imposed. To assess the welfare costs of
labor taxation, we report the welfare eects of public investment under lump-sum
(or head) tax nancing and labor tax nancing (labeled `H' and `L,' respectively).
The results show that, despite the short-run contraction in output and private
consumption, instantaneous welfare rises both in the short and in the long run in
the cases where public capital is productive. In the short run, instantaneous utility
rises by more under labor tax than lump-sum tax nancing, owing to the boost
in leisure consumption. In the long run, however, the labor market distortions
cause the instantaneous welfare eect to be larger in the lump-sum tax nanc-
ing scenario. Similarly, lifetime utility only rises if public capital is suciently
productive. In the benchmark case, the lifetime utility losses from labor market
distortions amount to 58 percent of the lifetime welfare gains.
4.6 Conclusions
The chapter studies the dynamic macroeconomic and welfare eects of public
investment in a micro-founded model of a small open economy in the OECD area.
The government keeps the budget balanced by employing distortionary labor taxes112 Public Investment and Balanced Budget Fiscal Rules | Chapter 4
to nance public investment. The household sector of the model extends a Yaari-
Blanchard model of overlapping generations by introducing an intertemporal labor
supply eect, public capital, and distortionary taxation. One the one hand, public
capital generates positive spillovers to private production. On the other hand, the
labor tax distorts the labor market.
For a plausible calibration of the model, we nd dampened cyclical dynamics
in key macroeconomic variables. The cycles are induced by the combination of
nite planning horizons of households, the wealth eect on labor supply, and the
balanced budget scal rule. A balanced budget permanent impulse to public in-
vestment increases long-run output and private consumption, which is in line with
empirical evidence. The benchmark case of Cobb-Douglas preferences yields a
long-run output multiplier of 2.25. In the short run, however, the strong decrease
in employment causes an even larger output contraction, which is accompanied by
a decrease in private investment and private consumption. An elasticity of sub-
stitution between consumption and leisure larger than unity or a suciently large
output elasticity of public capital or both increase the long-run output multiplier
above the benchmark value and exacerbate the negative short-run eect on em-
ployment, private investment, and output. Short-run private consumption rises,
however.
Finally, our numerical analysis reveals that a balanced budget public invest-
ment impulse improves households' lifetime welfare in the benchmark analysis.
Bom and Ligthart's (2008) short-run estimate of the output elasticity of public
capital of 0.08 implies an optimal public investment ratio of about 6 percent of
GDP, which is well above the OECD average. Therefore, our results suggest that,
from a welfare point of view, public investment should be encouraged even in the
second-best scenario in which governments have to resort to distortionary labor
tax nancing.
4.A Appendix
This Appendix derives a number of key expressions used in the main text. Bom
and Ligthart (2011) provide further details on the derivations.Section 4.A | Appendix 113
4.A.1 The Reduced-Form Model
The model can be condensed to
9 ~ zptq ￿ ~ zptq ￿  ptq; (4.38)
where  is the 4 ￿ 4 Jacobian matrix
 ￿
￿
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; (4.39)









A ptq ￿ ￿r
￿
!  w  wgp1 ￿ e
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For output, the yj coecients are dened as
yk ￿
"Yp1 ￿  !LLq
1 ￿  !LLr"Yp1 ￿  Lq ￿  Ls
; yx ￿ ￿
p1 ￿ "Yq!LL
1 ￿  !LLr"Yp1 ￿  Lq ￿  Ls
;
yg ￿
p1 ￿  !LLq
1 ￿  !LLr"Yp1 ￿  Lq ￿  Ls
; yd ￿ ￿
 !LL!I
Gp1 ￿  Lq
1 ￿  !LLr"Yp1 ￿  Lq ￿  Ls
;
where  L ￿ tL{p1 ￿ tLq. For employment, the coecients are given by
lk ￿
"Y  !LLp1 ￿  Lq
1 ￿  !LLr"Yp1 ￿  Lq ￿  Ls
; lx ￿ ￿
!LL
1 ￿  !LLr"Yp1 ￿  Lq ￿  Ls
;
lg ￿
 !LLp1 ￿  Lq
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1 ￿  !LLr"Yp1 ￿  Lq ￿  Ls
:
For the wage rate, the coecients are
wk ￿
"Yp1 ￿  !LL Lq
1 ￿  !LLr"Yp1 ￿  Lq ￿  Ls
; wx ￿
!LL"Y
1 ￿  !LLr"Yp1 ￿  Lq ￿  Ls
;
wg ￿
p1 ￿  !LL Lq






Gp1 ￿  Lq
1 ￿  !LLr"Yp1 ￿  Lq ￿  Ls
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Finally, the coecients for after-tax wages are given by
  wk ￿ wk ￿  Lplk ￿ wkq;   wx ￿ wx ￿  Lplx ￿ wxq;
  wg ￿ wg ￿  Lplg ￿ wgq;   wd ￿ wd ￿  Lpld ￿ wdq ￿
!I
Gp1 ￿  Lq
1 ￿ "Y
:
4.A.2 Deriving the Long-Run Employment Multiplier
Equation (4.9) can be fully dierentiated with respect to IG to arrive at a general
























The rst three terms capture the intratemporal substitution eect on labor supply
and the last term captures the negative wealth eect or intertemporal substitution
eect on labor supply.
The rst two terms are derived in the main text [see (4.28) and (4.32)]. To
derive d!Np8q{dIG, we fully dierentiate (4.10):
d!Np8q
dIG














































To obtain an expression for dXp8q{dIG, we note that the steady-state version
of equation (4.13) implies a xed ratio of total assets to full consumption: A{X ￿














After dierentiating the steady-state (aggregate) version of the household budget














Using dtLp8q{dIG [from (4.31)], (4.41), and (4.44), we nd the labor multiplier
(4.29).Chapter 5
Fiscal Policy and Long-Term
Interest Rates
Abstract: Conventional wisdom dictates that a debt-nanced scal stimulus
raises long-term real interest rates. This chapter shows that the interest rate ef-
fect is reversed when the public debt-to-GDP ratio is high. This `unconventional'
eect occurs because a debt-stabilizing tax raise strongly distorts future output,
which in turn makes private saving oversensitive to changes in public saving. We
document these ndings using Markov-switching models on quarterly time-series
data for the United States spanning the period 1960:1-2008:4. Our results suggest
that the supporting evidence of debt neutrality of taxes (Ricardian equivalence),
which is frequently found in the literature, is due to model misspecication. Re-
garding the eects of government spending, we nd that its composition matters;
government consumption and public investment often exert opposite eects on
interest rates.116 Fiscal Policy and Long-Term Interest Rates | Chapter 5
5.1 Introduction
What are the eects of debt-nanced increases in government spending or tax
cuts on long-term interest rates? Despite the fairly large body of literature de-
voted to this question, no conclusive answer has arisen yet. Two competing the-
ories dominate the debate. On the one hand, the `conventional' view|following
the terminology of Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999)|posits that, because private
saving is relatively insensitive to changes in public saving, a debt-nanced scal
stimulus generates excess supply of government bonds.1 This oversupply of bonds
lowers their price and raises real interest rates. On the other hand, the Ricardian
equivalence hypothesis (Barro, 1974) postulates that changes in public saving are
neutralized by opposing changes in private saving. Except for unexpected tempo-
rary government spending changes, debt-nanced scal policy shocks should have
no impact on real interest rates. However, the Ricardian hypothesis stringently
relies on assumptions about household behavior, some of which are contradicted
by empirical evidence at the micro level. Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), for exam-
ple, emphasize the empirical implausibility of Ricardian equivalence. Nonetheless,
Barro (1989) and Seater (1993), based on some supporting evidence at the macro
level, defend the Ricardian hypothesis as a good approximation of economic reality.
Explaining this controversy remains an open question.
This chapter shows that while the eects of unexpected scal policy changes
on long-term real interest rates are not always `conventional' (in the sense of being
in accordance with the conventional view), very seldom are they Ricardian. Using
Markov-switching models on quarterly time-series data (1960:1-2008:4) for the
United States, we nd that the interest rate eects of unexpected scal policy
changes are reversed at times of high (or rising) public debt as share of GDP.
Because they are the opposite of those predicted by the conventional view, we call
these eects `unconventional.' We show that the interest rate eects alternate over
time between conventional and unconventional, depending on the dynamics of the
public debt-to-GDP ratio. Not accounting for this nonlinear response generates
statistically insignicant eects.
To provide theoretical foundations for our empirical ndings, we rst develop a
simple model featuring Ricardian and liquidity-constrained households, who face
distortionary taxes. Owing to liquidity constraints, private saving is relatively
1According to Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), the conventional view assumes that the econ-
omy is Keynesian in the short run and classical in the long run.Section 5.1 | Introduction 117
insensitive to changes in public saving when public debt is initially low. Hence, a
debt-nanced scal expansion, for instance, exerts the conventional positive impact
on real interest rates. If the initial stock of public debt is large, however, Ricardian
households anticipate high future taxes. Because additional future taxes strongly
distort lifetime income, private saving is oversensitive to changes in public saving.
In this case, a debt-nanced scal stimulus is followed by a large boost in private
saving, causing an `unconventional' fall in real interest rates.
Our argument is that the sign and magnitude of the interest rate response to
scal policy changes depend on how agents perceive their impact on future output.
Arguably, government consumption and public investment have dierent output
eects (e.g., Baxter and King, 1993). In the presence of nominal or real rigidities,
government consumption stimulates aggregate demand and output in the short
run. Over the long run, public investment also generates supply-side positive out-
put eects. Hence, one objective of this chapter is to investigate whether the
composition of government spending matters. Indeed, we nd that government
consumption and public investment often exert opposite eects on long-term in-
terest rates.
The hypothesis of nonlinear interest rate eects builds on the literature that
followed Giavazzi and Pangano's (1990) seminal work on `expansionary scal con-
tractions.' Blanchard (1990), Bertola and Drazen (1993), Sutherland (1997), and
Perotti (1999) propose models where scal policy contractions may expand pri-
vate consumption at times of high scal stress (i.e., when the level of government
debt is high or fast increasing). Perotti (1999) reports supporting evidence of
nonlinear responses of consumption to scal policy shocks for a panel of 19 OECD
countries. Similarly, Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000) nd nonlinear eects of
scal variables on private saving, especially for developing countries. In contrast,
Afonso (2010) nds little evidence of episodes of expansionary scal consolidations
in the EU15 countries. The novelty of the present chapter is to show that, in a
closed (or large) economy, the possible oversensitivity of private saving to changes
in scal policy at times of scal stress generates similar unconventional responses
in long-term real interest rates.
To empirically motivate our hypothesis, we plot in Figure 5.1 the sensitivity118 Fiscal Policy and Long-Term Interest Rates | Chapter 5


































































Notes: The solid line (left scale) gives the sensitivity of private saving to changes in public saving.
It is calculated as follows: 4Sp ￿ 4Sg if 4Sg ￿ 0, and ￿p4Sp ￿ 4Sgq otherwise, where 4Sp
and 4Sg denote the quarterly changes in private and public saving-to-GDP ratios, respectively.
For ease of visualization, we plot the 9-quarter moving average of this variable. The dashed line
corresponds to the public debt-to-GDP ratio (right scale), which is available only after 1966:1.
The correlation coecient between the two variables is 0.3. See Appendix 5.A.4 for details on
data sources and variable denitions.
of private saving to changes in public saving (solid line) and the public debt-to-
GDP ratio (dashed line), for the United States.2 Figure 5.1 suggests a positive
relationship between the ratio of public debt and the sensitivity of private saving
(the correlation coecient is 0.3). For instance, the fast increase in the public debt-
to-GDP ratio during the years of `Reaganomics' is associated with a dramatic rise
in the sensitivity of private saving. Whether this occasional oversensitiveness of
private saving to scal policy changes generates unconventional interest rate eects
requires a formal analysis, which is developed in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
Understanding the eects of scal policy actions on real interest rates is im-
portant for policy-making. If a scal expansion raises real interest rates, private
investment is discouraged and the steady-state level of private capital is lowered.
Hence, using scal policy to stimulate aggregate demand in the short run may
2The sensitivity of private saving to changes in public saving is simply measured by the sum
of the quarterly changes of private and public saving (relative to GDP) if the change in public
saving is negative, and the negative of this sum otherwise.Section 5.1 | Introduction 119
lower long-run output. Alternatively, if households are Ricardian, scal policy is
to a large extent neutral. In this case, scal policy is neither eective at stimu-
lating aggregate demand in the short run nor does it discourage private capital
accumulation and output in the long run.
The relevance of the topic for policy-making has attracted a great deal of
attention in the empirical literature. However, no consensus on the empirical
relationship between scal policy and interest rates has emerged yet. Barro (1989)
and Seater (1993) review the early literature and conclude that the empirical
evidence is consistent with the Ricardian hypothesis. Bernheim (1989), Barth,
Iden, Russek and Wohar (1991), Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), and Gale and
Orszag (2003) conduct a comprehensive survey of the empirical literature and nd
a large number of papers reporting either positive, negative, or insignicant eects.
The general conclusion arising from this literature is that the empirical evidence
is `extremely mixed' (Bernheim, 1989, p. 70) or `not very informative' (Elmendorf
and Mankiw, 1999, p. 1658).
A number of studies have tried some methodological renements in an attempt
to shed further light on the relationship between scal variables and interest rates.
One promising approach|introduced by Watchel and Young (1987), and followed
by Cohen and Garnier (1991), Elmendorf (1993), Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba
(2002), and Laubach (2009)|looks at the response of interest rates to projections
of future (rather than current) budget decits. Gale and Orszag (2003) argue that
this approach more eectively detects signicantly positive interest rate eects of
budget decits. Another approach makes use of Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR)
models to estimate the impulse responses of interest rates to scal policy shocks.
Perotti (2005) and Caldara and Kamps (2008), for instance, t VAR models to
U.S. data and nd very small interest rate responses. Favero and Giavazzi (2007)
argue that larger interest rate responses are found if the VAR specication is
extended to include a public debt feedback equation. Dai and Philippon (2006)
obtain signicant interest rate responses by combining the VAR model with a
no-arbitrage term structure model. By acknowledging the major role played by
the dynamics of public debt, this chapter is most closely related to Favero and
Giavazzi (2007). Unlike their model, however, here the dynamics of public debt
manifests itself implicitly through a nonlinear response of interest rates.
A recent literature investigates the possibility of a nonlinear relationship be-
tween scal policy and interest rates. To the best of our knowledge, though, no
study so far has considered the possibility of reversed interest rate eects. On120 Fiscal Policy and Long-Term Interest Rates | Chapter 5
the contrary, this literature nds that the conventional eects are strengthened
during periods of scal stress. Using a panel of advanced and emerging economies,
Aisen and Hauner (2008) and Baldacci and Kumar (2010) nd larger eects of
budget decits on long-term interest rates for countries with large initial decits
or high public debt ratios. In the same vein, Ardagna (2009) documents larger
negative eects of scal contractions on interest rates in countries/years with large
initial budget decits. However, these results are not necessarily inconsistent with
ours. Conventional eects can indeed be reinforced at times of scal stress due
to changes in the risk premium. Here, in contrast, we investigate the response of
long-term interest rates to scal policy while controlling for changes in the risk
premium.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 analyzes a simple stochastic
closed-economy model where the interest rate eects of scal policy shocks depend
on the initial expected level of future taxes. Section 5.3 describes the econometric
methodology to identify periods of unconventional interest rate eects and the
time-series data used in the estimation procedure. The estimation results are
discussed in Section 5.4. Finally, Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 A Simple Model
This section presents a simple stochastic dynamic model of a closed economy, in
which unanticipated scal policy shocks generate either conventional or uncon-
ventional eects on interest rates, depending on the expected future tax burden
implied by the current level of public debt. The term `scal policy shock' is used
here to mean an unexpected change in government spending (or in any of its
components, for that matter) or taxes, irrespective of its structural nature or cor-
relation with other shocks. As discussed before, `conventional' eects refer to those
predicted by the standard Keynesian model; that is, a positive interest rate eect
of government spending and a negative eect of taxes. In contrast, scal policy
eects are labelled `unconventional' if they depart from the standard predictions.
In spirit, the model is similar to that of Perotti (1999), in that it focuses on
the response of private consumption to scal policy shocks without explicitly con-
sidering the production sector. Unlike Perotti's, however, our model features an
endogenous real interest rate. Section 5.2.1 describes the elements of the model.Section 5.2 | A Simple Model 121
The quasi-reduced form solution for the log-linearized version is discussed in Sec-
tion 5.2.2. All variables are dened in real terms. Lower-case variables denote the
natural logarithm of upper-case variables.
5.2.1 Model Description
Consider an economy inhabited by a continuum of households living for T periods,
whose population is normalized to one.3 Labor income and taxes are uniform
across households. Following Campbell and Mankiw (1989), we assume that a
fraction  of households are liquidity constrained and simply consume all their
disposable labor income in every period t:
C
c
t ￿ pYt ￿ Xtq; 0 ￿  ￿ 1; (5.1)
where Cc
t denotes aggregate consumption of liquidity-constrained households, Yt
is aggregate labor income, and Xt denotes net taxes. Note that , used here as a
measure of lack of access to nancial markets, has other possible interpretations.
Gal , L opez-Salido and Vall es (2007), for instance, interpret  as the fraction of
`rule-of-thumb' consumers.
The remaining fraction 1￿ are Ricardian households with access to nancial
markets. There are two nancial assets: government bonds, Bt, and private bonds,
At. Both assets are risk-free and pay one unit of the consumption good in the
subsequent period. Arbitrage ensures a common real return Rt ￿ 1 ￿ rt, where rt
is the real interest rate. The price of each bond is then R
￿1
t .


















; 0 ￿  ￿ 1; (5.3)
where Et denotes the expectations operator conditional on information available
at time t,  is a discount factor, Up￿q denotes the instantaneous isoelastic util-
ity function, Cu
t is aggregate consumption of Ricardian households, and  is the
3The results that follow are robust to innite horizons (i.e., T ￿ 8). Below, we analyze the
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intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Ricardian households maximize (5.2) sub-
ject to their budget constraint





where Ft ￿ At ￿ Bt denotes total nancial wealth at the end of period t. The
budget constraint (5.4) reads as follows: at time t, Ricardian households own
nancial wealth Ft￿1 and receive after-tax labor income p1 ￿ qpYt ￿ Xtq, out
of which they consume Cu
t and invest R
￿1
t Ft in nancial assets. The rst-order








where U1p￿q ￿ BU{BC. The transversality condition implies FT ￿ 0, so that
Cu
T ￿ p1 ￿ qpYT ￿ XTq ￿ FT￿1.4
The government collects (net) tax revenues Xt and spends Gt on goods and
services. Any spending in excess of taxes is nanced by issuing and selling gov-




t Bt ￿ Gt ￿ Bt￿1; (5.6)
which reads as follows: in period t, the government collects tax revenues Xt and
bond revenues R
￿1
t Bt, which are used to nance public spending Gt and pay back
the stock of debt Bt￿1 accumulated in the previous period. We assume that the
government must be solvent at time T, that is, BT ￿ 0. For a positive stock of
public debt at t ￿ T, this implies that households know that a tax raise will fall
within their lifetimes with probability one. Government spending is governed by
the following autoregressive stochastic process:




tq; 0 ⁄  ⁄ 1; (5.7)
where  G is a scaling factor,  is an autoregressive parameter, and "
g
t is an inde-
pendent and identically distributed stochastic shock to government spending, with
zero mean.
We assume the following stochastic process for real output:




tq; ;  ¥ 0; (5.8)
4The steady state of this model implies R
￿1
t ￿ . Here, we are interested in the short-run
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where  Yt denotes a deterministic trend and "
y
t is an independent and identically dis-
tributed stochastic disturbance to real output, with zero mean. Following Perotti
(1999), distortionary taxation is modeled by including the square of taxes. Gov-
ernment spending has a positive eect on output, captured by ; that is, we
assume in the background some type of nominal or real rigidity. Arguably, dif-
ferent spending components have dierent output eects. By allowing Gt to be
a vector of spending components and  a vector of output eects, equation (5.8)
can be easily generalized to accommodate this case. Below, we discuss the case
in which spending is split into a consumption component, Gc
t, and an investment
component, Gi
t.
The equilibrium real interest rate results from the combination of the budget
constraint of Ricardian households (5.4) and the budget constraint of the govern-
ment (5.6):
rt ￿ AtrAt￿1 ￿ p1 ￿ qpYt ￿ Xtq ￿ C
u
t ￿ pGt ￿ Xtqs
￿1 ￿ 1
￿ AtrAt￿1 ￿ p1 ￿ qYt ￿ C
u
t ￿ Xt ￿ Gts
￿1 ￿ 1: (5.9)
For a given stock of private bonds, At, the real interest rate depends on the demand
for and supply of government bonds. The demand for government bonds is given
by savings of Ricardian households, p1 ￿ qpYt ￿ Xtq ￿ Cu
t , whereas the supply of
government bonds is dictated by the budget decit, Gt ￿ Xt.
5.2.2 Eects of Fiscal Policy Shocks
We consider, without loss of generality, a model with 3 periods (i.e., T ￿ 3). The
timing of events in the model is as follows: in period 1, Ricardian households form
rational expectations about real disposable income in periods 2 and 3, and decide
on the intertemporal consumption prole; in period 2, unexpected scal policy
shocks occur, forcing households to revise expectations about period-3 disposable
income and readjust consumption plans; nally, in period 3, the government col-
lects just enough tax revenues to pay back the stock of public debt, and households
consume their stock of wealth. Intuitively, we can think of period 1 as `past,' pe-
riod 2 as `present,' and period 3 as `future.' Thus, the relevant question of this
chapter is: given the expectations formed in the past, what are the present eects
of scal policy shocks on interest rates if (a fraction of) households anticipate their
implications for future disposable income?124 Fiscal Policy and Long-Term Interest Rates | Chapter 5
To derive the eects of scal policy shocks on interest rates in period 2, we
log-linearize the equations of the model around the expectations formed in period
1 for variables in periods 2 and 3 (see Appendix 5.A.1). This procedure allows
us to write the model as a system of period-2 surprises and expectation updates
for period 3. As derived in Appendices 5.A.2 and 5.A.3, the quasi-reduced form
expression for the unexpected change in the interest rate in period 2 is
e
r
2 ￿  rg;2e
g
2 ￿  rx;2e
x
2 ￿  ry;2e
y





2 ￿ j2 ￿ E1pj2q is the surprise to variable j ￿ tr;g;x;y;au in period 2.5
5.2.2.1 Government Spending
In Appendix 5.A.3 we show that the eect of a shock to government spending on
the real interest rate is given by
 rg;2 ￿ 
!rg;2
!




, !rg;2, and !gg;3 are positive terms dened in Appendices 5.A.2 and 5.A.3,
and ~ 3 ￿ 2exppE1x3q. To simplify, we have assumed that !cg;2 ￿ !cg;3 (see Ap-
pendix 5.A.3). Two special cases are worth noting. First, the conventional Key-
nesian positive eect of government spending on the real interest rate is obtained
by setting  ￿ 1; in this case  rg;2 ￿ 
!rg;2 r1 ￿ !gg;3s ¡ 0. Second, the Ricardian
case is obtained by imposing  ￿  ￿ ~ 3 ￿ 0. In this case,  rg;2 ￿ 
!rg;2 p1 ￿ q,
which is zero for permanent shocks ( ￿ 1); temporary shocks to government
spending (i.e.,  ￿ 1), however, have strictly positive eects on the interest rate.
More generally, allowing for distortionary taxation along with liquidity con-
straints introduces the possibility of a negative eect of government spending on
the interest rate, depending on expected future taxes. Formally,  rg;2 ¡ 0 if








￿ p ￿ 1q
￿*
: (5.12)
Intuitively, debt-nanced increases in government spending require higher taxes
in the future. Lifetime disposable income drops, not only because of the higher
5Equation (5.10) is a quasi-reduced form expression because the eects of scal policy shocks
are obtained while keeping current output xed. We do so to allow comparison with the empirical
studies that analyze the eects of scal policy shocks on interest rates while controlling for output;
examples from the VAR literature include Perotti (2005) and Caldara and Kamps (2008).Section 5.2 | A Simple Model 125
Figure 5.2: Conventional and Unconventional Eects of Fiscal Policy Shocks
and the Expected Level of Future Taxes
Panel (a): Aggregate Government Spending
conventional eﬀects
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Panel (b): Disaggregate Government Spending
conventional eﬀects
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Notes: For the purpose of graphical representation, we assume in Panel (a) that x ¡ g, and
in Panel (b) that x ¡ gi ¡ gc; of course, dierent orderings are possible.
level of future taxes but also due to output distortions. Consumption smoothing
requires Ricardian households to reduce current consumption, thereby increasing
private saving. For suciently high expected future taxes, the drop in lifetime
disposable income is severe enough as to cause an increase in private saving larger
than the increase in debt. As a result, the interest rate falls.
Panel (a) of Figure 5.3 graphically illustrates the eects of a positive gov-
ernment spending shock in the government bonds market. The downward-sloping
curve, S0, represents the initial supply of government bonds, whereas the positively-
sloping curve, D0, shows the initial demand for government bonds. The initial
equilibrium is thus E0. The unexpected increase in government spending raises
the stock of government bonds, shifting the supply curve to S1. The eect on the
real interest rate depends on the consumption response by households. The com-
bination of liquidity constraints and low expected future taxes causes a small shift
of the demand curve to Dc
1, resulting in the conventional rise in the interest rate to
rc
1. Conversely, for suciently high expected future taxes, the increase in private
saving shifts the demand for government bonds to Du
1, causing an unconventional
decrease in the interest rate to ru
1.126 Fiscal Policy and Long-Term Interest Rates | Chapter 5
Figure 5.3: Eects of Positive Shocks to Government Spending and Taxes on
the Real Interest Rate































































































Notes: S0 and S1 denote the pre- and after-shock supply of bonds, respectively, whereas D0 de-
notes the pre-shock demand for bonds. Three after-shock cases are considered: the conventional
case (Dc
1), the Ricardian case (Dr
1), and the unconventional case (Du
1).
5.2.2.2 Taxes
In Appendix 5.A.3, the impact of a shock to taxes on the real interest rate is shown
to be
 rx;2 ￿ 
!rx;2
!
!cc;3rp1 ￿ q~ 3 ￿ s ￿ 
)
; (5.13)
where !rx;2 and !cc;3 are positive shares dened in Appendices 5.A.2 and 5.A.3.
The conventional negative eect of an increase in taxes on the real interest rate
is obtained by imposing  ￿ 1. In this case, (5.13) boils down to  rx;2 ￿
￿
!rx;2p!cc;3 ￿ 1q ￿ 0. The Ricardian neutrality result follows from assuming
 ￿ ~ 3 ￿ 0, in which case  rx;2 ￿ 0.
As in the case of government spending, the combination of liquidity constraints
and distortionary taxes gives rise to the possibility of both positive and negative
eects, depending on the expected future taxes. Formally,  rx;2 ¡ 0 if E1x3 ¡ x
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Intuitively, a tax raise|while keeping government spending constant|lowers cur-
rent disposable income, but at the same time decreases the stock of public debt.
Since the required level of future distortionary taxes is then lower, households ex-
perience a rise in future disposable income. For high expected future taxes, the
increase in future disposable income more than osets the decrease in current dis-
posable income. Because lifetime disposable income goes up, Ricardian households
raise current consumption. The drop in private saving more than compensates the
increase in public saving, causing the real interest rate to rise.
Panel (b) of Figure 5.3 illustrates the eects of a tax raise on the real interest
rate. The drop in the stock of public debt decreases the supply of bonds from S0 to
S1. If Ricardian households expect low future taxes, the decrease in private saving
shifts the demand for bonds by a small extent from D0 to Dc
1, resulting in the
conventional fall in the interest rate. In contrast, for high expected future taxes,
private saving decreases substantially, causing a large shift of demand curve to Du
1;
as a result, the interest rate rises. The Ricardian neutrality result corresponds to
the shift from D0 to Dr
1; the decrease in private saving perfectly osets the increase
in public saving, leaving the real interest rate unaected.
5.2.2.3 Government Spending Disaggregation
Arguably, government consumption and public investment have dierent output
eects. From a pure aggregate demand viewpoint, such eects should be homo-
geneous. From a supply-side viewpoint, however, public investment should have
stronger output eects, as it gives rise to positive externalities on private factors
of production (e.g., Baxter and King, 1993).6 Likewise, dierent components of
government spending may have dierent degrees of persistence. Perotti (2004),
for instance, documents a substantially larger degree of persistence of government
consumption shocks compared to public investment shocks.
The model described above can readily be extended to allow for disaggrega-
tion of government spending into government consumption and public investment.
Assuming independence, these two components individually follow stochastic pro-
cesses identical to (5.7), with gc and gi denoting the autoregressive parameters
6Aschauer's (1989a) seminal paper employs the production function approach to nd an
output elasticity of public capital of 0.39. Bom and Ligthart (2008) quantitatively review the
empirical literature that followed and nd an output elasticity in the range 0.08-0.15. In con-
trast, Perotti (2004) uses the structural VAR approach and does not nd evidence that public
investment shocks are more eective than government consumption shocks in stimulating output.128 Fiscal Policy and Long-Term Interest Rates | Chapter 5
of government consumption and public investment, respectively. Similarly, by let-
ting Gt be a vector of spending components and  a vector of output eects, the
output process (5.8) is easily generalized to accommodate dierent output eects
of spending components. In particular, let Gt include government consumption,
Gc
t, and public investment, Gi
t. Also, let gc and gi denote the output eects




2 ￿  rgc;2e
gc
2 ￿  rgi;2e
gi
1 ￿  rx;2e
x
2 ￿  ry;2e
y
2 ￿  ra;2e
a
2; (5.15)
where the eects of government consumption and government investment are given
by
 rj;2 ￿ 
!rg;2
!
1 ￿ p1 ￿ qrjpj ￿ 1q ￿ ~ 3pj ￿ !gg;3qs ￿ !gg;3
)
; (5.16)








￿ jpj ￿ 1q
￿*
; j ￿ tgc;giu: (5.17)
Hence, as shown in Panel (b) of Figure 5.2,  rj;2 ￿ 0 if E1x3 ¡ j, for j ￿ tgc;giu.
If, as commonly assumed, gi ¡ gc, and gc is not much larger than gi, then
gi ¡ gc. However, this inequality is reversed for gc suciently larger than gi.
5.3 Methodology and Data
We now turn to an empirical investigation of the existence of unconventional eects
of scal policy on interest rates, using equations (5.10) and (5.15) as theoretical
guides. This section introduces two modications to the theoretical model. First,
we allow for incomplete real adjustments by including the ination rate and focus-
ing on the long-term nominal interest rate. Second, we account for term-structure
eects by also including the real short-term interest rate.
The econometric approach consists of three steps. In the rst step, the unex-
pected changes in the variables of interest are isolated by means of a VAR model.
We obtain the structural form of the model and identify the equation correspond-
ing to the long-term interest rate. In the second step, we apply Markov-switching
methods to the equation of the long-term interest rate to endogenously identify
periods of conventional and unconventional eects of scal policy shocks. Finally,Section 5.3 | Methodology and Data 129
we investigate whether and how regimes of unconventional eects are related to
the dynamics of public debt. These steps are discussed in Sections 5.3.1-5.3.4.
Section 5.3.5 describes the data.
5.3.1 VAR Specication
Consider the following VAR model in reduced form:
Zt ￿ ApLqZt￿1 ￿ et; (5.18)
where, for simplicity, deterministic terms are ignored. In (5.18), Zt denotes a Q-
dimensional vector of endogenous variables, ApLq is a lag polynomial of order p,
and et is a Q-dimensional vector of reduced-form white noise residuals. Clearly,
system (5.18) implies that expectations of Zt at time t ￿ 1 are given by Et￿1Zt ￿
ApLqZt￿1, so that et ￿ Zt￿Et￿1Zt represents the unexpected changes of variables
in Zt. The structural form of the model is obtained by multiplying both sides of
(5.18) by the matrix of contemporaneous eects  :
 Zt ￿  ApLqZt￿1 ￿ "t; (5.19)
where "t is a Q-dimensional vector of structural innovations. The link between
reduced-form residuals et|which we refer to as `shocks'|and the structural inno-
vations "t is given by7
 et ￿ "t: (5.20)
We consider two model specications. First, we analyze a VAR model with
Q ￿ 6, including government spending (g), taxes (x), output (y), ination rate
(), short-term real interest rate (rs), and long-term nominal interest rate (i).
Fiscal variables and output are specied in natural logarithms, expressed in real
terms and scaled by population. This specication merely extends that in Perotti
(2005) and Caldara and Kamps (2008) to include the short-term real interest rate.
In this case, we dene Zt ￿ rgt xt yt t rs
t its










we refer to this as the `aggregate government spending' model. In line with the
discussion in Section 5.2.2.3, we then investigate a VAR model with Q ￿ 7, in
7In the VAR literature, the term `shocks' usually refer to the structural innovations, "t.
Because we are not interested here in impulse responses, we use the term `shocks' to refer to
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which government spending is split into its two main components: government
consumption, gc, and public investment, gi. Again, this specication extends that
in Perotti (2004) to include the short-term real interest rate. We refer to the
seven-variable VAR model as the `disaggregate spending' model.
Based on Perotti (2004, 2005) and Caldara and Kamps (2008), we set the lag
length to p ￿ 4. This choice appears natural given the quarterly frequency of the
data. Due to the well-known presence of stochastic trends in the data, all variables
enter the model in rst dierences. Hence, scal variables and output enter the
model in rates of growth. To account for deterministic trends in levels of variables
and to correct for seasonality, the VAR model includes a constant and quarterly
dummies.
5.3.2 Identication
We are interested in estimating the parameters of   corresponding to the equa-
tion of the long-term interest rate in system (5.20). Focusing on the relationship
between unexpected changes addresses Wachtel and Young's (1987) point that
interest rates quickly react to new information about future scal policy. More-
over, it lters out changes in the risk premium that are predictable from past
information. For the aggregated government spending model, the equation of the
















The disaggregated spending model is obtained by splitting spending shocks into
government consumption (e
gc
t ) and government investment (e
gi
t ) shocks, with pa-
rameters igc and igi, respectively. To identify the parameters of equation (5.21),
we need to assume that the shocks on the right-hand side are exogenous with
respect to ei
t. As discussed below, this is true for the scal shocks by construc-
tion, because government spending and tax revenues are both dened net of in-
terest.8 Also, it seems safe to assume that the long-term interest rate does not
aect real output and ination within a quarter. The exogeneity of the real short-
term interest rate is harder to defend. Lacking an indisputably good instrument,
we nevertheless assume that the long-term nominal interest rate does not aect
8Fiscal policy could still react discretionarily to changes in interest rates. As Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) point out, however, the inside lags of scal policy make this reaction impossible
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the short-term real interest rate within a quarter. Note that this identication
scheme is implied by a Cholesky decomposition ordering the interest rate last
in a ve-variable VAR|including also government spending, taxes, output, and
ination|which is a common assumption in the VAR literature (see, e.g., Cal-
dara and Kamps, 2008). However, the standard Cholesky decomposition imposes
further restrictions on  , which are not necessary in the present case.
Equation (5.21) is theoretically rooted in (5.10). A few modications are in-
troduced, however. First, we follow Hoelscher (1986) and model term-structure
eects by including the real short-term interest rate as an additional variable, with
is ¡ 0. This extension turns out to be important, given the strong monetary pol-
icy changes experienced in the United States over the sample period (Clarida, Gal 
and Gertler, 2000). Second, we allow for departures from the Fisher hypothesis.
Recall that equation (5.10) features the real interest rate on the left-hand side,
which in terms of the empirical model (5.21) is equivalent to setting i ￿ 1. If
lending contracts last longer than a quarter, however, a fraction of lenders cannot
incorporate the eect of unexpected changes in ination on the nominal interest
rate. We thus allow i ⁄ 1 by modeling the nominal interest rate on the left-hand
side while controlling for ination.
5.3.3 Regime Switching
According to (5.10), ig and ix in (5.21) are endogenous coecients. Instead, ig
and ix should be allowed to switch sign depending on expected future taxes. To
empirically test the hypothesis of time-varying eects of scal policy, we postulate
that the economy is at any time t in one of K possible states (or `regimes'). The
state of the economy, St ￿ ts1;s2;:::;sKu, is assumed to follow a Markov chain.
The coecients igpStq and ixpStq are then allowed to switch, depending on the
















For K ￿ 2, for example, s1 could be a regime of `low future taxes,' whereas s2
could be regime of `high future taxes;' according to (5.10), we would then expect
to observe conventional eects under regime s1 (i.e., igps1q ¡ 0 and ixps1q ￿ 0),
and unconventional eects under regime s2 (i.e., igps2q ￿ 0 and ixps2q ¡ 0). We132 Fiscal Policy and Long-Term Interest Rates | Chapter 5
estimate model (5.22) by Maximum Likelihood using Markov-switching methods
described by Hamilton (1989, 1994).9
In Markov-switching models, one has to decide a priori on the number of
regimes. Fortunately, our theoretical model provides some guidance on this choice.
For the aggregated spending model, Panel (a) of Figure 5.2 suggests three regimes:
a regime of conventional eects for E1x3 ⁄ g, a regime of semi-unconventional
eects for g ￿ E1x3 ⁄ x, and a regime of unconventional eects for E1x3 ¡ x. A
model with two regimes would only be a good approximation if the cut-o values
g and x are close to each other. In the disaggregated model, there are three
switching variables and three cut-o values: gc, gi, and x. Hence, Panel (b) of
Figure 5.2 suggests a model with four regimes. For the purpose of comparison, we
also estimate models with one (linear) and two regimes.
5.3.4 State Probabilities and the Dynamics of Public Debt
Conditions (5.12), (5.14), and (5.17) imply that the probability of the economy
being in a state of conventional or unconventional eects depends on the expected
level of future taxes. The above-mentioned Markov-switching methods provide a
means of estimating the unobserved state probabilities conditional on the observed
data. In turn, the (unobserved) expectations of future taxes depend on the stock
and dynamics of public debt. Therefore, in a second step, we study the role of
public debt dynamics in determining the probability of the economy being in a
given state sk. We estimate linear regression models of the form
PrpSt ￿ skq ￿ 0 ￿ 1PrpSt￿1 ￿ skq ￿ 2FSt ￿ vt; k ￿ 1;2;:::;K; (5.23)
where FSt denotes `scal stress' and proxies for the expected level of future taxes.10
Regimes of conventional eects are more likely in times of low scal stress; for these
we expect 2 ￿ 0. On the contrary, regimes of unconventional eects are associated
with times of high scal stress, so that we expect 2 ¡ 0. PrpSt￿1 ￿ skq is included
as an extra regressor to account for regime persistence. Estimation is performed
with Ordinary Least Squares.
The natural candidate for measuring scal stress is the public debt-to-GDP
ratio (`debt ratio', for short), as it represents the stock of future public liabilities
9Estimation is performed in Matlab R2009a using the Markov Regime Switch-
ing Regression Package developed by Marcelo Perlin, which can be downloaded from
http://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/leexchange/15789.
10The term `scal stress' is borrowed from Perotti (1999).Section 5.3 | Methodology and Data 133
relative to the creation of wealth. Alternatively, we use rst dierences of the debt
ratio, which is more appropriate if agents judge scal sustainability|and thus the
likelihood of a tax increase|according to the recent history of public debt.
Additionally, we apply two other measures of scal stress: the primary budget
decit and the dierence between the real interest rate, rt, and the rate of growth
of real GDP, 4yt.11 To motivate this choice, recall that the public debt-to-output
ratio at time t, Bt{Yt, is approximately given by
Bt
Yt







where Dt{Yt ￿ pGt ￿Xtq{Yt denotes the primary decit-to-output ratio (`primary
decit ratio,' for short). For a given dierence rt￿4yt, an increase in the primary
decit ratio increases the debt ratio one-to-one in the same period. Over time, the
magnitude of this eect depends on the persistence of the change in the primary
decit; in the case of a permanent change, the public debt ratio converges to a
higher long-run level. Persistently positive primary decits are compatible with a
steady debt ratio in the long run provided that rt ￿ 4yt. If rt ¡ 4yt, however,
persistent primary decits give rise to unstable scal situations in which the debt
ratio grows unboundedly. For this reason, we consider two cases. In the rst case,
scal stress is simply proxied by the primary decit ratio. In the second case, we
proxy scal stress by interacting the primary decit ratio with a dummy variable
capturing the periods of public debt instability, It:






￿ It ￿ vt; (5.25)
where It ￿ 1 if rt ¡ 4yt and Dt ¡ 0, and It ￿ 0 otherwise. If, as hypothesized,
the primary decit is only relevant in periods of debt instability, then 2 ￿ 0 and
either 3 ￿ 0, for conventional regimes, or 3 ¡ 0, for unconventional regimes.
Finally, we also use rt ￿ 4yt as measure of scal stress, as it indicates the
direction of motion of the debt ratio. For a given primary decit ratio, the debt
ratio follows an increasing path if rt ¡ 4yt, and a decreasing path if rt ￿ 4yt.
Therefore, rt￿4yt measures the speed of change of the debt ratio. If rt ¡ 4yt, then
agents attach a higher probability to a tax increase in the near future. Conversely,
if rt ￿ 4yt, then a steady public debt ratio is compatible with primary decits,
so that a tax increase in the near future is less likely.
11Above, yt was used to denote the logarithm of per capita real output. Here, 4yt denotes
the rate of growth of aggregate real GDP, which is approximately given by the rst dierence of
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Figure 5.4: Long-Term Interest Rate, Government Spending, and Tax Rev-



































































Notes: The long-term nominal interest rate (left scale) is measured by the 10-year Treasury
Rate. Government spending (at the level of the general government) and tax revenues (right
scale) are dened as ratios to GDP. See Appendix 5.A.4 for details on data sources and variable
denitions.
5.3.5 Data
We use quarterly time-series data for the United States spanning the period 1960:1-
2008:4. Perotti (2005) nds evidence of a structural break around 1980 in the
coecients of VAR models similar to ours. This observation is consistent with
more general evidence of structural breaks in the data-generating process of other
macroeconomic variables around the same date, especially in monetary policy
VARs.12 Hence, we split the data into two samples: the rst covers the period
1960:1-1979:4, while the second covers the period 1980:1-2008:4. Figure 5.4 plots
the long-term interest rate, government spending and tax revenues over the entire
data range. At a glance, the structural break around 1980 seems clear in the case
of the interest rate; after 1980 the upward trend is reversed. The tax revenues-to-
GDP ratio also seems to have stopped its downward sloping path after the 1980s.
As a renement, we follow Caldara and Kamps (2008) and redene the second
sample to start in 1983:1, thus avoiding the period of monetary policy change
related to Paul Volcker's disination measures.
12See Perotti (2005) and the references cited therein.Section 5.3 | Methodology and Data 135
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Empirical Analysis
Sample 1: 1960:1-1979:4 Sample 2: 1980:1-2008:4 Sample 3: 1983:1-2008:4
Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max
i 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0021 0.0034 -0.0002 0.0014 -0.0061 0.0037 -0.0002 0.0012 -0.0030 0.0031
g 0.0042 0.0124 -0.0231 0.0402 0.0040 0.0091 -0.0214 0.0216 0.0043 0.0091 -0.0214 0.0216
gc 0.0054 0.0118 -0.0167 0.0449 0.0041 0.0088 -0.0273 0.0207 0.0042 0.0089 -0.0273 0.0207
gi -0.0001 0.0419 -0.0938 0.1247 0.0035 0.0231 -0.0597 0.0551 0.0049 0.0216 -0.0597 0.0551
x 0.0029 0.0464 -0.2379 0.2057 0.0016 0.0412 -0.1883 0.1011 0.0041 0.0410 -0.1883 0.1011
y 0.0047 0.0101 -0.0179 0.0334 0.0039 0.0076 -0.0246 0.0196 0.0047 0.0062 -0.0171 0.0196
 0.0002 0.0033 -0.0104 0.0085 0.0000 0.0032 -0.0096 0.0221 0.0000 0.0025 -0.0096 0.0073
rs 0.0000 0.0035 -0.0103 0.0113 -0.0003 0.0041 -0.0314 0.0095 -0.0002 0.0025 -0.0070 0.0066
B{Y 0.0000 0.0052 -0.0111 0.0135 0.0000 0.0077 -0.0219 0.0468 0.0000 0.0077 -0.0219 0.0468
4pB{Y q -0.0018 0.0062 -0.0152 0.0092 0.0037 0.0093 -0.0231 0.0566 0.0036 0.0096 -0.0231 0.0566
r ￿ 4y -0.0055 0.0095 -0.0369 0.0197 0.0038 0.0083 -0.0151 0.0386 0.0027 0.0061 -0.0118 0.0218
D{Y -0.0142 0.0164 -0.0455 0.0500 -0.0032 0.0196 -0.0518 0.0392 -0.0040 0.0201 -0.0518 0.0392
I 0.0625 0.2436 0.0000 1.0000 0.3448 0.4774 0.0000 1.0000 0.3173 0.4677 0.0000 1.0000
Notes: Variables i, , and rs are dened in rst-dierences of quarterly rates. Variables g, gc, gi,
and y are dened in rst dierences of natural logarithms of real per capita values. Variable B{Y
is detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott lter, with multiplier equal to 100. Variable r ￿ 4y is
dened in levels of quarterly rates. I is a dummy variable. For more details on variable denitions
and data sources, see Section 5.3.5 and Appendix 5.A.4.
Time-series data on scal variables, output, and price level are obtained from
the NIPA tables published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data on interest
rates, population, and public debt are drawn from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Saint Louis' ALFRED database. Appendix 5.A.4 provides detailed information
on data sources and time-series denitions. Table 5.1 provides some descriptive
statistics.
The long-term nominal interest rate is measured by the 10-Year Treasury Con-
stant Maturity Rate. The ination rate is obtained by taking dierences of the
natural logarithm of the price level, which is measured by the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) deator. The (ex-post) short-term real interest rate is calculated
by subtracting the ination rate from the 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate. Output is
dened as real GDP per capita. Real output growth is derived by taking dierences
of the natural logarithm of real GDP.
Government spending is dened as the sum of government consumption and
government investment expenditures at the general government level (including
federal, state and local); interest and transfer payments are thus not included.
Likewise, our measure of taxes includes current tax revenues at the general gov-
ernment level, but excludes interest and transfer receipts. The primary decit-
to-output ratio is obtained by taking the dierence between general-government
expenditures and receipts|both net of interest payments|and dividing by GDP.136 Fiscal Policy and Long-Term Interest Rates | Chapter 5
Finally, we calculate the public debt-to-output ratio by dividing the total federal
government debt by GDP. Note that quarterly time-series data for public debt are
only available from 1966:1 onward.
5.4 Estimation Results
This section reports the estimation results. Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 discuss the
estimation results of the regime-switching model (5.22), and analyzes in turn the
aggregated and disaggregated government spending models. Our benchmark spec-
ications correspond to K ￿ 3 and K ￿ 4, respectively, as suggested by Figure
5.2. For ease of exposition, however, results of the linear and two-regime models
are discussed rst. Section 5.4.3 studies the results for a renement of the second
sample. Section 5.4.4 investigates the relationship between regime switching and
public debt dynamics. Finally, Section 5.4.5 brings the main ndings together.
5.4.1 Aggregated Government Spending
Table 5.2 reports the estimation results for the case of aggregated government
spending. Columns (1) and (4) show the eects of shocks to government spending
and taxes for the two samples assuming a linear model (K ￿ 1). Both eects
are signed according to the conventional view for Sample 1, although the eect of
government spending is negative for Sample 2. All eects are small and statistically
insignicant, however. The small interest rate responses to scal policy shocks are
consistent with those found by Perotti (2005) and Caldara and Kamps (2008)
using similar models.
The reason for the absence of signicant eects in the linear case becomes
clear once we allow for two regimes (K ￿ 2). Both government spending and tax
eects switch sign from State 1 to State 2. For both samples, the tax eect is
negative in State 1 and positive in State 2, although not statistically signicant
in the latter sample. The eect of government spending also switches signs across
states for both samples, despite being signicant only in State 2. States 1 and 2
could thus be termed `conventional' and `unconventional,' respectively. The signs
of the government spending eect for Sample 1 are puzzling though, as we would
expect igps1q ¡ 0 and igps2q ￿ 0, just as for Sample 2.
In light of Panel (a) of Figure 5.2, we allow for the possibility of a third regime
(K ￿ 3). For both samples, there is a clear distinction between the conventionalSection 5.4 | Estimation Results 137
Table 5.2: Estimation Results: Aggregated Government Spending
Sample 1: 1960:1-1979:4 Sample 2: 1980:1-2008:4
K ￿ 1 K ￿ 2 K ￿ 3 K ￿ 1 K ￿ 2 K ￿ 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State 1: igps1q 0.003 -0.003 -0.028*** -0.015 0.017 0.158**
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.013) (0.014) (0.081)
ixps1q -0.003 -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.002 -0.006** -0.059***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.014)
State 2: igps2q { 0.023*** -0.010*** { -0.045*** -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.014) (0.009)
ixps2q { 0.014*** 0.003** { 0.004 0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
State 3: igps3q { { 0.016*** { { -0.204***
(0.002) (0.046)
ixps3q { { 0.011*** { { 0.044***
(0.001) (0.017)
Invariant: iy -0.011 -0.026*** -0.020*** 0.037* 0.043** 0.029**
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.020) (0.018) (0.014)
i 0.460*** 0.474*** 0.457*** 0.457*** 0.566*** 0.489***
(0.052) (0.021) (0.016) (0.090) (0.082) (0.070)
is 0.440*** 0.452*** 0.405*** 0.378*** 0.491*** 0.423***
(0.052) (0.021) (0.016) (0.081) (0.076) (0.069)
N 76 76 76 112 112 112
L 496.59 515.71 530.36 634.53 637.94 648.57
Expected Durations:
State 1 { 1.96 1.08 { 1.41 1.00
State 2 { 2.86 1.00 { 1.00 24.25
State 3 { { 2.01 { { 1.63
Notes: K, N, and L denote the number of regimes, number of observations and log-likelihood,
respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and
10 percent level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. States 1 to 3 are ordered from
conventional to unconventional.
State 1, in which the eect of taxes is signicantly negative, and the unconventional
State 3, where it is signicantly positive. In State 2, the eect of taxes is already
positive, although small and only signicant for Sample 1. Notice, however, the
much larger eects of taxes (in absolute value) in States 1 and 3 for Sample 2.
The eects of government spending for Sample 2 are signicantly positive for
State 1 and signicantly negative for State 3, in line with Figure 5.2; their mag-
nitudes, however, are implausibly large. Additionally, there is barely any sign
of regime switching; with an average duration of 24.25 quarters, State 2 acts al-
most as an absorbing state. In contrast, the e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Sample 1 are still not in line with our expectations, as they are signicantly neg-
ative in State 1 and signicantly positive in State 3. We tackle these issues below
by disaggregating government spending into government consumption and public
investment.
The eects of unexpected changes in ination and real short-term interest rate
are both precisely estimated at about 0.45-0.50, not changing much across spec-
ications and samples. As expected, we nd strong departures from the Fisher
hypothesis. The eect of unexpected changes in real output is signicantly neg-
ative in the rst sample, but switches to positive in the second sample. Since
these variables are included for control purposes only, we do not discuss further
the estimates of their parameters in the rest of the chapter.
5.4.2 Disaggregated Government Spending
We now turn to the case in which government spending is disaggregated into gov-
ernment consumption and government investment. Table 5.3 reports the results
for one, three, and four regimes.13 Columns (1) and (4) show the estimation re-
sults for the linear case (K ￿ 1). Disaggregating government spending does not
aect the results much. All scal policy eects remain small and statistically in-
signicant. Allowing for three regimes clearly separates regimes of conventional
and unconventional eects (compare columns (2) and (5) of Table 5.3 to columns
(3) and (6) of Table 5.2). For Sample 1, the eect of taxes gradually switches
from negative to positive from States 1 to 3, while the eect of government invest-
ment switches from positive to negative. The eect of government consumption
gradually decreases from State 1 to State 3 too, but it always stays positive. For
Sample 2, the eects of government consumption and investment also switch from
positive to negative from States 1 to 2. The tax eect, however, is positive and
insignicant in States 1 and 2, and surprisingly negative in State 3.
As illustrated in Panel (b) of Figure 5.2, a model with four regimes is more
appropriate in the presence of three switching variables. The estimation results
of the four-regime model are given in columns (3) and (6) of Table 5.3. For
Sample 1, the four-regime model detects one regime (State 4) with a negative
eect of government consumption. The eect of taxes switches from negative in
State 1 to positive in States 2 and 3; in State 4, however, it becomes surprisingly
13A model with two regimes is clearly inadequate in view of three switching variables. Because
results for this case are not very informative, we do not report them. The results are available
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Table 5.3: Estimation Results: Disaggregated Government Spending
Sample 1: 1960:1-1979:4 Sample 2: 1980:1-2008:4
K ￿ 1 K ￿ 3 K ￿ 4 K ￿ 1 K ￿ 3 K ￿ 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State 1: igcps1q 0.004 0.027*** 0.018*** -0.016 0.067*** -0.019
(0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014)
igips1q ￿0.001 0.012*** -0.004*** -0.002 0.041*** 0.053*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
ixps1q -0.003 -0.011*** -0.021*** -0.002 0.002 -0.021***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
State 2: igcps2q { 0.012*** 0.026*** { -0.030*** 0.029***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.011) (0.010)
igips2q { -0.001 0.004*** { 0.006 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
ixps2q { -0.008*** 0.011*** { 0.003 -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
State 3: igcps3q { 0.006*** 0.007*** { -0.119*** 0.101
(0.002) (0.001) (0.046) (0.087)
igips3q { -0.003*** -0.003*** { -0.057*** -0.025***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.014)
ixps3q { 0.014*** 0.004*** { -0.025*** -0.074***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.011)
State 4: igcps4q { { -0.005*** { { -0.038***
(0.001) (0.015)
igips4q { { 0.004*** { { -0.017***
(0.001) (0.004)
ixps4q { { -0.009*** { { 0.011***
(0.001) (0.003)
N 76 76 76 112 112 112
L 501.67 555.57 561.33 635.57 656.07 663.44
Expected Durations:
State 1 { 1.20 1.09 { 1.30 1.00
State 2 { 1.36 1.53 { 3.86 1.53
State 3 { 2.13 1.13 { 11.10 7.70
State 4 { { 1.31 { { 1.00
Notes: K, N and L denote the number of regimes, number of observations and log-likelihood,
respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and
10 percent level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. States 1 to 4 are ordered from
conventional to unconventional. To save on space, estimates of invariant coecients are not
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negative. The eect of government investment, being negative in States 1 and 3
and positive in States 2 and 4, is less clear. By and large, we can take States 1 and
2 as regimes of predominantly conventional eects and States 3 and 4 as regimes
of mainly unconventional eects.
Regarding Sample 2, the eect of taxes now switches from negative in States 1,
2, and 3, to positive in the most unconventional State 4. Accordingly, the eects
of government consumption and investment shift from globally positive in States
1 and 2|with the exception of igcps1q, which is negative but insignicant|to
unconventionally negative in State 4. Hence, States 1 and 2 mainly consist of
conventional eects, whereas unconventional ones predominate in States 3 and
4. It is important to notice the much larger expected duration of State 3 (7.70
quarters) compared to the average duration of the remaining states. It turns
out that State 3 simply captures the rst eight quarters of the second sample,
corresponding to Paul Volcker's disination monetary policy. We thus reestimate
the model excluding the period 1980:1-1982:4.
5.4.3 Readjusting the Second Sample
Table 5.4 presents the estimation results concerning the period 1983:1-2008:4,
which we call Sample 3. Columns (1)-(3) refer to the case of aggregated gov-
ernment spending, assuming one, two, and three regimes (compare to columns
(4)-(6) of Table 5.2). The models with one and two regimes do not produce any
statistically signicant eects. Allowing for a third regime, however, makes it pos-
sible to identify conventional eects of government spending and taxes in State 1,
unconventional government spending eects in State 2, and unconventional tax ef-
fects in State 3; the positive estimate of igps3q is not in line with our expectations,
though, which calls for disaggregation of government spending.
Columns (4)-(6) of Table 5.4 report the estimation results for the case of dis-
aggregated government spending, assuming one, three, and four regimes (compare
to columns (4)-(6) of Table 5.3). The linear model now produces a signicantly
positive eect of government investment, although the eects of government con-
sumption and taxes are still small and insignicant. With three regimes, we now
nd negative tax eects in States 1 and 2, and positive tax eects in the State
3. Government spending, in turn, has a positive eect in States 1 and 2, which
switches to positive in State 3. The eect of government investment switches fromSection 5.4 | Estimation Results 141
Table 5.4: Estimation Results: Sample 1983:1-2008:4
Aggregated Spending Disaggregated Spending
K ￿ 1 K ￿ 2 K ￿ 3 K ￿ 1 K ￿ 3 K ￿ 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State 1: igcps1q 0.008 0.003 0.031*** -0.007 0.006 0.010*
(0.011) (0.014) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006)
igips1q 0.008 0.003 0.031 0.013*** 0.034*** 0.050***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
ixps1q 0.001 -0.002 -0.002* 0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
State 2: igcps2q { 0.008 -0.088*** { 0.034*** 0.013***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.007) (0.004)
igips2q { 0.008 -0.088 { -0.025*** -0.027***
(0.003) (0.002)
ixps2q { 0.003 -0.009*** { -0.003** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
State 3: igcps3q { 0.113*** { -0.057*** 0.027***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.004)
igips3q { { 0.113 { 0.009** 0.015***
(0.004) (0.002)
ixps3q { { 0.011*** { 0.018*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
State 4: igcps4q { { { { { -0.057***
(0.005)
igips4q { { { { { 0.003
(0.002)
ixps4q { { { { { 0.022***
(0.002)
N 100 100 100 100 100 100
L 596.90 597.43 618.91 605.93 639.90 662.19
Expected Durations:
State 1 { 1.07 1.01 { 1.62 1.69
State 2 { 1.00 2.04 { 1.00 1.02
State 3 { { 1.36 { 1.72 2.60
State 4 { { { { { 2.05
Notes: K, N and L denote the number of regimes, number of observations and log-likelihood,
respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and
10 percent level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. States 1 to 4 are ordered from
conventional to unconventional. To save on space, estimates of invariant coecients are not
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positive in State 1 to negative in State 2, but surprisingly swings back to positive
in State 3.
Finally, with four regimes the distinction between states of conventional and
unconventional eects becomes more apparent. The eect of government spending
is positive in States 1, 2, and 3, but switches to negative in State 4. Accordingly,
the eect of taxes is negative in States 1 and 2, but turns positive in States 3
and 4. Again, the eects of government investment are more dicult to interpret,
being positive in States 1, negative in State 2, and back to positive in States 3 and
4. By and large, however, State 1 is one of conventional eects, whereas State 4
is one of unconventional eects.
5.4.4 The Role of Public Debt
We now turn to investigating the relationship between state probabilities and the
dynamics of public debt. Table 5.5 shows the estimation results of equations (5.23)
and (5.25) for the three samples analyzed in Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4. We focus on
the probabilities of the most conventional and unconventional states (s1 and s4,
respectively), obtained using the model with four regimes (columns (3) and (6)
of Table 5.3 and column (6) of Table 5.4). Because in some cases unconventional
eects are found in State 3, we also consider the probability of the economy being
in either State 3 or State 4 (i.e., s3 ￿ s4).
The rst line of Table 5.5 reports the results for the case FPt ￿ Bt{Yt. The
debt ratio is detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) lter.14 The assumption
is that agents evaluate the sustainability of public debt by looking at how much the
debt ratio deviates from its long-run trend. For Samples 1 and 2, the signs of the
point estimates are generally in line with our expectations, but are statistically
insignicant. Only for Sample 3 do we nd a signicantly positive relationship
between the probabilities of unconventional eects and the debt ratio.
In the second line, we study the relationship between regime probabilities and
the rst dierence of the debt ratio. The assumption here is that agents judge
public-debt sustainability by comparing the actual debt ratio to that of the pre-
vious quarter; an increasing pattern of the debt ratio implies a higher probability
14The multiplier of the HP lter is set to 100, which is smaller than the common value of
400 used for quarterly data. We choose a smaller parameter because the debt-to-output ratio is
strongly non-stationary (see Figure 5.1). Qualitatively, the results do not change much for dier-
ent values of the multiplier; the statistical signicance, however, is aected if the HP multiplier
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Table 5.5: Estimation Results: Regime Probabilities and the Dynamics of
Public Debt
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
1961:1-1979:4paq 1981:1-2008:4paq 1984:1-2008:4paq
s1 s4 s3 ￿ s4 s1 s4 s3 ￿ s4 s1 s4 s3 ￿ s4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(a) Public Debt Ratio (Level)pbq
2 -0.016 -0.023 0.108 -0.034 0.023 0.011 -0.001 0.096* 0.158**
(0.018) (0.120) (0.148) (0.037) (0.025) (0.030) (0.059) (0.057) (0.062)
(b) Public Debt Ratio (Change)pbq
2 -0.004 0.126 0.193* -0.027 -0.028 0.017 -0.049 0.038 0.102*
(0.020) (0.107) (0.101) (0.040) (0.038) (0.048) (0.036) (0.060) (0.056)
(c) Interest-Growth Dierence
2 -0.013 0.060 0.096 -0.113*** -0.095* 0.192** -0.166*** 0.132** 0.200***
(0.026) (0.055) (0.072) (0.029) (0.054) (0.067) (0.055) (0.063) (0.058)
(d) Primary Decit Ratio (Linear)
2 -0.032** 0.064** 0.055** -0.002 -0.014 0.019 0.003 -0.022 0.005
(0.014) (0.028) (0.023) (0.015) (0.013) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
(e) Primary Decit Ratio (Interacted)
2 -0.032** 0.058** 0.051** -0.001 -0.005 0.001 0.038* -0.017 -0.046**
(0.015) (0.029) (0.024) (0.020) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
3 -0.010 0.104 0.061 -0.008 -0.042 0.079 -0.185*** -0.029 0.144**
(0.019) (0.117) (0.129) (0.065) (0.042) (0.105) (0.058) (0.048) (0.072)
Notes: paqFour observations are lost due to the lag-length of the VAR. pbqDue to the lack of
data, Sample 1 starts in 1966:1; see Section 5.3.5. Newey-West standard errors are given in
parentheses. Statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is denoted by ***, **, and
*, respectively.
of a tax increase in the near future. For Samples 1 and 3, we nd some evi-
dence of increases in the debt ratio being positively related to the probability of
unconventional eects in States 3 and 4.
Using the dierence between the real interest rate and the GDP growth rate
as a measure of scal pressure (i.e., FPt ￿ rt ￿4yt) reveals a strong link between
the dynamics of public debt and regime probabilities, especially for Sample 3. A
positive rt￿4yt implies that, for a given primary decit, the debt ratio is increas-
ing over time. In fact, we nd for Sample 3 a signicantly negative relationship
between rt ￿ 4yt and the probability of State 1, and a signicantly positive re-
lationship between rt ￿ 4yt and the probabilities of States 3 and 4. The same is
valid for Sample 2, although in this case we nd a surprisingly negative estimate
for the probability of s4. For Sample 1, in spite of the expected signs, no signicant
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Finally, we investigate the role of the primary decit ratio (Dt{Yt) as a mea-
sure of scal pressure. For Sample 1, the linear case shows a strong relationship
between the primary decit and regime probabilities; large primary decits are
negatively related to periods of conventional eects (s1) and positively associated
with regimes of unconventional eects (s3 and s4). Interacting the primary decit
with a dummy capturing unsustainable periods does not aect the results. For
Sample 3, in contrast, the primary decit is not related to the states probabili-
ties in the linear case. Once interacted, however, the primary decit is found to
be negatively related to regime s1 and positively related to regimes s3 and s4 in
periods of unsustainable public debt.
5.4.5 Bringing the Results Together
Figure 5.5 summarizes our main empirical ndings. The dashed line plots the
dierence between the real interest rate and the real GDP growth rate (`interest-
growth dierence', for short), rt ￿ 4yt, which captures the dynamics of the debt
ratio [recall equation (5.24)]. For the rst sample (1960:1-1979:4), this dierence
is mostly negative, generating the downward sloping path of the debt ratio shown
in Figure 5.1. For the second sample (1980:1-2008:4), however, the interest-growth
dierence is mostly positive, giving rise to the fast increase in the debt ratio expe-
rienced especially in the 1980s and rst half of the 1990s. Also plotted in Figure
5.5 (solid lines) are the regime-switching eects of the scal policy shocks, for
Sample 1 (1960:1-1979:4) and Sample 3 (1983:1-2008:4),15 obtained by weighting
the state-specic estimates using the state (smoothed) probabilities. Two gen-
eral conclusions are worth noting. First, all scal policy shocks generate eects
that alternate over time between positive and negative. Second, unconventional
eects of scal policy shocks are more frequent and more pronounced for Sample
3|during which the interest-growth was mostly positive|than for Sample 1.
In accordance with our theoretical model, the eects of government consump-
tion are mainly positive for Sample 1. For Sample 3, we nd that these eects
are strongly negative in periods of large interest-growth dierence (namely, 1985-
88, 1991, 1994-96, 2000-01, and 2008), and positive in periods of low or declining
interest-growth dierences (especially, 1991-94, 1997-00, and 2001-06). Likewise,
the eects of government investment are by and large conventionally positive for
15We focus here on Sample 3 because, as discussed in Section 5.4.3, the rst two years of the
1980s blur the distinction between conventional and unconventional eects.Section 5.4 | Estimation Results 145
































































































Notes: The dashed line shows the dierence between the long-term real interest rate and the
rate of growth of real GDP. The solid line denotes the time-varying eects of each scal policy
variable, which are computed by weighting the state-specic estimates using the smoothed state
probabilities. We plot the results for a 4-regime model (K ￿ 4) using samples 1960:1-1979:4
(column (3) of Table 5.3) and 1983:1-2008:4 (column (6) of Table 5.4). Both variables are
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Sample 1, and more frequently unconventional for Sample 3. The relationship
with the interest-growth dierences is not so clear-cut, despite the negative eects
in period 1985-88 and positive eects in period 2001-2004. A possible explana-
tion is the heterogeneous nature of public investment, whose supply-side eects
on output|or the households' perception about them|can greatly dier across
projects.16 In general, however, shocks to government investment have more con-
ventionally positive eects than shocks to government consumption for Sample 3,
which is consistent with gi ¡ gc (see equation (5.17) and Panel (b) of Figure
5.5).
From a theoretical point of view, the results regarding the eect of taxes are
perhaps more relevant, as they confront two opposing views: Keynesian and Ri-
cardian. Panel (c) of Figure 5.5 shows, however, that this eect is not always
negative or neutral. Rather, it oscillates between negative and positive, averag-
ing out at about zero. In light of these results, the empirical support commonly
found for the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis using linear models should not be
surprising. Unlike that of government spending, the change in the eect of tax
shocks from Sample 1 to Sample 3 is not so dramatic. We do nevertheless nd a
slight level shift; for Sample 1, tax eects uctuate between -0.02 and 0.01, while
for Sample 2 they oscillate between -0.01 and 0.02. More importantly, the eect of
tax shocks is positively correlated with the interest-growth dierence, especially
for Sample 3. This is particularly clear in periods 1985-88, 1991, 1994-96, and
2000-01, when the interest-growth dierence was large and the eect of taxes was
unconventionally positive.
To better grasp the size of the eects of scal policy on long-term interest
rates, we convert the estimates so as to give the impact (in basis points) of a
shock of one percent of GDP to each scal variable. Our estimates imply that, for
example, in the the last quarter of 2007, a government consumption shock would
have raised interest rates by 34 basis points. A similar shock to taxes would have
decreased interest rates by 31 basis points.17 In the rst quarter of 2008, when the
Bush Administration announced the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, these eects
would have switched to -141 and 64 basis points, respectively. The response of
16Technically, this corresponds to assuming that gi in (5.17) is project specic. Because public
investment stimulates output also via aggregate supply, the output eects of public investment
are likely to be more heterogeneous than those of government consumption.
17The size of the long-term interest rate eect of the government consumption shock is roughly
in line with that found by Canzoneri et al. (2002), whereas the eect of the tax shock is about
twice as large. Gale and Orszag (2003) review other empirical studies nding similar eects.Section 5.5 | Conclusions 147
interest rates to a government investment shock would be much more pronounced,
however, switching from -300 to 38 basis points. In the third quarter of 2007,
a shock to public investment of one percent of GDP would impact long-term
interest rates by 6 percentage points. Being about twenty times larger than the
eect of a similar shock to government consumption, the size of this eect in one
single quarter seems implausibly large. Spillover eects from public investment to
private investment|which have been abstracted from in the empirical analysis|
may explain this outcome.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter argues that the eects of scal policy shocks on long-term inter-
est rates are nonlinear. We show that the presence of Ricardian and liquidity-
constrained households together with distortionary taxation gives rise to uncon-
ventional interest rate eects|i.e., scal expansions (contractions) lower (raise)
interest rates|when expected future taxes are high. We document these ndings
using quarterly data for the United States (1960:1-2008:4). We apply Markov-
switching methods on a VAR model to endogenously detect periods of unconven-
tional interest rate eects of unexpected scal policy changes. The eects of scal
policy shocks are found to switch sign across regimes. If a linear model is esti-
mated, however, these eects average out to small and statistically insignicant
magnitudes. This observation is particularly relevant for the eect of taxes, as it
suggests that the empirical support commonly found for the Ricardian equivalence
hypothesis using linear models results from model misspecication. Also, we nd
that shocks to government consumption and public investment exert opposite ef-
fects on interest rates in most regimes, suggesting that households distinguish the
dierent role played by these two components of government spending in aecting
future output.
The main policy implication of the results presented in this chapter is that
debt matters. At times of low scal stress|i.e., when the public debt-to-GDP
ratio is low or declining|debt-nanced increases in government spending or tax
cuts have positive eects on long-term real interest rates. Although potentially
eective at stabilizing output in the short run, expansionary scal policy may
crowd-out private investment and reduce long-run growth. This long-run output148 Fiscal Policy and Long-Term Interest Rates | Chapter 5
eect depends to some extent on the reaction of the monetary authority; ac-
commodative monetary policy moderates the interest rate increase and limits the
pernicious crowding-out eects. In contrast, at times of a high or increasing pub-
lic debt-to-GDP ratio, expansionary scal policy reduces long-term real interest
rates. However, this unconventional interest rate eect does not suggest that the
government should pursue debt-nanced expansionary scal policy when the level
of public debt is high. In fact, if investors perceive public debt to be unsustain-
able, the risk premium imposed on government bonds may more than oset the
fall in real interest rates. For this reason, the U.S. evidence documented in this
chapter should not be generalized to European countries such as Greece, Ireland,
or Portugal, which currently face extremely high interest rates on government debt
mainly through severe increases in the risk premium.
The results in this chapter are not without limitations, however. First, it is de-
batable whether VAR-based unexpected changes are not anticipated by the public.
In fact, Perotti (2005) nds, for the United States, that VAR-based innovations
to taxes are correlated with OECD forecasts. One alternative approach would be
to use Romer and Romer's (2010) narrative account of tax changes in the United
States to distinguish anticipated and surprise tax shocks, as in Mertens and Ravn
(2008). Second, this chapter nds implausibly large eects of public investment
shocks on interest rates. These large eects may be due to positive spillovers from
public to private investment (see, e.g., Bom, Heijdra and Ligthart, 2010a). Fur-
ther work on the relationship between public investment and interest rates seems
necessary. Finally, impulse responses could be obtained from the VAR model af-
ter imposing some identication strategy. Perotti (2004, 2005) and Caldara and
Kamps (2008) provide several alternative identication strategies for (linear) VAR
models similar to ours. We intend to deal with these issues in future work.
5.A Appendix
This Appendix provides further details on log-linearization and solution of the
model described in Section 5.2.1, and discusses in more detail data sources and
denitions.Section 5.A | Appendix 149
5.A.1 Log-Linearization
This section derives the log-linear approximations of the relevant equations of the
3-period model. Below, we ignore that the log-linear equations are valid only as
approximations and write them as equalities. Unless otherwise mentioned, lower
case variables denote natural logarithms of upper case variables.
Let us exemplify the log-linearization procedure for the generic function Zt ￿
FpVtq, for t ￿ 1;2;3. First, take logarithms on both sides of the equation to
get zt ￿ lnFpexppvtqq. Next, take a rst-order Taylor approximation around the
expectations at time 1 to arrive at











It follows from (5.26) that, for t ¡ 1,
E1zt ￿ lnFpexppE1vtqq; (5.28)
E2zt ￿ lnFpexppE1vtqq ￿ !zv;tpE2vt ￿ E1vtq; (5.29)
so that, approximately,
zt ￿ E1zt ￿ !zv;tpvt ￿ E1vtq; (5.30)
E2zt ￿ E1zt ￿ !zv;tpE2vt ￿ E1vtq: (5.31)
Dening the surprise to variable j in period 2 by e
j
2 ￿ j2￿E1j2, and the expectation
update for period 3|given the arrival of new information in period 2|by u
j
3 ￿
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5.A.2 Log-Linearized Model
We start by looking at the update in expectations of future consumption by Ri-
cardian households from period 1 to period 2. Imposing F3 ￿ 0 on (5.4), log-
linearizing and rearranging gives
u
cu
3 ￿ p1 ￿ q!cy;3u
y
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!yg;3 ￿ exppE1pg3 ￿ y3qq; !yx;3 ￿ exppE1px3 ￿ y3qq; ~ 3 ￿ 2exppE1x3q:













!xg;3 ￿ exppE1pg3 ￿ x3qq; !xb;3 ￿ exppE1pb2 ￿ x3qq;






The unexpected change in the stock of debt in period 2 is derived from the











!bg;2 ￿ exppE1pg2 ￿ r2 ￿ b2qq; !bx;2 ￿ exppE1px2 ￿ r2 ￿ b2qq:Section 5.A | Appendix 151
To derive the unexpected change in the real interest rate, we log-linearize and















!ry;2 ￿ exppE1py2 ￿ a2 ￿ r2qq; !rc;2 ￿ exppE1pc
u
2 ￿ a2 ￿ r2qq;
!rx;2 ￿ exppE1px2 ￿ a2 ￿ r2qq; !rg;2 ￿ exppE1pg2 ￿ a2 ￿ r2qq:










We seek a quasi-reduced form equation for the unexpected change in the real
interest rate as a function of the unexpected shocks to government spending and
taxes. Solving the system of equations consisting of (5.34)-(5.39) gives
e
r
2 ￿  rg;2e
g
2 ￿  rx;2e
x
2 ￿  ry;2e
y
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; (5.42)
 ry;2 ￿ 
p1 ￿ q!ry;2; (5.43)
 ra;2 ￿ 
p1 ￿ !rc;2!ca;3q; (5.44)
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We assume that 
 ¡ 0. A sucient condition for this is that  ¡ !cb;3r￿p1￿q~ 3s.
Under non-distortionary taxes (i.e., ~ 3 ￿ 0), this boils down to  ¡ !cb;3. If taxes
are distortionary, ~ 3 ¡ {p1 ￿ q suces.
5.A.4 Data Sources and Denitions
We collected time-series data from two sources. Data on scal variables, public sav-
ing, private saving, output and price level come from the NIPA tables published by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data on nominal interest rates, population and
public debt are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis' ALFRED
database. Table 5.A.1 shows the denitions and sources of the time-series data
used in the empirical analysis.
All series from the NIPA tables are expressed at annual rates. We transform
them to quarterly rates by dividing by 4. All scal variables are dened at the
level of the general government. Output, government spending and its components
(government consumption and government investment), and net taxes are dened
in real per capita terms; we deate the series using the price level and divide by
population. Private saving, public saving, the primary budget decit and public
debt are scaled by nominal GDP. Quarterly data for public debt are only available
from 1966:1 onward.
We dene the ination rate as the rate of change of the price level (GDP
deator). The rate of growth of real GDP is given by the rate of change of
quarterly GDP deated by the price level. Data for short- and long-term nominal
interest rates are monthly and are originally expressed at percent per annum;
we transform them to quarterly rates expressed in decimals by averaging over
a quarter and dividing by 400. The short-term (ex-post) real interest rate is
calculated by subtracting the rate of ination from the short-term nominal interest
rate.Section 5.A | Appendix 153
Table 5.A.1: Data Sources and Denitions
Variable Denition Source
Output `Gross Domestic Output' (A191RC1) NIPA Table 1.1.5
Government
spending





`Federal' gross investment (A823RC1) plus




Government spending minus government in-
vestment
|
Net taxes `Government current receipts' (W021RC1)
minus `Current transfer payments'
(A084RC1) minus `Interest payments'
(A180RC1)
NIPA Table 3.1





`Current expenditures' (W022RC1) minus
`Current receipts' (W021RC1) minus `Interest
Payments' (A180RC1) plus `Interest and mis-
cellaneous receipts' (W059RC1)
NIPA Table 3.1
Private saving `Net private saving' (W202RC1) NIPA Table 5.1
Public saving `Net government Saving' (A922RC1) NIPA Table 5.1
Population `Civilian Noninstitutional Population'
(CNP16OV)
ALFRED










`10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate'
(GS10)
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